Equilibrium balking strategies for a clearing queueing system in alternating environment.
Citation:
Economou A, Manou A. Equilibrium balking strategies for a clearing queueing system in alternating environment. Annals of Operations Research [Internet]. 2013;208(1):489-514.
We consider a Markovian clearing queueing system, where the customers are accumulated according to a Poisson arrival process and the server removes all present customers at the completion epochs of exponential service cycles. This system may represent the visits of a transportation facility with unlimited capacity at a certain station. The system evolves in an alternating environment that influences the arrival and the service rates. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk, based on a natural linear reward-cost structure. We study the balking behavior of the customers and derive the corresponding Nash equilibrium strategies under various levels of information.
