@article {18343,
	title = {Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?},
	journal = {Operations Research},
	volume = {62},
	year = {2014},
	pages = {910-925},
	abstract = {We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1280},
	author = {Manou, A. and Economou, A. and Karaesmen, F.}
}
