<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Manou, A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Economou, A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Karaesmen, F.</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Operations Research</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1280</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">62</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">910-925</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record></records></xml>