GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RUSSO-AMERICAN ENERGY ANTAGONISM IN THE SUB-SYSTEM OF THE BALKANS IN THE GREATER SYSTEM OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

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Abstract-Introduction: During the last months the Geopolitical Complex of the Mediterranean features an ongoing upheaval in the Western Balkans region, part of the Geopolitical Sub-system of the Balkans. Greece has the ambiguous privilege of forming the intersection of two unstable Sub-systems of the Mediterranean Geopolitical Complex, i.e.:

i. the Sub-system of the Balkans and
ii. the Sub-system of Turkey and the Near East.

We shall demonstrate that these two Sub-systems feature an intense joint function of instability in the present juncture and we shall also emphasize the main Geopolitical Factor that causes the aforementioned instability, i.e. energy security. Furthermore, we shall lay emphasis on the new Cold War-style antagonism between the two fundamental Poles of International Power, i.e. Moscow and Washington, an antagonism affecting in a destabilizing manner the Geopolitical Complex of the Mediterranean and in the Western Balkans regions as a main focal point. The term new Cold War-style is used so as to highlight the fact that there exists a considerable ideological distance between these two Poles (the same applies albeit in a different manner for the relations between Washington and Beijing), as was the case during the Cold War. The ideological difference in this case consists of the contrast between the neoliberal Western approach and the identitarian conservative approach of the East spearheaded by Moscow.

Our analysis is based on the classic Anglo-Saxon geopolitical school and especially on N.J. Spykman’s «containment model», as the latter has been modified by Z. Brzesinsky. Our methodological approach is based on Systemic Geopolitical Analysis.

Key words: Geopolitical Analysis, Western Balkans, Energy security, Mediterranean, Russo-American Energy Antagonism

I. Eastern Europe and the Balkans: Unstable Balance and Power Redistribution

I.1 The Balkan Sub-system concerning the actions of Washington

i. The first action against Russian power projection was loss of Russian influence over Montenegro, a country with Slav-Orthodox population. Montenegro became a member of NATO in 2017.

ii. The second action against Moscow was the downfall of the pro-Russian government of Gruevski in FYROM and the gradual reorientation of FYROM under the new government.

iii. The third action consists of the recently adopted by US Congress executive orders that introduce sanctions against the Russian Federation. It should be noted that the sanctions were adopted despite President Trump’s objection by a wide margin of 98 to 2 and having already been adopted by the House of Representatives with 419 votes in favor and 3 against.1

In general NATO expansion in the Balkans and Eastern Europe has led to inclusion of thirteen new

member-states during a period of eighteen years (March 1999-June 2017), thereby excluding vast regions of vital interest for Russian economy from Moscow’s influence.

This coherent and strategic surrounding of Russia by NATO and its allies in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe is a faithful fulfillment of Spykman’s theoretical model of Rimland and the geostrategic approach of the diplomat George Kennan and his theoretical successor Zbigniew Brzezinsky. Such an intention can be clearly deduced from the text itself of the recent US sanctions against the Russian Federation. Article 254 reads as follows: “Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017” (Tuesday 3 January, 115th Congress of USA) SEC. 254. Coordinating aid and assistance across Europe and Eurasia. (a) Authorization of appropriations. – There are authorized to be appropriated for the Countering Russian Influence Fund $250,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019. (b) Use of funds. – Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund shall be used to effectively implement, prioritized in the following order and subject to the availability of funds, the following goals: (1) To assist in protecting critical infrastructure and electoral mechanisms from cyberattacks in the following countries: (A) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union that the Secretary of State determines – (i) are vulnerable to influence by the Russian Federation [A.N.: A rhetorical question: which states are implied?]; and (ii) lack the economic capability to effectively respond to aggression by the Russian Federation without the support of the United States. (B) Countries that are participating in the enlargement process of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia [A.N.: i.e. FYROM], Moldova, Kosovo, Serbia, and Ukraine [A.N.: Interesting concerning future planning in the region]. (2) To combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries and prosecutors general offices in the countries described in paragraph (1). (3) To respond to the humanitarian crises and instability caused or aggravated by the invasions and occupations of Georgia and Ukraine by the Russian Federation. (4) To improve participatory legislative processes and legal education, political transparency and competition, and compliance with international obligations in the countries described in paragraph (1).(5) To build the capacity of civil society, media, and other non-governmental organizations countering the influence and propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat corruption, prioritize access to truthful information, and operate freely in all regions in the countries described in paragraph(1).

Russia attempts to respond to these NATO advances by resorting to its comparative advantages in the region, mainly energy and especially natural gas that forms one fourth of European energy consumption. It should be noted in this context that Gazprom supplied the EU with one third of this quantity. Given the compulsory reduction of electric energy from coal due to EU quotas and NATO policy concerning energy security in Europe the Balkan states face a serious energy dilemma that is driven to a solution dictated by US and NATO interests. Croatia, a EU member has to align itself to this policy, while other states of Western Balkans aspiring to become EU members have to reorient their policies accordingly.

It is also clear that NATO assumes that Russia’s ability of a future energy influence over Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM and Bulgaria can be easily transformed into political influence; such a perspective is annoying to Washington given also the Cold War climate that the Congress insists on maintaining against the Russian Federation.

NATO’s geostrategic response vis-à-vis existing or possible Russian influence in the Western Balkans is developed on two levels:

1. Energy security, through the following pipes:

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2. On March 12 1999 the Czech republic, Hungary, Poland entered NATO, being followed in March 2004 by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, by Albania and Croatia on April 2009 and lastly by Montenegro on June 2017.
3. A.N. = Author’s Note (I.Th. Mazis).
5. A.N. Russia can exert political influence over Bosnia-Herzegovina through the constituent polity of Republika Srpska.
i. Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP, connecting Turkey-Greece-Albania-Italy) due to be completed until 2020.

ii. Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline (IAP), an extension of TAP that shall be bi-directional and will be divided in a LNG terminal on the island of Krk of Croatia and shall supply Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania and FYROM. Construction of the LNG terminal shall cost 630 million Euros and 50% of the expenses shall be covered by the EU, while it holds a capacity of 4-6 billion m³. The Croatian government seeks strategic investors that shall also act as common owners of the whole project. It should also be noted that Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, FYROM and Montenegro, assisted by USAID, signed in May 2017 an agreement for the construction of this project, so as to reduce their energy dependency from Russia. Serbia and Romania did not sign this agreement.

iii. the general Western energy planning includes the development of the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline (EastMed). The pipeline was approved in April 2017 with a Common Statement by the Ministers of Energy of Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Israel during a ministerial meeting in Tel Aviv and in the presence of the European Commissioner Miguel Arias Canete. The EastMed Pipeline belongs to the European program Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). According to studies and the reports by the companies Intecsea and C&M and IHS-Cera it has been proved that this pipeline is: a) technically feasible, b) economically viable and of a lower cost in comparison to other planned pipelines and c) complementary to other export options. It should also be noted that on the basis of the certified existing resources in the Levantine basin and in the EEZ of the Cyprus Republic this pipeline could provide 30 billion m³/year to the international markets. Such estimation does not include the remaining fields in the area or the Egyptian deposits in Al Zor that shall be transported in a variety of ways to the international markets, i.e. as LNG or through EastMed.

The strategic importance of this pipeline for Greece and the Cyprus Republic but also for Israel and Egypt under al-Sisi (and not under Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood), as well as the influence of oil companies that have or shall invest in the EEZ of the Cyprus Republic have been triumphantly manifested during the recent series of Turkish provocations in the region. The author of this paper had emphasized this strategic importance many years ago and considers himself justified.

2. Relevant methods on a political level.

Serbia shall be the first field of confrontation between Moscow and Washington in this regard. Moscow cannot allow a pressure on Serbia as had happened in 1999. If tension arose in Serbia, this could lead to a general conflict in the Balkans and perhaps in other parts of Europe.

2. Poles of International Power and their Action in the Sub-systems: Behavior and Rationality Analysis

2.1 Description of Moscow’s Behavior and Evaluation of its Rationality

Russian Federation can respond to the aforementioned exclusion initiated by Washington in only one peaceful manner, i.e. with the Turkstream pipeline, a project jointly decided by Russia and Turkey in October 2016. Announcement of new sanctions imposed on Nord Stream II has led Russia to speed up construction of Turkish Stream in the Black Sea, a work under progress. Since May 2017 Swiss Allseas that has taken on the project from Gazprom, has already constructed 15 miles of the undersea pipeline. The first of these two parallel pipelines shall be wholly functional by March 2018, while the second by 2019. Planned yearly capacity of each branch shall be 15.75 billion m³ or 32 billion m³ for both branches.

6. TAP’s shareholding is comprised of BP (20%), SOCAR (20%), Snam S.p.A. (20%), Fluxys (19%), Enagás (16%) and Axpo (5%).

This pipeline is supported by Serbia as a gesture of coordination with Russia, still it does not seem possible that the pipeline shall reach Serbia due to a variety of geostrategic issues, such as:

i. Relations between Turkey and the EU have reached their lowest point ever. Withdrawal of German military personnel from Incirlik and Konya is a clear indication.

ii. Relations between Turkey and the US feature tensions. The US withdraws gradually its forces from Incirlik seeking new facilities in an expanded base in Suda, Crete.

iii. Turkish interest to obtain Russian weapons’ systems, such as S-400, shall endanger Turkish relations with NATO and its political addendum, the EU.

iv. Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and the connection of the latter with UCK, as well as Turkish involvement with the Islamic State and other jihadist groups in Syria.

Moscow faces a double irrational model concerning its Balkan policy:

iv.1. the vision of a Greater Albania that shall include Kossovo and the Serbian valley of Presevo is contrary to Russian interests and undermines the core of its defensive strategy vis-à-vis expansion of NATO influence in the Western Balkans and in the possible corridors of Russian energy pipelines towards the EU. Creation of a Greater Albania with Turkish support shall lead to entry of Albania into NATO and the EU after a while!

iv.2. How shall Moscow respond to a strong influence exerted by militant Salafist elements ante portas? To what degree can Moscow disregard Turkey’s support and instrumentalization of jihadist Islam?

The answer is that Moscow has to receive considerable compensation and assurances concerning this irrational nexus of relations with its Turkish ally, especially concerning Turkish support for Islamo-fascist groups in Syria.

a. Syria is the region where fundamental Russian strategic interests in the SE Mediterranean are at stake: i) regaining part of its previous (Soviet) influence on the Arab-Muslim world, ii) access to Syria’s natural gas, iii) on the Shiite corridor of Iran’s natural gas towards the Mediterranean (Tehran-Damascus-Lebanon) and iv) on power projection towards a key strategic point in the Middle East that protects Western interests, i.e. the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf.

b. Russia faces a war concerning its soft power and status as a superpower in a reforming international environment. This war causes serious economic damage to Russia, which is already isolated on an economic level.

c. Moscow has taken into serious consideration US support for a Kurdish state in northern Syria. In August 2017 State Department and Pentagon officials met in Raqqa with Kurds belonging to PYD/YPG. The US officials reportedly promised creation of a Kurdish state in northern Syria within six months according to international practice. Moscow seems to have encouraged Ankara to announce cease of support for revel Islamist groups in Syria and start of talks for preserving the integrity of the Syrian state.

Turkey also seems to face a grave geostrategic dilemma, as through such a strategy it opposes both US and NATO interests:

iv. 3. Turkey revises its policy in the Balkans against NATO policy in the Western Balkans.

iv. 4. Turkey distances itself from those elements that until now allowed Turkish power to be projected onto the Adriatic Sea, with naval forces in the port of Vlore (Avlon). NATO support for Turkey cannot be guaranteed from now on given its anti-Western and anti-NATO behavior.

v. TAP shall in all probability be cancelled. TAP aimed to secure European energy security and independence from Russian natural gas. This marks a complete reverse of US and NATO strategic planning concerning supply of energy for the EU!

vi. Azeri energy deposits lose their relevant value in this context and shall have to be transported to-

9. Ibid.
wards the EU through another route, i.e. through the planned pipeline linking Burhas and Alexandroupolis. This pipeline supported by the US towards Athens and Sofia, as well as by the composition of the consortium, shall serve Western interests in a satisfying manner.

d. In light of the above, the Islamo-fascist regime in Ankara does not seem to last long.

2.2 Description of Washington’s Behavior and Evaluation of its Rationality

Washington has never ceased to implement a policy of power projection inside the Rimland. This policy has been influenced by the models developed by Spykman and Brzezinsky, while US bureaucracy still has not accepted President Trump’s views on the matter of US-Russia rapprochement.

a. Washington acts according to a primordial expansionist rationalism that evolves into irrationality given the explicit German and secondary French reactions. The European dipole of Germany and France has witnessed considerable reduction of its influence.

b. Washington’s irrational behavior (as formulated by the system Bush Jr.-Obama-Clinton) is enhanced due to certain issues in the region.

The first group of these issues concern handling of Albanian-Islamist nationalism:

1. Handling of issues related to Albanian-Islamist nationalism:
   i. How shall Washington deal with a possible rule or considerable influence of militant Salafist elements of Daesh and Al Qaeda in a Greater Albania that shall belong to the institutional framework of NATO and the EU?
   ii. How shall Washington convince the European allies concerning a European cooperation that shall lead to a tremendous increase of Islamist jihadist elements inside the institutional framework of the EU?
   iii. To what degree will Washington be able to effectively control the instrumentalization of jihadist Islam by an anti-American, anti-Semitic and Islamist “allied” Turkey controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and under Qatar influence? Qatar was in turn recently isolated by the other Gulf countries, US and Israel as a ‘promoter of international terrorism’.

The second group of these issues concern handling of Albanian-Islamist nationalism in relation to the name dispute between FYROM and Greece:

2. Handling of issues related to Albanian-Islamist nationalism and the proposed name of FYROM:
   i. An eventual name in the version of Upper Macedonia would allow for an immediate expansionist agenda put forth by Skopje concerning a ‘Macedonian national identity’ and subsequently to high diplomatic tension between FYROM and Greece inside NATO. Upper Macedonia as a term does not exclude such an expansionist agenda.
   ii. Ankara could interfere in this dispute in a variety of manners using among other tools the network of the Muslim Brotherhood –funded by Qatar- to conduct covert operations of destabilization inside Greece and primarily in Western Thrace, a region that features a corresponding network of subversion based on the Turkish Consulate.
   iii. Such an event would undermine the unstable relations between Greece and Turkey inside NATO and would offer a window of opportunity for external actors.
   iv. As the issues of North Korea, Syria, Iran, Venezuela and Kurdistan remain open, NATO would not profit from such tension at the SE Wing of the Alliance.
   v. An appropriate name for FYROM should not be based on imaginary national or ethnic affiliations; rather it should keep a balance between the Albanian-speaking and the Slavic-speaking element. Such a name could be Centro balkan Republic/Republique Centra balkane, a name that suitably allows for the preservation of identitarian cultural elements of the composing ethnic groups and serves to identify the new state in a geographical manner. Such a name could be based on the existing example on an international level of the Central African Republic/Republique Centrafricaine. It also allows NATO to claim a considerable success in the Balkan region at least on matters of semiotics.
   vi. The name Upper Macedonia poses an additional problem, this time for Serbia. The northernmost
limits of Upper Macedonia cannot be properly defined and could include (as Albanian nationalists claim) even the Serbian valley of Preševo. If the Albanian-speaking element of FYROM that currently supports the government in Skopje resumes the ‘Macedonian’ dimension of an imaginary ethnic affinity, it could claim a part of Serbia using the same tools (i.e. Turkey, UCK, jihadists). What would Russia’s response then be and what would that mean for security and stability in the SE Europe?

In conclusion and given the above remarks, a Greek proposal concerning the name of FYROM could be the one mentioned above. Other perspectives pose serious immediate and long-range dangers of destabilization for all interested parts and especially for the Poles of International Power, i.e. Moscow and Washington.

2.3 Description of Berlin’s Behavior and Evaluation of its Rationality

1. Berlin reacts, as German economic interests are damaged, such as a) the consortium of Nordstream II whose President is the former Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, and b) the Blue Stream project (Article 232), that shall supply Turkey with Russian natural gas through the Black Sea. This project involves German interests.

2. Despite the sanctions on Russia the US has reserved for itself the privilege of conducting cooperation between US and Russian companies in the Arctic Circle with no obstacles; after a relevant demand by US companies, Russian cooperating companies in these consortia can keep 33% of their shares (Article 223d).

The Social Democratic Party (SPD) through Sigmar Gabriel, Foreign Minister of Germany, and Brigitte Zypries, Minister for Economics and Energy, has referred disapprovingly to those US provisions that allow US companies to obtain a comparative advantage in relation to Russian ones concerning European import of hydrocarbon. US actions thus promote dependence of European economies on cheaper

10. “Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017”, (Tuesday 3 January, 115th Congress of USA), SEC. 232. Sanctions with respect to the development of pipelines in the Russian Federation. (a) In general. The President, in coordination with allies of the United States, may impose five or more of the sanctions described in section 235 with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment described in subsection (b) or sells, leases, or provides to the Russian Federation, for the construction of Russian energy export pipelines, goods, services, technology, information, or support described in subsection (c): (1) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more; or (2) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair market value of $5,000,000 or more. (b) Investment described. An investment described in this subsection is an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of the ability of the Russian Federation to construct energy export pipelines. (c) Goods, services, technology, information, or support described. Goods, services, technology, information, or support described in this subsection are goods, services, technology, information, or support that could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the construction, modernization, or repair of energy export pipelines by the Russian Federation.

11. “Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017”, SEC. 223. Modification of implementation of Executive Order No. 13662. [a, b, c ] (d) Modification of directive 4.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall modify Directive 4, dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order No. 13662, or any successor directive (which shall be effective beginning on the date that is 90 days after the date of such modification), to ensure that the directive prohibits the provision, exportation, or reexportation, directly or indirectly, by United States persons or persons within the United States, of goods, services (except for financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production for new deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects— (1) that have the potential to produce oil; and (2) that involve any person determined to be subject to the directive or the property or interests in property of such a person who has a controlling interest or a substantial non-controlling ownership interest in such a project defined as not less than a 33 percent interest.[https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3364/text#toc-H954BE429129341AB9D32B2D4775AA845, accessed: 8-08-2017]
shale gas and oil that has begun to be exported by the US in a reversion of European dependency routes. Mrs Zypries has also stated that US Sanctions on Russia are a violation of international law and that “the Americans cannot punish German companies because they operate economically in another country. There are (partnerships) for natural gas and petroleum pipelines (in the region),” Zypries further added that Germany doesn’t want a trade war and has repeatedly, and on different levels, urged the Americans not to leave the line of common sanctions. Zypries also asked the European Commission to look into possible countermeasures against the United States, following tough sanctions against Russia that could potentially hit European companies. There is an understanding that with the new restrictive measures the US is trying to push forward its own interests in the energy sector, Die Welt quoted Michael Harms, Managing Director of the German Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations, as saying: «The sought [after] sanctions against pipeline projects are designed to boost energy exports from the US to Europe, create jobs in the US, and strengthen US foreign policy.» Harms said. Harms thinks that the US targets specifically German companies that participate in the Nord Stream II consortium in the North Sea. Implementation of these measures would be ‘a fundamental intervention concerning EU energy supply and would lead to rise of prices and reduction of the capabilities of European economy’.

2.4 The French case

The French company TOTAL has huge interests concerning investments in the Arctic Circle, namely “export and production of LNG in a quantity of 16.5 million tons per year in a very difficult region from a geophysical point of view. The French company has created a huge and highly complex workplace in the Arctic Circle in an investment of 25.2 billion Euros or 27 billion US$ that has been subsidized by the Russian company Novatek (50,1 %), by TOTAL itself (20 %), by China National Petroleum Company (20 %) and by the Silk Road Fund (9,9 %). This project shall acquire until 2021 15 icebreakers LNG 299m in length and 50m in width to boost production. These giant-sized constructions cost 300 million US$ and shall be able to safely cross an ice sheet 1.5 m in width at a temperature of -50°, in order to transport 170.000m³ of LNG at a temperature of -160°.”

This huge investment could be undermined. TOTAL is also affected due to sanctions imposed on Iran [H.R.3364 — 115th Congress (2017-2018)]. Since June 2016 the French company had announced signing of an agreement of 4.8 billion US$ in cooperation with the Chinese company CNPCI concerning Iranian natural gas. TOTAL would thus be the first European company that returned in Iran since 1979. The agreement was signed despite US sanctions on Iran. The consortium is composed as follows: TOTAL 50.1%, CNPCI 30% and Iranian Petropars 19.9%. European concerns are legitimate in this case also.

2.5 Conclusions

European reactions, specifically reactions by huge European oil companies, could alter US sanctions to a degree. Such an outcome could ironically enough reinforce the position of President Donald J. Trump who was undermined by the system of Obama and Clinton, a system supported by all European governments. Times are changing indeed.

Concerning Greece we could note the following:

15. A.N. TOTAL holds 19% of Russian NOVATEK.
i. If Suda (Crete) becomes the station that shall hold US nuclear weapons transferred from Incirlik, Greece’s geostrategic position as an important ally of NATO shall be greatly elevated. This could be achieved if Washington offers the current Greek government considerable privileges that shall allow for the ratification of said agreement in the Greek Parliament.

ii. In such an environment new and better perspectives rise concerning solution of the Cyprus Issue or the name dispute with FYROM. In the latter case if Greece insists on “a composite name with a geographical determinant” and does not repeat the common and unanimous decision of political leaders of 1992 under the Presidency of the late Konstantinos Karamanlis, there shall not be another chance that shall serve Greek interests.

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