

XXI. Greece's New Defence Doctrine: A Framework Proposal

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The views presented in this text are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defence Analyses Institute or of the Ministry of National Defence.

Introduction

I. General Remarks and Assumptions

Generally speaking, the drafting of a Defence Doctrine follows the drafting and adoption, on the part of a government, of a National Se-

curity Policy, which includes the statement of the country's Defence Policy and, consequently, its Defence Doctrine.

In order to clarify the theoretical premises of the aims underlying the drafting of the Defence Doctrine, a set of definitions must be presented in detail.

It should be stressed that this framework proposal, by its very nature, cannot be considered to imply a detailed presentation of the country's New Defence Doctrine. It simply aims to outline the essential parameters which, in the eyes of its authors, should be considered by the country's political leadership so that the final drafting of this Chart will be both complete and effective in view of protecting our national interest in all its aspects.

II. On National Interests

The inherent interdependence, a feature of nowadays International Politics and Economy, is an undoubtedly serious challenge for the state actors of the international system, in the sense that the latter are called upon to both develop and exhibit a noteworthy capability to adapt and cooperate in order to best serve their national interests and aims.

However, this development is at the same time perceived by some scholars, opinion leaders, or even political officials as a proof of the alleged sustainability of the ideologeme of "international society".¹ In the light of such ideologemes, "Kant-, and even theology-inspired scholars of international relations"² assert an alleged withdrawal, up to the degree of total extinction, of the notion of National Interest, as well as the abolition of the Nation-State.

Certainly, it may be difficult to counter-argue the remark that, within the current international system the notion of National Interest is, day by day, hard to define,³ or at least to define in a unique sense. How-

1. I.Th. Mazis, *Geopolitics: Theory and Praxis*, Athens 2002, 182, note 3; 143 (in Greek).

2. I.Th. Mazis, *op.cit.*, 1.

3. On the terming of "National Interest", cf. the famous works of the founder of the science of International Politics and classical representative of the School of Political Realism, Hans J. Morgenthau: *In Defense of the National Interest*, New York 1951. Also: «The Problem of the National Interest», in: *Dilemmas of Politics*, Chicago 1958, Chapter 4. Also: *Macht and Frieder: Grundlegung einer*

ever, in the view of the School of Political Realism and Neo-realism,⁴ this is due not to the elimination of the National Interest (or even the Nation-State) but to the fact that the states, by means of participating in multilateral/international structures, International Regimes⁵ and New Poles of International Power Concentration,⁶ aim to serve increasingly (and in the wisest possible manner) their national interests, not explicitly and directly but through the influence the states exercise upon the common institutions and policies of the aforementioned multilateral/international structures.

In this sense, we should take into serious account the important remark of Hans-Dieter Heumann relating to the Politics of the so-called European Integration: “what is foremostly prohibited upon examining the Integrationspolitik, is its idealisation, as if it were a procedure within which National Power and National Interests have no role to play anymore”.⁷

Theorie der internationalen Politik, Gütersloh 1963. Also: *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*: New York 1978, 5th Edit. Cf. also Beard, Charles, *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy*, New York 1934. Also: Deutsch, Karl, *The Analysis of International Relations*, New York, 1978, particularly chapter 3. Also: Kindermann, Gottfried-Karl, *Grundelemente der Weltpolitik: Eine Einführung*, 4. Auflage, München/Zurich 1991, 19 ff.

4. On the School of Political Realism and of neo-Realism (Structural Realism), see the classical works of Hans J. Morgenthau and taken purely representatively and in addition to the works of Karl Deutsch and Gottfried-Karl Kindermann: Waltz, Kenneth N., *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York 1959. Also: Ibid, *Theory of International Politics*, New York 1979. Also: Keohane, Robert O. (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York 1986.
5. On international regimes, cf. Κουσκουβέλης, Ηλίας, *Διπλωματία και στρατηγική της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης* [Kouskouvelis, Elias I. (1995), *Diplomacy and Strategy of the EU*], 118. In relation to the (fully understandable and grounded) criticism of Prof. Kouskouvelis to the Political Realism and Neo-Realism, we should simply remind, at least with reference to the latter, the remark of Professor Kindermann, based on which Neo-Realism perceives "the concepts of Interest and Power as being variably multifunctional, in other words as related not only to political and military parameters, but also to economic and socio-cultural parameters" (Kindermann, *op. cit.*, 24).
6. On the New Poles of International Power Concentration cf. Mazis, *op. cit.*, 38 ff. and 138 ff.
7. Heumann, Hans-Dieter, «Nationale Interessen and Sicherheit in Europa», in the remarkable review of the German federal parliament *Aus Politik and Zeitgeschichte*, Nr. B 8/89, 17.2.1989, 14.

The author thinks that the “opposite is true”, and explains: “obviously, individual states try to exert their national influence on the common policy and on the community institutions. It is true that the aims of the European Union are formulated ever increasingly, both internationally and supra-nationally, but the motives and the directions derive from the national perspectives.⁸ Interstate and supranational treaties and agreements of a diplomatic, defence policy or financial character are made possible in case all the contracting nation states agree in principle, despite and regardless of partial disagreements. The states agree with the provision that the parties responsible consider that such an agreement serves in one way or another, in the short or in the long term, their National Interests (besides, this explicates the use of the term “common”, in lieu of “single”, “policy”).

Consequently, the doctrine of interdependent National Interests in the current international environment does apply, at least for the so-called Western republics or, in scientific terms, for the “social formations of the Aristotelian-Roman Jewish political philosophy.”⁹ However, the International Politics analyst should, from time to time, try to elucidate the web of the reputable “interdependence” by demystifying it, in order to be able to investigate the scope, the content, the power and the vulnerabilities of this impressive sequence in the light of the various national aims and interests before drawing sound scientific and political conclusions.

This is because the individual directions of the various national interests are to be usually found underneath the trivial term “interdependent interests”, as Christian Hacke observes.¹⁰ This is particularly true in terms of the Security Policy, whose scope is the primary concern of this paper, in that it constitutes, both “historically and politically, the kingdom of the Nation State” (Hacke). Security policy, in this sense, “even in an integrated Europe, has an essential national focus, until today”.¹¹

Consequently, the critical issue of our times in relation to the National Interest is to be found apart from the observation that the National Interest is becoming extinct - as usually claimed by the propo-

8. *Op.cit.*

9. Mazis, *op.cit.*, 144.

10. Hacke, Christian, «Nationale Interessen in einer interdependenten Welt» In: Kaiser, Karl / Krause, Joachim, *Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik, Band 3: Interessen und Strategien*, München 1996.

11. *Op.cit.*

nents of the Idealistic School. Actually, it has to deal with which of the individual national interests are “communized”, in other words which are the national interests that can be, or are indeed, subjected to the overlying interest of a new Pole of International Power Concentration, or even a new International Regime, not to the detriment of the core of the national interest of each state actor, but, on the contrary, to its additional benefit. The core in question is definitely what is known as “Security”, termed either as the security of a national territory in relation to an external threat, or as the protection of its established state order, of the way of life and of the prosperity of its citizens. Besides, nowadays, security is a lot more than external security per se. It is economic, environmental and human resource security.¹²

Consequently, the current perception of some scholars, opinion leaders and policy makers, of the participation of states in supranational formations, as being suggestive of the elimination of the National Interest (or even of the Nation-State), the typical example of which is the EU (“the multinational, and not supranational formation which has optimistically been termed as the European Union”)¹³ seems to ignore the fact that the evolution in question can be also read vice-versa. The proclaimed loss (even, partial) of National Power and the ceding of National Sovereignty (nominal or even practicable in many areas) mean also the addition of National Power and, in this sense, the extension of National Sovereignty.¹⁴

In this sense, it is fair for the attentive researcher of the international system to observe that the tolerances of the nation-state model are being questioned, without however being abolished.¹⁵ The Nation-State, instead of being dissolved or abolished (as the proponents of the secularized theology of the Totalitarian Meta-National Progressivism tirelessly claim),¹⁶ evolves and determines the conditions for its participation in New Poles of International Power Concentration and specifies the ex-

12. See: Liotta, P.H., «To Die For: National Interests and Strategic Uncertainties», in: *Parameters*, Summer 2000, 46-57.

13. Mazis, *op. cit.*, 181.

14. Kouskouvelis, *op. cit.*, 154.

15. Mazis, *op. cit.*, 144.

16. John Fonte prefers the term "Transnational Progressivism", while Panayiotis Kondylis speaks of "Progressivismus". For a complete critique of the trendy internationalist ideologies, see the renowned and voluminous work of Kondylis; in particular: Kondylis, Panajotis, *Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg*, Berlin 1992.

tent of the powers and authority that it will cede to these poles, having in mind that this process aims exactly at an “optimisation” (“*Optimierung*”, in the words of Prof. Hans-Peter Schwarz) of the promotion of its National Interests, both in substance, and methodologically-wise.

National Security Policy

The term *National Security Policy* is meant to describe the web of related actions which, based on the use of appropriate means, satisfy the security perception of a state and supersede every form of threat that is or tends to be expressed by internal or external factors against the national interests. This Policy is distinguished into four branches:

A.1. The branch of *Military Security Policy*, which, according to Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, relates to the confrontation of external threats through the harmonisation of policy options with the military means available.¹⁷

A.2. The branch of the national cohesion policy (*Situational Security Policy*), which relates to the confrontation of risks emanating from social, cultural, demographic, economic and ecological changes in the national context.

A.3. The branch of the *Homeland/Internal Security Policy*, which relates to the confrontation of risks of internal erosion and threat for national security. The internal security concept focuses in particular on the demographic, economic and geo-cultural changes that may constitute threats in the following aspects:

i. penetration of ethnic-cultural (“ethnic”/“religious”) conflicts into the context of the national geographical space, that may assume a dimension of terrorism and, by extension, of subversion;

ii. erosion of the social cohesion and breakage of the national social web, through the creation of non-integrative pockets of ethnic/religious groups that may lead to phenomena of “hot” radicalisation, resulting in risks for the Internal Security;

iii. creation of organized crime networks or cells (corruption, smuggling and sale of narcotics and psychotropic substances, human trafficking, smuggling of weapons and nuclear materials, etc.) by exploiting the needs of such ethnic/religious groups and cooperating with transna-

17. Cf. Sir B. Liddell-Hart, *Strategy*, New York 1967, 335.

tional organized crime networks; and

iv. placement and exploitation of the financial product of such criminal activities on behalf of international networks of terrorism and/or placement and circulation of this product within a nation's legal financial system.

A.4. Finally, the branch of *Defence and Intelligence Diplomacy*. Defence Diplomacy functions on the basis of collecting defence information from the geo-strategic environment of the nation-state actor concerned in order to prevent crises and to project the national power of the actor in question within this environment.

Defence Policy

The term *Defence Policy* of a nation can be considered to include all of the military, political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and psychological measures, the adoption of which can guarantee that (i) the state in question will not be forced in any way whatsoever to cede any of its material or value acquisitions (i.e. of national interests) in its effort to prevent the eventuality of being involved in a war; and (ii) the state in question will be in a position to successfully defend its values, should its war involvement become unavoidable.¹⁸

Power is a fundamental element of the National Security Policy, in its wider sense, and of a state's Defence Policy, in its stricter perception. In international literature, power is defined as the capability of a country (more specifically, of a nation-state actor/factor) to make the remaining actors/factors of the international system or sub-system ready or willing to acknowledge its policy options, through the direct or implicit use of specific capabilities of the factor/actor in question, i.e. its economic, financial, technological, military, institutional, diplo-

18. Cf. Η. Ηλιόπουλος & Δ. Σκιαδάς, *Πολιτικο-στρατιωτικές σχέσεις και αμυντική διπλωματία: Θεωρητική, συγκριτική και θεσμική ανάλυση* [Eliopoulos, E., Skiadas, N., *Politico-Military Relations and Defence Diplomacy: A Theoretical, Comparative and Institutional Analysis*], DAI, Athens 2004, 5. The authors cite D.J. Murray/Viotti, Paul R. (ed.), *The Defence Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study*, Third Edition, Baltimore/London 1994, Introduction, xix; and Snyder, Glenn/ Diesing Paul, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crisis*, Princeton/N. York, 1977.

matic knowledge, geographical, cultural and demographic capabilities.

The interdependence of the abovementioned parameters of power defines, in the final analysis, the type and size of a country's power, as well as its historical strength as a political, economic, social and cultural entity. The less the dimensions of power a country has or can utilize to its benefit, the greater the damage to its power and its submission to the influence of other countries.

Turkey exemplifies this remark. It is a country whose foreign policy has relied on three dimensions of power only (military, geographic and diplomatic), something that explains the effort of the majority of its political forces to join the EU. This explains also in part the relevant US policy of pressure on the EU. Beyond every other explanation, this policy reflects the US aims to restrict the role of the EU in the geo-strategic game extending from Gibraltar and Crete, crossing Cyprus and Israel and ending at India and China.

Greece is a country that has never elaborated a proposal for a National Security Strategy. Given that the management of all the aspects of National Power lacks coherence as well as a central axis of reference and, therefore, a medium to long-term perspective, it is reasonable for the country's National Defence Doctrine to rely on virtually axiomatic assumptions which, in the eventuality of a serious crisis, may prove to be extremely optimistic.

In the new international security environment, asymmetrical threats can develop within our country, either against targets of allied interests or against purely national targets.

In this sense, it has been acknowledged that Greece, following the fall of bipolarism in Europe, faces a totally competitive environment, characterized by instability and fluidity in its northern surroundings, where serious national issues are pending, resulting into risks for our national security, and by Turkey's constant and active threat. We should not forget that we have faced five major crises with Turkey during the last forty-five years (in 1955, 1963, 1967, 1974 and 1996) which resulted in the Turkish invasion and occupation of 40 percent of the Cyprus territory, the contest for half the Aegean Sea and the loss of the last remaining geo-cultural footholds of Hellenism on the opposite coast of the Aegean, i.e. the expatriation of the Greek minority of Istanbul, Imvros and Tenedos.

In geo-strategic terms, Greece is a part of the *Rimland*, the Earth's Ring, which functions as a barrier for the southbound tendencies of the

Eurasian land power, as it is perceived by the Anglo-Saxons to be “a potentially homogenous strategic threat”. Based on Spykman’s theory, this interpretation of the international balance of power constitutes the main axis of development for the American geo-strategic concept of international reality, regardless of political placement. The two fundamental views of reality (of the Republicans and the Democrats) differ only in the emphasis they place on the exercising of a conspicuous or covered hegemonic role of the US in the world (more or less unilateral, with more or less emphasis placed on the use of military power and use, by the Republicans, of multilateral cooperation only when deemed necessary, or, in the case of the Democrats when such a cooperation is deemed feasible). Given that the US determines Europe’s main strategic options in the field of Defence and Security, and will indeed continue to determine it for the years to come owing to the inability or to the deliberate remissness of the Europeans, and that the US constitutes the main regulator, whether positive or negative, of the situation in the SE Mediterranean, the geo-strategic perception of the Greek territory, together with our country’s defence policy, ought to use as its starting point the US perception of the greater Mediterranean area and, consequently, its major strategic options.

The Bush accession to power has marked the disambiguation of the general theoretical axes that will characterize the change of the US Defence Doctrine and, therefore, the change in the structures and the targeting of NATO, as well as the theoretical premises and the consequent practice of other great nations (France, Germany, China, India, the countries of the Arab peninsula, Pakistan, Australia and Russia). The US planning is fully explained by the maps numbered 43 and 44 of N. Spykman’s *The Geography of the Peace* (pp. 174-5).¹⁹ These maps reveal the substantiality of the area of the Aegean Sea in controlling the creation of a future Eurasian space, as well as the role of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, China, Central and Eastern Europe in this respect. At the time the American geographer published his analysis, the extent of the oil deposits of the Arab peninsula was unknown. In other words, the control of Iraq and Iran has since become imperative, based on this approach. Even more, after the collapse of the Soviet state and the consequent independence of the Caucasian republics which marked the release of the oil deposits of the

19. N.B. I.Th. Mazis (ed.), *N. Spykman, Η γεωγραφία της ειρήνης*, Preface, Introduction: I.Th. Mazis; translated by P. Kelandrias. Papazissis/Geolab editions, Athens 2004 (in Greek).

Caspian Sea to the benefit of the American and other Western oil companies, the US geo-strategic orientation was liberated on the basis of the abovementioned geopolitical analysis and of the consequent geo-strategic policies of the US. The US has zealously put effort in controlling the, geographically speaking, “trapezoid of oil” (Caspian Sea-Arab peninsula, Iraq-Iran) and, through it, the way and rate of development of the power, both of Europe and of the emerging, potent and energy-consuming markets of China and India. The US aim is to achieve a long-lasting domination with an economy of “hard power”.

Based on the above, there are five (5) aspects of primary geo-strategic interest that must be thoroughly examined:

i. The *type* and the *extent* of the domination which the US aims to implement in the Aegean and the way this aim could be utilized to our country’s benefit.

ii. The Aegean Sea, as being the *par excellence* area of joint operations in the Greek space, must be examined in terms of both its contribution in the determination of our Defence Doctrine on the basis of the new, geo-strategically defined, dynamics that have been released in the Mediterranean basin and their evaluation by the US.

iii. The parameters of power, together with the eventual establishment of a Germano-Russian geo-strategic complex and the future possibility for the consolidation and empowerment of a Franco-German axis, that would instill a completely different meaning into Europe’s Common Defence and Security Policy.

iv. The possibility for the co-existence or competition between an Anglo-Saxon and a Euro-centric geo-strategic entity (such as the one mentioned above), and, therefore, the placement of our country, in terms of defence policy, both at a theoretical (political) and a practical (arms procurement) level.

With reference to points *three* and *four*, it should be stressed that this examination must take place with a minimum horizon of twenty years. Important factors that must be taken into consideration are the relations between the weapons industry of the above axes and their wider economic and political cooperation. Cultural diplomacy among the components of these axes is indeed a criterion for elucidating the trends of geostrategic cooperation among them.

v. The utilisation of the country’s non-military aspects of power, in the context of the prevalent geo-strategic scenario (i.e. the Anglo-Saxon, or the Euro-centric, influence).

It should be noted that the analysis, albeit far from being a geopolitical one, that seems to prevail the thought of certain circles of the Greek elites claims that the country's role lies in becoming a Balkan superpower. Based on the previous line of thought, this is a mere secondary target. What is of interest is to ensure the road and railway corridors and to maintain the balance of power that will allow an early containment of developments that could lead to complex crises. In other words, from a defence viewpoint, the area of the Balkan Peninsula is a secondary, and not a primary, field for the country's long-term interests. It does present an interest, albeit small, as pertains to exports, as it constitutes the route of communication with the other European countries. However, owing to the expansion of NATO and the EU,²⁰ the Balkan Peninsula will become much safer and more predictable, while the major risks can emanate mainly from the East and the Southeast.

Consequently, we ought to examine whether there is a role for the armed forces in the protection (and the means of protection) of the sea supply routes that make up the country's single energy axis. We should also look how far afield this should and could extend, if necessary, but also how this protection will be assembled, in its legal, political and defence aspects in particular. Possibly, this requirement might be addressed by the New Doctrine of Special Operations, together with the determination of the form and the equipment of such operations. Similarly, we ought to examine other forms of energy that is imported in the country, which may become targets in the event of power projection operations and/or preparation for war by other countries. This is a major issue, because, *inter alia*, the armed forces that rely upon technology to carry out a large spectrum of their activities are susceptible of being neutralized for lacking main and alternative power import, production and distribution networks. It is not a matter of chance that the American doctrine provides for the destruction of the enemy's networks, while, on the other hand, a series of studies have been undertaken to protect the country's critical infrastructures. Not only is this related to the fact that the country's heavy strategic industry is shipping, but it also depends on the fact that all the major changes that Greece can bring about to the geopolitical parameters without being significantly influenced by external factors relate exactly to these two directions, *i.e.* infrastructure protection and

20. This expansion, including all the countries of the region, should become our main objective in order to enhance the terms of regional security.

alternative energy sources, or even the procurement of energy from multiple sources.

We should also examine Turkey's geo-strategic approach to the Greek space, in relation to the developments of the new US Defence Doctrine. In this sense, apart from examining its expectations and fears, we ought to look further, into its intimate thoughts as to what may or may not happen in its pursuance of its national interests. The US pressures for Turkey's accession to the EU is partly explained by Spykman and also by the fact that the US knows the uni-dimensional nature of Turkey's power and consequently recognizes its important vulnerability.

Only the EU can provide sufficient funding and has the market size that is required to restructure and empower the Turkish economy and it is therefore natural for Ankara to resort to the continuous promotion and emphasizing of its "European face", without however affecting the essence of the Kemalist regime, in other words the keystone of its strategic orientation.

Unless there is a radical change in the country's social structure, the non-substantial change of the Kemalist hard nucleus of Turkey's foreign policy is in line with the pursuance of its threat against Greece. This is, indeed, an issue for investigation. It is in this very environment that we must also investigate the geopolitical and strategic value of Cyprus and its relation with Greece. More specifically, we should look into the special role of Cyprus in the US geopolitical planning, a scheme that is accepted by both the Democrats and the Republicans in the US, with particular emphasis on the island's value as a strategic base and a relatively secure advanced vault towards the Middle East. Similarly, we should also examine the geopolitical position of Cyprus and the geo-strategic terms of security which it imposes upon the geopolitical factor and geo-strategic actor that is Israel.

Greece's planning should include the examination of three alternative scenarios:

i. The *desirable scenario*, which is based on a two-zone, two-community federation ensuring a close relation of cooperation between the two communities and a clear national sovereignty of the new state within its international environment.

ii. The *undesirable scenario*, creating a Cyprus on the basis of the "Anan VI" plan. In other words, a state with an extremely limited national sovereignty, even controlled by third parties. In this case, any relation with the country in the defence field will be implemented through

mechanisms that will rely on the strategic planning of the US and the UK, fully and bindingly.

iii. A Cyprus constituted on the basis of a *substantially modified Anan Plan*, capable of functioning as an independent state, and member of NATO in the near future; this will serve the interests of all the parties involved on the island.

Referring to the above cases (i) and (iii), it is clear that a Defence Doctrine, together with its corresponding National Security Framework must be formulated (obviously, in a distinct manner for each of the states) that will be governed by both the essence and the principles of the ESDP and will underline NATO's complementary role in terms of geopolitical background and geo-strategic targeting. In order for this to be accepted by the most important Power Pole in the region, Israel, the NATO cooperation aspect should rather be strengthened. The consent of Tel Aviv is of utmost importance for the adoption of such a pair of doctrines.

Based on these three scenarios, we should study also the relation which Greece can develop with the other countries of the SE Mediterranean. This relation should in fact comprise parameters such as:

i. The extent to which it serves the development of the country's parameters of power, together with its cost.

ii. The cost-benefit analysis, particularly in terms of the country's comprehensive national security, as well as the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the change that will be brought about to the country's security balance.

iii. The cost-benefit analysis, particularly in relation to the country's defence potential and the structure of its defence planning.

iv. The examination of the lifespan of such plans, given the eventuality of radical changes in many countries of the region (e.g. change of regime in Egypt, democratisation of an emerging federal, or confederate Iraq, creation of a Palestinian hybrid state, change of regime in oil-rich Arab countries, etc.).

v. Geopolitical analysis and geo-strategic presentation of the routes of hydrocarbons in relation to the respective influences on the stability and security factors of the region and, therefore, determination of the possible influences on Greece's Defence Doctrine.

vi. The degree to which the developments in the India-China-Japan triangle are carriers, on a feedback basis, of new problems to the SE Mediterranean and Greece's umbilical cord of energy.

Greece's relation with the EU has been adequately mapped. What is

useful to examine before completing the assessment of the geopolitical parameters underlying the country's new Defence Doctrine, is the planning of specific countries in relation to the Balkans, and particularly the SE Mediterranean. Given that there are three distinct, and mutually incompatible, geo-strategic approaches in the EU, this is considered indispensable.

The first approach is the Anglo-Saxon one, which focuses on the naval consideration of things, seeing Europe as part of the Eurasian island that must be controlled from its coastline (Spykman), based on the teachings of Mahan and later scholars. This explains why the US emphasis is placed on the sea and air supremacy and power, while - based on their new doctrine - land forces become lighter and more easily transportable, carrying few heavy equipment items such as tanks and self-propelled armored artillery units. This approach requires flexible forces, capable of being rapidly transported and deployed, that rely on small logistic support followers (queues) as well as on increased lethality. This means rapid and precise target acquisition. Such forces are capital- and technology-intensive and are totally unsuitable for the Greek parameters of power. Their particular emphasis on C4ISR systems, with a continuous satellite support, renders this model unsuitable for any European country, due to its cost and complexity and, therefore, underlines the need for cooperation at the European level.

The second model is that of the *land pole of power*, developed by the German School of Geopolitics, i.e. K. Haushofer and later scholars. The limits of this model were not shown during WWII, because the Reich failed to adopt its most important suggestions, such as the synergy with Moscow at the political, defence and economic levels. Today, the situation has changed. It is no more possible, on the pretext of ideological factors (e.g., Communism) to prohibit such strategic synergies. This trend explains the current approach between Moscow and Berlin, mainly in economic areas, the concerted action of these two countries within the camp of the parties rejecting the "legality" of the American-British intervention in Iraq as well as their action in the cases of Poland's EU accession and the war in Yugoslavia against Milosevic, on the basis of this approach. However, a basic issue related to the implementation of such a model is its functionality in the future, while having to face a significantly powerful and internationally competitive Russia, in the current European political and economic conjuncture.

The third model is *French*, as codified by Strausz-Hupe. In essence,

it is the adaptation of the elements of the two aforementioned models to the particularity of France which, first after the War and the dissolution of the British Empire, preserved close ties with its former colonies in Africa, thus adapting the elements to its role as a prevalent foreign power in Africa. This adapted the whole structure of its forces to a duality of simultaneous roles, i.e. projection of power and limited use of military means afield their bases, on the one hand, and a heavy conventional army for defence in Europe, on the other. This is the combination of contrastive capabilities, which was achieved through a small but significant land force with the Foreign Legion, combined with the naval and air force means that could serve this specific force. It was not a matter of chance that Britain and France are the only members of NATO, in addition to the US, that have a limited, albeit true, expeditionary capacity. This was the requirement of the geo-strategic model they followed, even though the aims of the three actors deviated from one another.

Today, these three models continue to co-exist and to serve as the basis for interpreting the policies of the three countries in major issues of European orientation. The French and German approaches go hand-in-hand, and this is due to the fact that none of the two can direct the EU Europe autonomously. Taken independently, their political, defence and “moral” power cannot counterbalance the power of the US. The conciliation of these two models resulted in the initiatives that led to the creation of the EU Rapid Response Force and determined the needs, both materially-and doctrine-wise.

Greece participates in this planning and is partly obliged to adapt to its requirements the procurements of defence material and the training of certain high readiness military units. This must be necessarily considered as a constitutive element of a New Defence Doctrine and must be therefore examined in the light of the geo-strategic model that is closer to the country’s national interests. Based on the findings of such an approach, we should draft the New Defence Doctrine. It is obvious that no single model can fully satisfy the country’s needs, unless the vital national interests (except the self-evident interest of survival) change essentially. It is therefore an urgent need to assess the role of the EU and NATO in a twenty-year horizon.

Finally, based on all the above, the country’s vital interests must be projected in the short- to medium-term and any pertinent changes must be fully considered.

Defence Doctrine: Structure and Requirements

A comprehensive and effective National Defence Doctrine should sufficiently include, co-assess, analyze and ensure the following points:

1. Analysis/assessment of the country's geopolitical and geo-strategic position

This analysis is as follows:

a. Description of the Articulations/Centres of the Mediterranean Geopolitical Complex: General Characteristics

The articulations of the geopolitical complex of the Mediterranean are based on the following characteristics:

- i. their role as a dominant node of communication (economically, politically and culturally speaking);
- ii. their role as a point of energy deposits, natural reserves and natural availabilities;
- iii. their role as an accumulation point for weapon forces and as a concentration and diffusion point for political power or as a secondary/sub-metropolitan centre for the transfer and imposition of hegemonic metropolitan power, of the defence type.

This metropolitan power is transferred or imposed through these articulations of the Mediterranean geopolitical system, through either:

1. the direct relations between this sub-metropolitan centre/articulation with the metropolis; or
2. the influences and interactions that are exercised upon the articulation/centre within the mechanisms of International or Regional Collective Security Systems that incorporate the said centre/articulation.

b. Geographical Determination of Articulations/Centres in the Mediterranean

Category (a) includes:

- i) Gibraltar;
- ii) Malta;
- iii) the Gulf of Sirt;
- iv) Crete;
- v) Cyprus;
- vi) Suez;
- vii) the Bosphorus Straits;

- viii) Hellespont;
- ix) the Greek Eastern Aegean and its insular complexes, as the continuity of the commercial and military route of the Dardanelles;
- x) the port of Thessaloniki;
- xi) the port of Volos; and
- xii) the Otranto-Corfu straits.

Our remark lies in the significant difference of density among centres of this type that is observed between the Eastern and the Western Mediterranean, with the Eastern Mediterranean basin occupying an advantageous position.

Category (b) includes:

- i) the area of the Caspian Sea;
- ii) the area of the Eastern Aegean;
- iii) the Otranto-Corfu area;
- iv) the area of Cyprus-Alexandretta-Syria-Lebanon-Israel;
- v) the Gulf of Sirt (Libya);
- vi) the area of Algiers;
- vii) the area of Morocco.

As pertains to category (b), our remark enhances once again the geopolitical importance of the Eastern Mediterranean basin.

Category (c) includes zones such as those of:

- i) Southern Italy (NATO bases);
- ii) Northern and NW Greece (NATO bases);
- iii) Crete (American-NATO bases);
- iv) Cyprus (British and American bases);
- v) Malta;
- vi) Gibraltar (British dominion);
- vii) Israel (of Western geopolitical influence, facing significant internal problems due to the Palestinian question);
- viii) Iraq (until recently, a pole questioning the American geopolitical influence, an active ally of the Islamist movements in the area of the M. East with a doubtful geopolitical future);
- ix) Syria (a pole questioning the American geopolitical influence, with a vague stand towards the international Islamist movement and with a doubtful geopolitical future);
- x) Lebanon (a pole questioning the American geopolitical influence and an accessory of Syrian influence with a doubtful geopolitical future);

- xi) Egypt (of Western geopolitical influence, with elements of instability attributable to the powerful Islamist movement of the region that has a noteworthy historical relation with the country itself);
- xii) the zone of Maghreb (a zone of unstable Western geopolitical influence with a strong and active Islamist movement);
- xiii) Iran (a zone of intense questioning of the American geopolitical influence, with a doubtful geopolitical future);
- xiv) Turkey (a zone of West-oriented geopolitical influence, with factors of political and social instability - of Islamist and Kurdish origin - and serious problems in issues pertaining to political liberties and human rights. Doubtful geopolitical future, related at a first level [that of the sub-system] with the future of Iraq, Syria, Iran and at a second level [that of the system] with the future of Syria, Jordan, S. Arabia and the UAE).

Conclusions

1. The first conclusion drawn from the overview of the above-mentioned zones coincides with the conclusion drawn for Categories (a) and (c). In other words, the density of the geopolitically important Centres is much higher in the Eastern than in the Western Mediterranean basin.

2. Also, a second conclusion is that the sources of instability, of conflict as well as of ideological/cultural and ethnic/racial confrontation (Islamist Movement, Kurdish and Palestinian Issues) are also to be found mainly in the Southern and the SE Mediterranean.

c. Axes of geopolitical influence

Based on the above, the following can be identified within the Mediterranean basin:

i. An horizontal zone of Anglo-Saxon geopolitical influence, between the 36th and the 30th parallel, which is defined by points of established Anglo-Saxon strategic power, in the form of military facilities such as:

(1) The pre-existing flight prohibition zones, in Northern and Southern Iraq (above the 36th and below the 32nd parallel, respectively), the memory of which is nowadays quite revealing when consider-

ing the aims of the Anglo-Saxon, but also of the French, factors in the region.

- (2) The American-Turkish base of Lefkoniko in the occupied Northern part of Cyprus, which the US want to transform into a NATO base, in their aim to transfer some of the activities availed by the Turkish base in Incirlik, a facility the US see as the strategic complement of Lefkoniko in defending the American interests in the M. East. It should be noted also that the base of Lefkoniko is nowadays equipped with modern anti-submarine systems.
- (3) The British military bases in Dekelia and Akrotiri, located in the free Southern part of Cyprus.
- (4) The US and NATO military bases in Crete.
- (5) Malta; and
- (6) The British military bases in Gibraltar.

This Anglo-American zone of geopolitical influence, which divides the Mediterranean basin into a Northern and a Southern part, can exercise strategic control at a nuclear-war level, as well as at an electronic-warfare and electronic intelligence level, within a region developing from the zone of Maghreb and up to the zone of Crimea, in terms of nuclear ballistic defence. Also, it can complement the services of the American-British universal *Echelon* network.

ii. A zone extending vertically in relation to zone (i) and joining these two points:

- (1) Port Said, in the Suez Canal (the transit point of around 40 percent of the crude oil quantities transported from the M. East to the markets of Northern and Western Europe and the corresponding transatlantic markets, through Gibraltar).
- (2) The port of Thessaloniki and its extension to the port of Rotterdam, the world's biggest market for spot oil.

iii. Also, a zone extending diagonally in relation to the horizontal zone of Anglo-Saxon influence, which connects the Dardanelles with Gibraltar.

These zones are characterised by the transport of hydrocarbons and are fully controlled by NATO, and more in particular the Anglo-Saxon, defence mechanisms.

c.i. The Perception of Modern Geopolitical Reality of the Mediterranean by the International Factor - The Cyprus Issue

c.i.i The geopolitical reality in the SE Mediterranean, as is currently perceived by the US, is characterised by the following:

(1) Cyprus controls the critical point of the SE Mediterranean, where:

i) the oil pipelines of Mosul and Kirkuk through Yumurtalik, and, finally through Alexandretta end up;

ii) the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline if and when it is completed, will end up;

iii) the oil pipelines of the Syrian coastline (Latakia), as well as of those in Lebanon (Sidon) end up;

iv) the important pipeline of Mosul (Iraq)-Haifa (Israel) will end up, when Iraq will be politically stabilized, as conceived by the US to serve the British-American interests; this pipeline will transport the cheapest and qualitatively best at an international level crude oil of Mosul and Kirkuk (Light Kirkuk oil) to the SE Mediterranean; and, finally,

v) the transport routes for oil from the Persian Gulf to the Western markets end up in the Eastern Mediterranean, through the Suez Canal.

(2) The airspace between Cape A. Andreas and Laodikeia (Syria), having a width of 100 km, can be fully controlled by the air forces based on Cyprus. These, in a scenario of threat for Israel, could cooperate defence-wise with Damascus. This would also be the case for the Syrian air force, if it cooperated with Nicosia.

It is natural for Tel Aviv to be quite reluctant towards such an eventuality, because no one could ever assure the Israeli officials that an agreement of this kind would not end up having negative consequences for Israel's national interests.

Let us take for example the case of the Defence Cooperation between Israel and Turkey (whose relations with Syria are intense due to the issue of the management of the Euphrates water reserve). One of the aims of this cooperation is the creation of "strategic depth" for the Israeli Air force, in the eventuality of a Syrian attack against Israel. This aim would be neutralized, if the above-mentioned cooperation between Nicosia and Damascus were in place, resulting in unforeseeable consequences for the security of Israel.

Also, an eventual pro-Arab stand of a unified and sovereign Cyprus in the defence-political field is interpreted by Tel Aviv as the ultimate threat for its national security, given that it excludes all sea- and air-

military operation routes (both for offence and defence) towards the Arab territories, on the one hand, and constitutes a basis for equivalent offensives against Israel.

This is the apparent point of coincidence, in terms of strategic perception, between Tel Aviv and Ankara.²¹ Obviously, Tel Aviv thinks that the only guarantee for the security of its state is the Anglo-Saxon military control over Cyprus, which would never allow for a pro-Arab shift of the Cyprus Republic, more importantly in the present conjuncture of the American involvement in Iraq.²²

In conclusion, it should be noted that any decision aiming to resolve the Cyprus issue, if it were to be compatible with the interests of Hellenism, should not, under any circumstances, be taken before the consolidation of peace and democracy in Iraq'. This is because the qualitative change of the Baghdad regime brought about by the mostly Anglo-Saxon invasion will result into new balances in the region of the M. East and will formulate all the requirements which Israel considers necessary for the consolidation of its security. This development will create the necessary security climate in Tel Aviv that will lead to a more positive stand towards the quality of the solution proposed for the Cyprus issue, to the benefit of both communities and not towards a one-sided solution benefiting the Turkish Cypriot side only.

It should be noted that in our view, this is not the best case scenario, in spite of the fact that the US unfortunate manipulations in managing the post-war situation in Iraq can create doubts as to how the consolidation of peace and security will emerge in the region. The increasing degree of involvement of strong European countries (France, Germany) and of state actors with a significant importance, permanent members

21. See: Mustafa Aydin, *Η τουρκική εξωτερική πολιτική: Πλαίσιο και ανάλυση*, Πανεπιστήμιο της Άγκυρας [Mustafa Aydin (2004). *Turkish foreign policy: Framework and Analysis*. University of Ankara/ School of Political Sciences], study submitted to the DAI. In his study, the Turk professor states that "a serious factor in the Turkish perception of security is that the islands of the Aegean, being in the control of an enemy force can prohibit Turkey from using the two main ports of Istanbul and Izmir and prevent entrance into the Straits. In this case, navigation can be secured from the side of the Eastern Mediterranean only if the island of Cyprus, capable of blocking the region, is controlled by a friendly government".

22. N.B.: In other words, the establishment of a non-theocratic republic of the Middle Eastern type.

of the Security Council, such as Russia, suggest ways to resolve the undesirable situation within the reconstructed Iraq.

(3) The zone included between the 35th and the 36th parallel, which includes at its eastern edge Cyprus (Episcope, Akrotiri, Larnaca and Lefkoniko), Crete (Souda) and, at its western edge, Malta and Gibraltar, is a particularly important set of geo-strategic footholds for the Anglo-Saxon naval forces controlling the entire S. Mediterranean, in other words the turmoil of Maghreb, through this geopolitical axis. The latter is the exit route for the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf and of the Caspian basin that will be routed towards Gibraltar and the Atlantic.

An independent, two-community and two-zone Cyprus with a sovereign, powerful and unique identity and a full member of the EU, will in fact oblige Brussels to seriously address the security issues in this point of the Eastern Mediterranean.

In other words, Brussels will have to address the fact that a possible Turkish pressure upon the Greek Cypriots is a factor of instability in this strategic region and mainly at the SE edge of the enlarged EU, taking into consideration that such a pressure will cause the natural response, at the level of political decision-makers and of the public opinion in Athens.

This eventuality can have two outcomes for Brussels:

i. either that, in an apparent European incapability to provide credible explanations to Athens and to the European public opinion, the EU will waive de facto all its rights in protecting its interests in its SE edge, an area of utmost importance, and will thus be self-nullified by silently accepting the mythical character of the European political integration (which presupposes the implementation of the ESDP);

ii. or that, on the contrary, the EU bureaucracy decides to vigorously and effectively address the source of the destabilizing pressures, i.e. the Turkish revisionism and the issues of political liberties and human rights in the Turkish territory.

It should be stressed that, particularly as regards the fair, viable and functional solution of the Cyprus issue on the basis of a two-zone, two-community federation with a clear national sovereignty and with full respect of the *acquis*, the *sine qua non* precondition is for the Greek side to take seriously under consideration all the factors ensuring Israel's security in the region. It is readily concluded that an already secure Israel (with its state of security ensured before any "solution" of the Cyprus issue) would result into the degradation of Turkey's strategic im-

portance, of its geopolitical preferences and options in the region, and therefore, of its options with respect to the solution of the Cyprus issue. Conversely, this would increase the negotiative capacity of Greece and the Greek Cypriots. Consequently, Greece and Cyprus ought to move towards the direction suggested by this analysis: the enhancement of the Israeli perception of security.

d. Assessment

Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the end of Cold War and the rapid developments noted since 1989 in the regimes of the USSR and the countries of Central, Eastern and SE Europe, the situation in Europe, in general, and in our neighborhood, in particular, has changed dramatically. Surely, Greece's participation in the most important instruments of collective security (defence, economic, political and cultural), such as the United Nations, the OSCE, NATO and the EU increases the power of its presence and its capability to cooperate and intervene in the area described. However, its security will probably not cease to be threatened and endangered in the foreseeable future.

The destabilisation of the Balkans, the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia - which peaked with the conflict in Kosovo and Metohija, the Albanian Big Idea, the hardship of the Greek National Minority in N. Epirus, the irredentist aims of Skopje, the latent Bulgarian Big Idea, the political, economic, military and cultural penetration of Turkey in SE Europe, the permanent wave of illegal immigrants, the continued political and economic instability in all the Balkan countries, the production and trafficking of drugs in, or through, some of them and, finally, the export of all types of criminality, including terrorism, are serious threats for our National Security.

Turkey has a long tradition of a revisionist and expansionist policy in its surroundings, expressed through its views of *Lebensraum*, or even through the pan-Turkist and/or Islamist ideologemes, always with a long-sighted strategy of a great Regional Power and independently from its internal social, economic and political deficiencies and problems.

The above-mentioned remarks are based on the estimation that:

1. Turkey, with its Islam-inclined/Islam-like government, aims to

constitute an acceptable and desirable solution for the “international factor”, given its desire to acquire credibility in the eyes of the Turkish-speaking and/or Muslim pockets of the Balkans, whose “protection” it will then claim to undertake, as having the “moral grounds” to do so, acting as “assignee”, on behalf of the international community. Besides, Turkey becomes a more valuable partner for the US, as a regional sub-metropolitan actor in the mechanism of the neo-Spykmanist model.

2. Also, the desire to expand the geopolitical sphere of influence of the modern neo-Ottoman Turkey, is not exhausted in the Balkan Peninsula. Based on the same diligent (i.e. obsessive) model of Turkish origin, it tries to extend its geopolitical influence to the petroliferous areas of the Muslim republics of Central Asia, as well as to exercise pressure upon the NW part of China (Xinjiang), where Turkish-speaking Muslim populations live (around 20,000,000 persons, the Uyghurs).

3. Also, it tries, unsuccessfully, to present itself as a reliable negotiation partner with Iran, the geopolitical presence and dynamism of which in the region completes the Islamic “security zone” around Russia, in cooperation with the New Afghanistan and Musharraf’s Pakistan.

Considering the above, a clear picture of an American-Turkish “security zone” is created against the Russian “downstream trends” towards the warm waters of the Mediterranean, from the geographical area consisting of the geographical zones of the Balkans, Turkey, Iran, the republics of Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In other words, Turkey tries to persuade the US that the only possible crack in the above “zone” would be a geopolitically uncontrolled Greece, inspired more by a Euro-centric geopolitical approach and tending to detach itself from the Anglo-Saxon hegemony.

It should be noted that this planning of Ankara is perceived dually and warily by circles of the responsible political elites of Tel Aviv. This is due to the fact that, any failure of this neo-Ottoman model in the Balkans (Albania, Kosovo, FYROM, Bulgaria, Greece) would cause an avalanche of developments, whose central characteristic would be the prevalence of the radical Islamist movement in the territories of the Balkan Peninsula. This is an eventuality upsetting Israel, a reminiscence of the failure of the American model “better mullahs than Soviets” in Iran and Afghanistan. Also, it is by no means appeasing the fact that a major part of the “Afghan” mujahedins and members of the Al-Qaeda (even Bin Laden himself) have at times acted or continue to

act in the context of the UCK and other Islamic-nationalistic groups in the Balkans.

The fears of the above-mentioned prudent circles in Tel Aviv must be taken seriously under consideration upon planning the New National Defence Doctrine and, of course, upon drafting the framework of our country's National Security, as part of the hypothetical geo-strategic triangle Greece-Turkey-Israel. A triangle, albeit, with only... two sides!

In relation to Greece, Turkey aims to impose its geopolitical purposes in the following areas:

a. *In Cyprus*, based on its disorienting policy and the use of threats, it aims to solidify the current situation. The case of Turkey's behavior, as well as of a part of the Turkish Cypriot political elite, relating to the approval of the Anan Plan by the Turkish Cypriots and to the positive stance of Erdoğan's government is linked to the extent of imbalance which the Plan presented, in favor of Turkey, with the aim being precisely to cause its rejection by the Greek/Greek Cypriot side and to reverse the international public opinion about which side (the Greek or the Turkish) really aims at a peaceful and just solution of the Cyprus issue. The London-Washington dipole will indeed put effort in making this reversal the starting point of efforts for the "institutional-legal" creation of an independent Turkish Cypriot state entity, in the context of "indifference", "tolerance" and/or cooperation of specific Euro-Atlantic political circles and/or "eager" ethnic-national groupings.

b. *In the Aegean*, a series of unilateral claims (continental shelf, territorial waters, national airspace, Athens FIR, elimination of Greece's defence potential from the islands of the Eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese, operational control within the NATO framework, S&R responsibility, questioning of our national sovereignty) together with the use of threats of war, aims to achieve a re-allocation of the area at a boundary adjacent to the 25th meridian, taken from the Turkish coastline.

c. *In Thrace*, Turkey aims to complete the turkification of the Muslim minority, through the "homogenisation" of the Pomaks and the Roma, on the basis of a common minority Turkish ethnic conscience, the transfer of minority populations in the prefecture of Evros and the cultivation of the ideal of independence, combined also with the Muslim minority living in Southern Bulgaria.

The competition for the production, transport and exploitation of oil in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea complicate the situation in the region even further.

2. Analysis/Assessment of the Diligence Model

The specification of a national framework of security policy and, following this, of a National Defence Doctrine, relies on the thorough and objective analysis of the country's perception (political elite, policy makers, social elite, opinion-leaders, intellectuals, people) about itself, its position and its role in the international system and its regional sub-system.

At this point, we should focus particularly on the system of National Education, on the targeting of this system in issues of comparative analysis of the Mediterranean, the European and the Greek Civilization and on its updating and adaptation to the new international ideological-political and cultural elements. The distinction of the national and cultural identity of the modern Greek/European citizen should constitute a major indication of success for our educational system.

Also, in the process of creating the learning requirements for consolidating the perception (together with its consequent requirements) (i) that our country constitutes a "Middle Power" in the US-EU-Middle East supra-system and a "Maritime Nation" with a concept of worldwide dimension and mission; and (ii) of the geo-strategic role it plays and must play in common with the US and the UK.

3. Determining the Mission of the Armed Forces

The mission of the Armed Forces consists of meeting the following three objectives:

3.1. National Defence - Deterrence

It is a dual ("classical") mission, as it has been formulated since the establishment of the Greek state and its armed forces on the basis of the country's geopolitical/geo-strategic position, as analyzed already, and taking also into account the changes of the international political environment.

3.2. Allied Defence - Deterrence/Collective Security

At the time of bipolarism, and as a consequence of Greece's full participation in the Western political, military, economic and ideologi-

cal camp, the National Defence mission was expanded substantially towards Defence and the Allied territory (NATO). The principle of deterrence is of value, mainly as a set of preventive measures of a nation-state actor and relies basically on the perception of third parties in relation to the capabilities and the determination of the nation-state actor in question.

In the post-Cold War era, the emphasis is shifted from Collective Security and Defence, in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, to the Cooperation for Security (Cooperative Security, Defence Diplomacy) in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty or other multilateral structures and international regimes.

3.2.1. Greece-EU/ESDP

A. In principle, our country's participation in the effort is considered purposeful and, under certain conditions, useful for our National Interests. Consequently, Greece should aim at participating in the nucleus of the European defence policy and military cooperation scheme, the creation of which is a political aim and has been defined as a programme objective that must be followed by Paris and Berlin, regardless of its final formulation.

B. However, it is also purposeful and useful to prevent a premature or immoderate optimism, and to ignore or underestimate the strategic/international policy deficit of the European Pole of Power that is currently being incubated. On the contrary, upon drafting our Defence Policy and, more in particular, our country's Defence Doctrine, we should take under consideration the following:

i) Despite the remarkable economic power of the EU, its form so far has not been able to render it a strategic player in the chessboard of International Politics.

The EU may have emerged as an "Economic Superpower", as the world's biggest market, with a currency directly competing the US Dollar, with a decisive role in the WTO, with a higher GDP than the US and with a much higher contribution to the international development aid - even with a bigger population size than the US. However, it has failed to become a major power, in the typical international political sense of the term. This may sound strange, particularly in the light of the remark that, in Europe's and the world's post-war history, the Economy plays a major role, much more importantly than before. This

finding is, of course, more applicable to the “new”, enlarged EU of the 25 member-states.

ii) *The incapability of the European bloc to translate its undoubted economic potential to a strategic power of an analogous stance* is due to three reasons:

- (1) its limited military power;
- (2) its decision-making processes; and
- (3) the lack of strategic ambition and of a corresponding political determination.

With regard to point (1):

This point is the one most discussed and misinterpreted. EU's problem was *not* the “lack of military means”, generally and vaguely speaking. Its member-states do have noteworthy and modern armed forces the size of which, when taken cumulatively, exceeds that of the US. Also, the height of defence expenditure is by no means negligible. The daily defence and security expenditure of the EU member-states amounts to USD 0.5 million, compared to USD 1 million of the US. Consequently, the issue is not the limited - or the inexistent - military means and potential, as is usually believed. The problem focuses on a different point: the military power of an international actor depends not only on the existing resources and means, but also on the rationality of their usage and, what is more important, on the degree of determination to use them in pursuing political objectives. In the case of the EU, there is neither a rational resource utilisation scheme (costly simultaneous existence and operation of fifteen national defence policy bureaucracies, non-allocation of work among the national defence industries, lack of compatibility among Europe's weapon systems, etc.), nor the political determination to utilize the existing means. The deeper cause of this stance is due to the conscious strategic and political choice of Western Europe, in the post-war era, towards the political and military defence and security framework of the US and its transformation to a virtual projector of power for the hegemonic World Naval Power.

Additionally, in the case of Europe, a suspending factor is the force of inertia. For half a century, the European political elites were “seasoned” to the fact that the answer to the security dilemma which their countries faced would be given by the US. They expected initiatives and actions from their Atlantic Protector and, indeed, there were such initiatives and actions. The European political elites welcomed, rejected,

acclaimed or criticized them and, finally, compromised with them. *In geopolitical terms, the EEC/EU was and remained the continental accessory of the World Naval Power in the Rimland of Western Eurasia.*

With regard to point (2):

It is not a matter of chance that countries such as France or the UK acted unilaterally (or on the basis of allied relations outside the framework of the EEC/EU); in all cases they needed to take immediate and effective military action to protect their interests, in Africa, Latin America, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere. This independent action is explained by the fact that the decision-making mechanism within the EU, in matters of foreign and defence policy is, admittedly, sluggish and ineffective, given that it is fully dependent on the consent of each of the national governments, not only for the *in principio* adoption of a decision, e.g. for military action, but also for the implementation of this decision throughout its staging.

This is of course a problem known to the EU officials, who elaborate ways to overcome it, as was obvious also in the speculation that developed in the aftermath of the Constitutional Assembly and the British-American intervention in Iraq. Many proposals were presented: election of the EU President for a longer term, enhancement of the role of the ESDP HR and upgrading him to a quasi-Foreign Minister of the EU, further extension of the decisions taken with the majority of votes, etc. *However, it is certain that these mechanisms, if and when they are put in place, will not affect the right of veto of the member-states, with regard to the imposition of an already agreed policy with the use of weapons.* It is utopian even to imagine that any of the historical (and democratically governed) EU member-states would ever cede the privilege of decision for the deployment of EU military forces (including its own soldiers).

However, exactly because the capability, should the need arise, to impose a policy with the power of weapons is and continues to be the inviolable term and the par excellence element of strategic power, the EU, particularly in its new form and composition (of the 25 member-states), and no matter how much it tries, will not become a strategic actor capable of competing the US in International Politics in the foreseeable future, at least not unless the Paris-Berlin dipole proceeds to the creation of a few-membered, powerful and durable nucleus of cooperation in the military and defence policy areas.

In any other case, the only thing to be shown, once again, will be the unbearable lightness of the Euro-cratic institutional diligence, given that it is not through institutions that a partnership of nations can acquire the particular element of unity in taking decisions and implementing them to the last. This is an element that has been characteristic of all Powers, regardless of their geopolitical range, in other words of all state actors of the international system. Sometimes, the comparison to the US is only superficial, lacks historical perspective, and fully ignores the common national origin, the common linguistic and cultural identity (even, in its religious-dogmatic aspect), the political culture and the historical memories of the emigrants of the first US states. These are in full contrast to Europe's background: it is not a simple joining of certain self-managed communities of homogenous people, but the unification of nations with a long course of history which, until nowadays, and with the exception of a particularly small economic and technical/bureaucratic elite adopting the mentality of supra-nationalism, is the strongest point of reference for the vast majority of Europe's peoples, at least in the field of political symbolism and political psychology.

With regard to point (3):

Given that the EU is not a nation, even of the US structure (and therefore, from a legal viewpoint, the use of the term "European Constitution" in lieu of "Constitutional Treaty" is totally ungrounded), it does not have, nor will it ever acquire, the historical ambition and, consequently, the political determination to act as a World Pole of Power, i.e. as a Great Power with a strategic perspective. This is the third, and most important, cause of Europe's incapability.

C. Naturally, the combination of the above does not lead to the conclusion that our country ought to keep its distance from the efforts of the EU or, to be more specific, of some of its member-states. Such efforts aim at establishing a European, independent, expedient and reliable policy in the field of Security and Defence. On the contrary, as mentioned already, Greece should aim at the maximum possible participation in the EU nucleus that is currently being formulated (with the initiatives of Paris and Berlin) and assist the efforts of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg with the objectives of:

- a) extending the method of enhanced cooperation also in the field of the ESDP;
- b) enacting a solidarity clause among the EU member-states;

- c) extending the scope of Petersberg-type missions;
- d) enhancing the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO);
- e) completing the formation and enhancing the operational readiness of the European Rapid Response Force, on the basis of the already existing French-German Brigade;
- f) establishing a European Command for Strategic Airlifts;
- g) establishing a European unit of radiological and bio-chemical warfare;
- h) establishing a European system of Immediate Humanitarian Aid;
- i) establishing European Military Training Centres and Schools;
- j) establishing a European-only Planning and Command Staff;
- k) establishing a mobile Joint Headquarters for the Rapid Response Force.

It should be noted that the proposal for the establishment of a European-only General Staff touches upon the “hot-point” of the Euro-Atlantic relations and constitutes a truly revolutionary and symbolic movement, serving directly the purpose of Europe’s emancipation from the US in the fields of defence and international policy.

D. Following the suggestions of point (C) above, Greece obviously aims at creating a *Defence Union* of the EU member-states, as per the EMU model or that of the Schengen Group. Greece’s strategic aim must be, in this sense, the “*European Union of Security and Defence*”, within the framework of the Constitutional Treaty of the enlarged EU, or even outside it, if need be. *This is not an end in itself, but an effort incorporated in the perception of the need to achieve a multitude of strategic options.*

A critical remark, however, is that even in case the ESDP developed into a defence alliance (an assumption totally hypothetical and, for the time being, unrealistic), in other words even if the EU (and, to be more precise, *a homogenised and reinforced nucleus of its member-states*) acquired a functional and reliable military branch, *it would not be a wise or permissible choice for Greece to consider that such a (transformed) ESDP would offer a complete and effective guarantee for the country’s defence.* Besides, this is how Greece should behave also in the case of NATO.

Admittedly, Greece’s participation in the ESDP or, what is more, in a functional and reliable European Security and Defence Structure (the

“Euro-Zone” of Security and Defence, the ESDZ) will be a welcome and appreciable *power enhancement* in the planning of our country’s defence policy, given that the latter will benefit politically from the full and on a par participation in the above-mentioned structure of European security and defence. *However, the confrontation of any external threat to our National Security and, consequently, our country’s National Defence, remains an absolute priority and a critical concern for the decision makers of each state actor.*

3.3. Projection of Power, Military Diplomacy and Cooperative Security

After the end of the bipolarism era, and in the light of the changes and events of the first and the second post-Cold War decades, a new, and also dual, mission is added. Its first aspect concerns the *Projection of Power*,²³ seen here as a *Mild Method of Power Projection* (Soft Power) and, consequently, the *Military Diplomacy*. This is because Military Diplomacy and the so-called “Intelligence Diplomacy” have been remarkably upgraded after the end of the Cold War and the resultant “change of the defence policy projections in Europe” and, therefore, the dramatic extension of both the content and the concept of security. Military Diplomacy and Intelligence Diplomacy designate a set of state actions, of a complex military and diplomatic nature, that aims to increase and enhance the conditions and the feeling of a nation’s security through the continuous and appropriate collection of information on the regional and wider international environment, the development of communication channels with the defence policy officials of the remaining states and the cooperation with them in order to defuse tensions, to project the national power and to formulate the terms of security in the regional and the international environment.

3.3.1. Greece-NATO in the Post-Cold War Environment

1. The end of the Cold War did not mark, at least not to this day,

23. N.B. Power Projection is the exercising of activity that emanates from the nation-state actor and is directed towards its external environment, generally and specifically. The qualitative and quantitative participation in international exercises and missions are the power projection of the national actor, such as the mission of the fleet or the air force in an operational theatre in a distant region of the world.

the construction of a unified, homogenous and independent from the US supremacy, Pole of International Power among Europe's continental powers. On the contrary, the developments in the 90s re-affirmed the hegemonic role of the World's Naval Power (the US) over Europe; a role whose symbolic peak was the invasion in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the 24th of May, 1999. This invasion marked the role of the European Allies within the structure of NATO, as it is perceived by some officials in Washington. Furthermore, the undermining of a self-reliant perspective of defence (and, consequently, international) policy of the European Pole of Power that is currently being formulated was the substantial outcome of the agreements in Nice, Istanbul and Ankara, following Britain's intense and well-planned actions. It was through these agreements that the parties interested managed to prevent Europe's progression towards creating its own command structures and developing its own operational capabilities outside the structures of NATO. This was, indeed, the fundamental purpose served by Britain's well-known "turn" in 1998: as soon as the possibility to create the ESDP became clear, Britain judged it would be meaningless to oppose it by keeping a distance, and that it would therefore have to play a leading part in order to sway the process and to control its course. It must be admitted that Mr. Tony Blair has proven to be a loyal supporter of the traditional British Diplomacy.

Of course, in the light of the impressions and feelings caused by the new invasion of the US and some of its allies, this time against Saddam's Iraq, the continental powers that play a leading part in the creation of a European Pole of Power (France, FRG) proceeded to a series of diplomatic initiatives and announcements, ranging from the consultation with their former enemy, Russia, and with China, to an announcement about the establishment of a purely European Headquarters (however, purposefully avoiding any reference to a General Staff and opting for the neutral wording of "nucleus collective capability for planning and conducting operations"). As it is already known, this was the cause of massive reaction by the US and the Atlantists in general, on both sides of the Ocean, and particularly of Britain, which discerned the eventuality for the ultimate achievement of Europe's independence from the US in the defence policy area.

A year later all the above are still simple intentions and declarations. Fifteen years after the elimination of its counterbalance and its alleged *raison d'être* as a defence organisation, NATO *is still a reality, the im-*

portance of which may not be tolerably or forgivably ignored by any political official, and the only system of collective security in the Euro Atlantic World.

2. *Greece feels somewhat bitter about some responses, stances and positions of NATO.* Let aside sentimentalism, the *political morale* that must be embraced by Greece's political and defence officials, public opinion leaders and scholars is that *National Defence has always been, and will always be, a strictly National matter.* The perceptions adopted by some political or scholarly elites, of some "international communities" or even "benevolent hegemonies" to which will be subcontracted the solution of the security dilemma of the nation-state actor directly affected, belong to the sphere of political theology or theological politics, as is proven by the everyday international practice of power reallocation among the planet's national, economic, political and cultural actors. In philosophical terms, this could be defined as a political neo-Kantianism. *The reminder is always opportune and purposeful, given that a major part of Greece's ideological mechanisms unfortunately relies on ideologemes that lack historical perspective and are characterised by a regulatory or internationalist origin, which in the recent past proved to have a critical impact, also on political officials.*

Politically interpreted in relation to NATO, the above remarks point to the conclusion that Article 5 of the NATO Treaty cannot be used as an instrument of complete and definitive elimination of the Threat emanating from the Turkish revisionism or as a pivot for the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict. (Article 5 was the keystone of the Constitutional Chart of the North Atlantic Treaty, as the clearest and most overt expression of Allied solidarity against an already deployed outside attack on a member-state). Besides, practically speaking, the invocation of Article 5 by Greece to confront the Turkish threat cannot have any results, as has been proven repeatedly given that, on the basis of the Organisation's argumentation, "there can be no threat whatsoever between Allies".

3. The German re-unification, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of the former USSR and its satellites and the consequent rapid change of Europe's geo-strategic landscape had and continue to have multiple consequences and side-effects at all levels of Political Security. The destabilisation of the Balkans, the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, with its peak, the conflict in Kosovo and Metohija and the collapse of Serbia, a country which, whatever its state/endosystemic form, played

an exceptional role of a medium regional power for almost a century, the Albanian Big Idea, the hardship of the Greek National Minority in N. Epirus, the irredentist aims of Skopje, the latent Bulgarian Big Idea, the political, economic, military and cultural penetration of Turkey in SE Europe, the permanent waves of illegal immigration, the continued political and economic instability in all the Balkan countries, the production and trafficking of drugs in, or through, some of them and, finally, the export of all types of criminality, including terrorism, are all serious threats for our National Security.

Under these circumstances, the value of the Internal Security Policy is constantly increasing, as the means to confront the threats of erosion and subversion of the National Security from within. Internal Security focuses in particular on the issue of demographic, anthropo-geographic and geo-cultural changes, which may constitute threats in the following aspects:

- i. penetration, within the national geographical area, of ethnic-cultural (“ethnic”/“religious”) conflicts, which may assume a terrorist and, by extension, a subversive dimension;
- ii. erosion of the social cohesion and breakage of the nation’s social web through the creation of ethnic/religious pockets that are not socially integrated; this may lead to phenomena of “hot” radicalisation, giving rise to results that are dangerous for the nation’s internal security;
- iii. facilitation of the creation of organized crime networks (drugs, human trafficking, weapons smuggling, etc.) by exploiting the needs of these ethnic-religious pockets and in cooperation with international organized crime networks;
- iv. exploitation and transfer of the financial product of such activities to international networks of terrorism.

With reference to the country’s national security problem, and contrary to the clauses and possibilities that were offered by Article 5 and that are already exhausted or annulled, it is our belief that Greece’s National Security Policy makers should, from now on, act with a view to establish the whole spectrum of application of *Article 4* of the North Atlantic Treaty, in relation to the above-mentioned remarks on Internal Security.

It is reminded that Article 4 of the 1949 Washington Treaty sets forth the Organisation’s member-states obligation to “consult whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened”. What is of

particular interest for Greece is that Article 4 focuses not on a direct, visible (already expressed) (external) threat originating from a specific centre, but on security concerns of the member-states, in their widest sense.

4. Of course, we should not ignore the fact that the invocation of Article 4 does not necessarily give rise to the “preventive planning of a member-state’s protection against an attack by a third country”, but relates to the request by a member-state of the North Atlantic Treaty in relation to its concern that its security, in the wider sense, is threatened. This means that, in this case, we ought to disregard our usual over-expectations as to the allied solidarity on a given issue, should the need arise.

However, given the fact that Greece is located at a geopolitical and also geo-cultural crossroads, equivalent to that of Spain, it will be (together with Spain) the *par excellence* “Western” country that will be called upon to confront, during the next decades, the new forms of Threats against its National Security. Hence, Greece should, purposefully and usefully, take a well-planned initiative at the levels of diplomacy, defence policy and communication, towards fully utilizing Article 4 of the constitutional chart of the North Atlantic Alliance, to the extent that it opens the perspective for an instrument of political, primarily, and military, secondarily, assistance. This is fully in line with the increasing sensibility of the American and other NATO officials in the field of Internal Security. However, we should stress another parameter, perhaps not crucial, but nonetheless not negligible: contrary to what applies in the case of Article 5, the provisions of Article 4 (consultations on matters of security, etc.) involves also the Russian Federation.

5. In any case, the National Security Policy planners and officials of any country and of our country in particular, ought not to forget that the coverage provided to the country by any multilateral/international security structure can enhance the national defence and security but not guarantee it. This is particularly true in the case of Greece and NATO and its quality in assisting to the elimination of the Turkish Threat.

Consequently, it is neither politically purposeful nor practically feasible or militarily expedient for Greece to insist on seeking, eliciting, imposing or ensuring international law “safeguards” and the theoretical/statutory “guarantees” (its territorial integrity, the direct and immediate military assistance by its partners, etc.). Besides, in addition to Greece’s experience with NATO, the relatively more recent - but none-

theless not less problematic - experience from its participation in the WEU has shown that this stance has been quite unproductive given that, except for causing our partners' usual discontent, has also led to the exclusion of Greece (the only country among all the organisation's full member-states) from the provisions and clauses on automatic mutual assistance in the framework of the organisation's collective defence scheme.

We should, therefore, bear always in mind that, in the case of Greece, the eventual effectiveness, adequacy and reliability, of either the existing Euro-Atlantic or the currently formulated European security structure will depend, not on the international law/legal stipulations for political solidarity and military assistance, but, principally, on major strategic and political terms, i.e.:

a) the geopolitical landscape, in general, and the geo-strategic planning of the naval and continental powers, in particular;

b) the convergence of interests and objectives between the World Power (including the secondary regional powers that complement it) and Greece;

c) the convergence of interests and objectives between the basic factors of the European Pole of International Power (EPIP) and Greece;

d) the political determination of the above EPIP factors to cover, or to leave uncovered, the renowned "capability gap" between the EPIP itself and the Transatlantic/Anglo-Saxon Pole of International Power, and hence the deficit of military means and strategic ambition of the EU (EPIP); and

e) last but not least, the defence capability and the overall credibility of the defence policy of the country itself and the relevant political determination of its officials to vindicate the National Defence and Security, in every possible way and with all the means available. S. Huntington was right to remark that "It is still the man who shapes the office"!

It is therefore concluded that in the modern post-bipolar transitional international system the Doctrine that must be followed in relation to the mission of the Greek Armed Forces tends to assimilate the premises of the French doctrine, i.e. the preservation of the capability for national defence and deterrence, with the simultaneous acquisition of a power projection capability.

In terms of the defence aspect per se, it is concluded that the Doctrine to be adopted must follow the teachings of the Israeli doctrine. In other words:

- **Flexible Defence**, in lieu of the obsolete (already since the interim war period) static defence;

- **Joint Command Structure and Interoperability**, in lieu of the, also obsolete, Command and Individual Operations

- **Joint Military Areas Command** (at Israel's General Staff participate not only the Chiefs of Staff, but also the Area Commanders);

- **Emphasis on Special Forces and Fast-Moving Units** (mechanized/airborne);

-Acquisition of defensive capability for **two operational theatres**.

Also, and more in particular with reference to point 3.3 (the *Power Projection* aspect), it is concluded that the Doctrine to be adopted must be oriented towards that of Spain: Simultaneous maximum usage of all the factors of national power, with emphasis on the *geo-cultural/linguistic information aspect*. In any case, the country's defence doctrine should be ruled on the basis of the tetrptych: (i) early prevention; (ii) power projection; (iii) reliable deterrence; (iv) defensive war.

Our country's defence doctrine has, to date, relied upon the concept of Deterrence, at least at the level of declarations, given our proven incapability -on two occasions, at least: 1974 and 1996- to operate actively and to consolidate the requisite perception, at the level of a multitude of other national actors, about our intentions and capabilities as a reliable player of the international system and the regional sub-system.

We have tried to substitute this deficit of reliability at the level of our national power projection, by investing in our participation in various international organisations and by relying upon their capabilities and/or abilities for intervention to serve our own National Security.

However, we soon realized that no other party would ever be willing to undertake such a task, unless it served its own strategic interests, at a relatively low cost. Following similar concepts of institutional diligence, Greece's foreign and defence policy faced the crisis of Imia and the fiasco of the "S-300" anti-aircraft missiles. At the level of strategic planning, our country's approach in issues of power projection should be prudently pursued, if and when there is a long-term objective to preserve the country's defensive equipment, both quantitatively and qualitatively, at a level compatible with the country's economic standards and its technological and knowledge-based development.

3.4. *Internal Security. Human Resource and Environmental Security*

Internal Security is an issue emerging anew in the fluid post-bipolar international environment, at an intense pace, and is now combined with the demographic threat. The problem of massive immigration is a direct threat for the states' internal security, in the following senses:

a) introduction of ethnic-cultural ("ethnic"/"religious") disputes and geo-cultural conflicts, capable of escalating to direct and immediate threats for the National Security (e.g. terrorist attacks);

b) gradual undermining of the national and social cohesion, through the creation of parallel societies (ghettoing) resulting in the breakage of the social web, the reversal of demographic balances that are crucial for National Security and the emergence, in the long term, of internal ethnic-cultural disputes;

c) uncontrolled and interweaved action of elements of the international terrorism of narcotics (narco-terrorism), of human trafficking and of the international organized crime in general;²⁴

d) ensuring of official positions in the country's financial, social and political structure through the capital investment networks, and the corruption of the public sector; and

e) economic and social destabilisation of the country and funding of the operational needs of organized crime and conspiratorial groups.

Even though the country's Internal Security Policy is not the primary and in principle authority of the Ministry of National Defence, it is directly related to the National Defence Doctrine, to the extent that it aims to eliminate the risk of subversion of National Defence from within²⁵ or of its erosion by trends and changes of a social, economic, demographic and ecological nature, the impact and side-effects of which are manifested in the future.²⁶ The improvement of the terms of National Secu-

24. On the international smuggling of narcotics as a threat for the national and international security, cf. Friesendorf, Cornelius, «Der internationale Drogenhandel als sicherheitspolitisches Risiko», *Forschungsberichte Internationale Politik* vol. 27, Muenster, 2001.

25. Cf. S. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, 19th printing, Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 2002, 2.

26. In this context, the Greek mythology offers a suitable paradigm for the confrontation of the asymmetrical enemy strategy in the internal national front. When fighting with Antaios, Hercules disregarded that his opponent's mother was Earth. Each time he would fell on the ground, he would recover his power.

rity is achieved through the establishment of National Unity by means of measures aiming to protect the social web and the demographic cohesion, as well as with the improvement of the state's financial status. The importance that economy, in particular, plays in the proper and effective defence policy of a nation is justified also historically.

The economic and social dimension of a country's internal security includes, by nature, the maximum possible degree of the "uncertainty" factor, the confrontation of which is only possible through a mechanism ensuring maximum possibility of initiative and adaptability of the defence mechanisms to this type of asymmetrical hostile strategies. The so-called "asymmetrical" threats/attacks aim to achieve either escalating or multiplying results in a country's internal front. In other words, asymmetry must be seen as a strategy and it must be understood that its constituent operations or attacks aim to implement this very strategy. It is for this purpose that asymmetry must be perceived not as a series of individual actions, but as a strategy that is purposefully implemented to achieve specific targets. As a consequence, the response to this strategy must also be strategic and implemented particularly in the framework of the herein proposed Instrument for the Prevention and Confrontation of Asymmetrical Threats (IPCCAT, see Chapter E).

The information existing in relation to the new risks and threats as well as to the asymmetrical strategies through which these are "implemented" is inadequate, given that our country does not have the capability to collect, process, evaluate and utilize such information. This information is useful both for the National Treasury and the instruments of other ministries, such as the ministry of public order, the ministry of defence, the foreign ministry, the ministry of the interior, etc.

It is therefore necessary to establish and utilize a central unit for the collection, processing and centralized utilization of financial and economic information, in the framework of an operational plan, entitled e.g. "Antaios". The core of the "Antaios" plan is a National Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), which can operate at the level of the National Treasury. Its aims are:

-To provide strategic information to the governmental bodies and services, with the objective of a nation-level combating of the (financial) organized crime and of the money laundering phenomenon;

Finally, Hercules defeated his opponent by holding him in the air and cutting him off from the source of his power. It is through this prism that internal threats must be cut off from the source of their power.

- To assist in determining and recovering lost fiscal revenues;
- To combat corruption in the public and private sectors;
- To supervise and coordinate the so-called “addressees”, within the scope of application, of Act 2331/1995 (financial sector, self-employed persons, companies, etc.) and to utilize all pertinent reports;
- To combat terrorism (see the financing of terrorist organisations);
- To assume the role of an observatory for the asymmetrical threats described above, within the geographical area of Greece’s sphere of direct interests (SE Europe, Turkey, M. East) and to assist in exercising an effective economic diplomacy, on Greece’s part and in supporting Greek military units participating in peacemaking missions;
- To act as a link with similar services and units of foreign countries, within the context of international cooperation.

The means aiming to implement the mission of the NFIU are:

- The standardisation in terms of information management and distribution; such information covers financial transactions at a national level (reports, etc.);
- The provision of operational information with the aim to address serious criminal behaviors in the financial sector; The specialized provision of information and coordination services to the Greek administration (financial and customs authorities, the police, intelligence services, etc.);
- The publication and procurement of know-how products in the field covered by this information, on behalf of the Greek administration (printed material, software, etc.);
- Public information activities, addressed to the citizens, on the issues concerned and the participation of citizens in directly gathering information and evidence, using a complete and user-friendly website;
- The representation and cooperation, at a national level, with competent units of other countries and with foreign financial institutions, e.g. the FATF within the OECD;
- The drafting of suggestions for legislature and regulatory amendments, as well as on operational priorities.

Overall, the mission of the NFIU as a tool within the organisational framework of the herein IPCCAT proposed has, primarily, a financial content and objective and, secondarily, ought to function as the centralized instrument for the provision and management of information and evidence (Financial Intelligence Unit) on terrorism, money laundering,

and the organized financial crime, in relation with both the Greek and the foreign cooperating services.

The “Antaios” operational plan can play a central role in the context of a system that is capable of providing the Greek government with an overview of both the financial and the other sectors of the economy, particularly in the field of financial information collection, analysis and evaluation, related to money laundering and financial crime in general, corruption as well as terrorism. The benefits of such an approach are multi-faceted: enhancement of Greece’s Internal Security in terms of both the public revenues and the country’s image.

4. Determining the National/Ethnic-state Threats

The determination of Threat is still a *conditio sine qua non* and the cornerstone of any Defence Policy and Strategy, as well as of any Doctrine. In the case of Greece, the source of the Threat is, diachronically, the Turkish revisionism.

Regardless of the state regime, the ideological legitimisation, the political conjuncture, the occasional recession or exaltation of the Turkish revisionism and the temporary improvement or deterioration of the political atmosphere, regardless of the, at times, forecasted good intention of the temporary managers of Turkey’s institutional supra-structure, and, finally, regardless and to the detriment of any appeasement policy that Greece follows, a revisionist state actor in control of the Straits, whatever its institutional form, is a constant and fundamental threat of the Naval Power of the Archipelago (Greece), in geopolitical, geo-economic, geo-strategic and geo-cultural terms.

In witness of the above, we should take seriously under consideration the historically paradox fact that, despite having signed the Treaty of Lausanne as the defeated party, we have reached the point of strongly defending its validity towards a revisionist Turkey. The paradox lies in the fact that, as a rule of thumb (and of reason), the defeated countries pursue, violently or smoothly, the revision of the treaties and of the territorial and international law status quo that emanates from them. This rule has applied without exceptions in the case of the Great Powers (Germany of the Interim War Period), as well as of Medium (Hungary) and Small Powers (Bulgaria).

5. Defensive Preparation for the Worst Case Scenario (in combination with the National Cohesion/Internal Security Policy)

The successful deterrence and, should this fail, the successful defence against the Turkish threat should always be the first concern of the Defence Policy and Strategy officials, in cooperation with the assignees of the National Cohesion and Internal Security Policy.

6. Concert - Symmetry of Strategic, Operational and Tactical Objectives

It is the crucial parameter of a Defence Doctrine. Any asymmetry or disconcert among the strategic, operational and tactical objectives may prove to be dangerous or even fatal for the outcome of a war.

For example, in the case of the Yom Kippur War, Israel, having been strategically annihilated, was defeated also on the political level, despite the fact that, during the second phase of the war, it demonstrated noteworthy tactical and operational profits. Conversely, Egypt came out of the war as the political winner, because it had and maintained the strategic supremacy, despite the fact that the spectacular advance had a very different outcome than the one predicted by the gains of the first days of the war.

Similarly, the US suffered a humiliating political defeat in Vietnam due to a serious strategic crisis (including the erosion of the internal front); at the time they demonstrated a series of tactical successes at various operation fronts!

7. Modern Technologies and War

7.1. Technology

The technological dimension in a country's defence, relates to its capability to produce, use and/or modify technologies with a direct or indirect application in the field of defence, in all areas required. It is directly related to the capabilities and deficiencies of the country's educational system and its interior economic environment. Knowledge in the fields of natural sciences, information systems as well as Mediter-

ranean and European languages and cultures, acquired by the country's university graduates, permits the unhindered introduction and usage of high-profile technologies in the defence sector, by both the users and the maintenance personnel.

Moreover, these structures improve the country's available capacity for modifying such technologies and customizing them to fit the specific purposes outlined by its operational doctrine. The existence of highly qualified personnel, both within and outside the armed forces, creates also the basis for the implementation of a wider RTD system, allowing the development of prototype applications and means. These are a strategic advantage for the country, given that they are unknown to the potential enemy and difficult to analyze. Also, the technological infrastructure allows the optimum utilisation of the offsets included in defence material procurement contracts. Such offsets are usually not implemented at all, or implemented in a strange and unorthodox manner.

Within the context of a Defence Doctrine, and in order for this Doctrine to avoid facing implementation problems due to deficient technological infrastructures, it is a necessity to record the capabilities in all areas both within and outside the armed forces, in order to determine the country's capability to implement equipment programmes in the mid-term.

Consequently, a detailed database will have to be put in place, to include all the necessary information. This database will have to be updated on a regular basis, so as to be used as a benchmark for future planning.

Moreover, a second and significantly larger database will also have to be created, to serve as a research tool for registering all the information traced in accessible (open) sources in relation to the worldwide developments of defence applications. This database will allow the immediate evaluation of threats within Greece's wider geopolitical space, since it will permit the analysis of various scenarios and the mid-term forecasting of the potential of various combined threats and risks.

The aspect of determination is, at all times, a research field of the Intelligence Services, primarily. On a secondary basis, it is possible to enhance it with a pertinent database. This, too, requires the examination of the information infrastructure of the central government instrument under consideration and its possible modification, so as to permit, technically and administratively, the creation of an *ad hoc* special service,

whose tasks will be outside the authority of the General Staffs.

It is not a matter of chance that the American Pentagon has partly modified its organisation in order to establish three such services, with their task being the drafting of scenarios, considering also Greece's procurements. Some of the above-mentioned scenarios have been used at times as a means for influencing our foreign policy.

Therefore, and in addition to all the aforementioned models that must necessarily be taken under consideration when drafting a new Defence Doctrine, we should, furthermore, examine the possibility of our country's participation in joint ventures related to equipment and logistics programmes and to include functions that will be predicted to be reliable in the future and in periods of crises.

The reliable functions should be clarified and, based on such an analysis, included in the Defence Doctrine or excluded from it. Similarly, we should look into the Logistics chain related to modern technologies, so as to render possible the drafting of a self-reliant Doctrine in the technological field. Given that the Navy and the Air force are the *par excellence* sectors that rely on highly-profiled technological systems and given, also, that the theatres of possible operations are *par excellence* aeronautical with the participation of Special Forces, their importance for the new doctrine is more than evident, as is also the extent of their influence upon it. In other words, the technological basis should be examined not only with regard to its various dimensions, but also with regard to its relation with the Logistics system, its exogenous dependence and its dependence on the (mainly electrical) power grid of the country. Simultaneously, we should examine the degree of dependency of the armed forces on specific technological systems and the alternative solutions, so as to determine the limits of the systems in periods of intensive use, as well as the possibilities for their rapid corrective maintenance.

7.2. *Technology and War*

Within the context of the new doctrine, we should also look into the relevance of information flows on the basis of the increased role of the C4ISR systems and the subsequent change of the armed forces' information structures. This is necessary for the following reasons:

First, in order to modernize the way the military units are manned and trained, that will have to be created to serve this specific purpose.

Given the tightness of resources, the armed forces do not have the luxury of creating a service analogous to the National Security Agency and to the information gathering and processing structures of the US or of major European countries. Consequently, the method that is considered to be most appropriate for the purposes of this study and for drafting a far-reaching defence doctrine is the creation of a cellularly-formed service which will function as the model of a nucleus, capable of providing all levels of field command with real-time information, without, however, offering visible and easily targeted points of collapse. Its structuring requires, of course, detailed planning and careful analysis.

The **second reason** relates to the change of structures and character of the potential threats which the New Doctrine will be called upon to confront. The instability caused in the wider strategic chain of the SE Mediterranean creates a privileged field for the action of systems with a high technological profile, particularly within the armed forces. Without neglecting the indispensable contribution of human intelligence (HUMINT), its political vulnerability renders indispensable the need to collect information using other means as well, which, due to their operational nature, abolish the traditional structure of the information systems and require an adequately developed networking and usage, so as to reduce costs. All the above should be studied and constitute an important pillar for the country's new Defence Doctrine.

It should be noted at this point that the new strategic doctrine of the US has brought about significant changes in the way the information warfare is seen and has connected it closely with information gathering and management using C4-systems. For the purpose of clarifying the scope of requirements for the armed forces in this sector, we should mention the main changes brought about to the US doctrine. The innovations introduced are briefly the following:

- Dismantling of the big and heavy units and replacement with new, rapidly moving and easily transported, units with small logistic support followers.

- Emphasis on the independent gathering of information, with the primary aim being the speed of analysis and the preciseness in the location of targets. This achieves full protection of friendly forces and total exposal of the enemy to friendly fire.

- Reinstitution of the doctrines and further processing of the tactical combined weapon systems that had been developed around the end of WWII, in order to re-establish the immediate and precise cooperation

between the artillery, the infantry and the air force; a cooperation lost after the Vietnam war.

-Utilisation of the Navy for the close support of land operations, with emphasis on the preciseness of indirect fire and the development of long-range artillery systems, as well as of rocket systems with external terminal guidance. The submarine warfare doctrine is proportionally modified, placing particular emphasis on the support of Special Forces.

-Focusing on the “Full Spectrum Dominance” term, which marks a new type of warfare, characterised by capital and technological intensity and realistic and intensive training, insofar as this is possible.

-Emphasis on the destruction of the enemy’s factors of power, including their main energy, transportation and telecommunications infrastructures. The war acquires a dimension of economic pressure, which in turn requires flexible economic instruments and financial fluidity.

-Emphasis on the protection of the national territory, at a degree first marked since 1960, when the last air-defence squadrons of the US were dismantled and replaced occasionally by the National Guard, with the exception of Alaska.

-Emphasis on the use of unmanned means at the commencement and during the war, with the aim to minimize the financial and political costs.

-Emphasis on the change of the information structure at the political and military field, with a pertinent restructuring and changes to the already existing services, as well with the creation of a special branch within the American Pentagon, with a specially appointed high-rank chief.

-Emphasis on the systemic texture of warfare, which translates into a comprehensive interconnection of all the parameters of power of the state that are used in wartime and in peace-enforcement operations. Based on the American Doctrine, the combination of info-centric warfare and interoperability means Systemic Warfare, with all the possible consequences on the cultural level and the totalitarian nature of war.

-Full prevalence, without opponents, over the militarization of space, with the aim being the full destruction of any means of the enemy and to achieve total supremacy in the info- and network-centric warfare. According to the US Secretary of Defence D. Rumsfeld, war in space is inevitable and constitutes the field in which the US must not face equivalent opposition.

7.2.1. The Transformation of Warfare in the Post-Cold War Environment

During the last two years, defence technologies have developed at an unprecedented pace. This development is usually termed as the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). Also, a series of dramatic changes is observed in both the methodology and the overall concept of warfare, in the context of the geopolitical challenges put forward by the post-Cold War era and, during the last years, the “war against terrorism”.

Generally speaking, it can be said that the combination of technological developments and the new geopolitical challenges in the post-Cold War world, particularly after September, 11 have changed the overall form and essence of warfare and of military power, primarily in the US.

The essence of this transformation lies in the observation that the “tool of war” tends to increase its multi-dimensionality and to become “cheaper” than its Cold War predecessor. In other words, it tends to cover a multitude of warfare scenarios and of operations other than war (OOTW), at a significantly lesser cost.

The cost of warfare operations can be briefly broken down as follows:

i) The financial cost, covering the creation, maintenance and war-time utilisation of a war force.

ii) The “blood cost”, i.e. the capability of a war force to operate with the minimum casualties among its personnel and the general population, or even among the enemy forces, should this be deemed necessary.

iii) The time cost, in other words the capability of a war force to overcome quickly in the event of a geo-strategic challenge and to rapidly attain victory.

iv) The “dependency cost”, i.e. the capability of a war force to operate without relying on forces or facilities availed by other countries.

7.2.2. Info- and Network-centric Warfare

In the modern culture that is characterised by information and network intensity, a new form of info-centric/network-centric warfare emerges.

The info-centric warfare places emphasis, inter alia, on multi-level systems, such as the US FCS (“Future Combat System”), which operate in the form of “battle units”, on the basis of network unification, and at the level of sensors, data-fusion techniques, communication links, precision assault artillery, man-machine interfaces (MMIs), unmanned vehicles, etc.

8. “Professional Army” Issues

In order to meet the *de facto* requirements as outlined above, a new National Defence Doctrine will have to be drafted, based on the type of armed forces which our country really aims to develop for the next decades. It is clearly a matter of major political option. What has yet to be clarified is the notion of the so-called “professional army”. By its very nature, an army is not a profession in the traditional meaning of the term.

There can be no such thing as working hours at the soldiers’ level, simply because there would be no army.

An army cannot be considered professional, if not trained in all the means it has available for reasons of cost.

An army cannot be considered professional, if it does not avail the elementary means for survival and of clothing to the soldiers of all ranks.

An army cannot be considered professional, if it is incapable of adequately utilising its technological means owing to the small number or to the technological drawbacks of its simulators or if it lacks the inter-networking capabilities that are a prerequisite for the full training of personnel in combined operations. “Professionalism” must be fully understood. The American model is a too costly solution for the country’s capabilities. Possibly, the model that matches Greece’s standard best is a combination of the French and the Singapore models, respectively in terms of the Foreign Legion’s structure and the mobilisation and training of the reserve personnel. Sweden’s and Switzerland’s models are quite interesting, in terms of reserve army, nation-wide civil defence and osmosis of the civil and military elements. Also, the percentage of professional personnel is quite different in highly-profiled technological weapon systems, compared to systems requiring massive troops. The elimination of the army of draftees is impossible, not only because the technological cost is unbearable for Greece, but also on the psychological level. Dating back to Plato and Machiavelli, it is always a true statement that a fully professional army is quickly alienated from the values that guide and sustain a national army and ends up to be a mechanism with lower limits of strength and tolerance. And this is particularly dangerous at times of prolonged and potentially serious crises.

Greece has to date presented an army of draftees and reserves, inadequately trained, poorly equipped, and relying on a Defence Doctrine emphasizing the concept of inflexible defence. This concept, according

to which the country's main infrastructures would be available from the start of a war and for a long period of wartime, failed to take under consideration the economic escalation of a crisis or war, i.e. the major political problem for the administration. It is obvious that a Defence Doctrine cannot be modified each time there is a change in the country's economic figures. We should not forget that in Greece, this change is a harmful but common phenomenon. What is important is the need to have an overview of certain principal capabilities and strengths of the country in this area, as well as the range of sacrifice the government is determined to accept, compared to the range of benefits. These are decisions of political nature that, to a large extent, shape the nucleus of the Doctrine and, therefore, cannot be taken for granted.

The combination of Economy, Technology and Political Determination will form the bases of tolerance of the New Doctrine. Any change that may be decided in the future will rely on these three elements.

Following the rationale of the above remarks, it should be examined whether the armed forces of the future will be professional and, by extension, the things to be decided upon are the type of professionals required for manning them, as well as whether the armed forces will integrate the factor of power projection as a main stage of their operation. Furthermore, things that must be clarified are the degree and the rhythm of technology absorption, based on the capabilities available, the human resources and the quality options these offer, and the lifetime cost of technological infrastructures.

On the basis of this study, Greece will be able to draft a far-reaching Training Doctrine. This, in turn, will enable a variety of options in relation to the adaptability of the Defence Doctrine to contingencies. Given that our country, according to the treaties it has signed, relating mainly to the NATO structures and to the developing defence capability of the EU, as well as that it does not have the luxury of dual capability so as to avail forces to collective defence organisations while having to keep up with the need to preserve its national interests, it is obvious that the Doctrine must include not only a new method of personnel recruitment and troop formation, but also a comprehensive approach to the problem of limited means and resources. This problem must be addressed mainly through common training procedures at the level of strategic threats, with the simultaneous emphasis on the use of Special Forces as the main contributor to Greece's participation in a small range of allied missions. Moreover, it will have to preserve the important power multiplication

systems (e.g. airborne radars) within the national territory. In this way, Greece will be in a position to contribute to international missions, with a low political cost and without fragmenting the existing forces, thus permitting the concentration of forces in areas of importance for the Greek interests and allowing the government to contribute to international initiatives with domestic forces, through negotiation and with the aim to serve political aims. We should not forget that war is still the exercising of policies with other means.

The changes mentioned above mark, on the one hand, the worldwide scope of the US plans, and, on the other, the concert of the Republicans and the Democrats at the national level in relation to the US supremacy, mainly in Europe and in the India-China-Indonesia triangle, i.e. the US keys for a low-cost hegemony. It is, in other words, the application of the US National Defence Doctrine, as formulated since 2001, and published by the White House, during the Bush administration. Based on these changes, it is relatively easy to calculate, in the mid-term, their “cost” for Greece’s Defence Doctrine, because of the geo-strategic turbulence and the structural change they will bring about in the wider region.

9. The Structure of Relations between Political and Military Officials

This is a basic aspect of a Nation’s Defence Policy, according to Huntington. On the institutional level, a constant requirement is the development of a system of Political-Military Relations that will maximize the nation’s military security and will at the same time minimize the sacrifice of other social values. A properly balanced model of relations between the political and the military officials²⁷ is required for this purpose. It is a historical certainty that the nations that develop a properly balanced model of relations between the political and the military officials acquire a major comparative advantage in their effort to respond to the security dilemma they face. On the contrary, those nations that fail to find the proper balance waste their forces and are exposed to unforeseeable risks.

In our times, at least when referring to modern Western pluralist for-

27. Cf. S. Huntington, *op. cit.*, 2.

mations of the Aristotelian-Roman-Jewish-Christian type, the requirement is not the establishment of the democratic/parliamentary control over the armed forces, but how to prevent the abuse of the armed forces, a valuable public asset of the nation and the people, by groups of organized interests (politicians, opinion leaders, etc.) which, under the flag of various political theologies (postmodernist/meta-national progressivism, humanism, etc.) try to mislead the armed forces and the political and military officials towards venturesome activities that are, in the final analysis, totally damaging for the National Interests.

Consequently, the drafting of a New Defence Doctrine requires full knowledge, insofar as it is possible, of all the dimensions of power, at least in the present conjuncture, or the estimation of these dimensions on the basis of the worst case scenarios. This will probably result in a waste of resources because of the concern for situations that will possibly never exist, or even the diffusion of effort in areas which might prove to be useless in a detailed registration scheme.

Besides, emphasis should be put on Greece's participation in Collective Security Systems and other organisations which, to a certain extent, bind the drafting of the Defence Doctrine because of the political decisions already taken and ratified with treaties. The validity, and mainly the interpretation of the latter, must neither be taken for granted nor considered as easy to breach as the case may be. The recent events of the third war in the Gulf prove that both the treaties and the international organisations are, to take a constant assumption of the Realist School of International Relations, as valid as the corresponding armed forces of their signatories.

Of course, the neo-Realist School accepts that, in a world of pre-existing interdependence, sometimes the so-called "soft power projection" of a state is rather more desirable, even if the term "soft" does not imply a passive, but, on the contrary, a more active stance on the operational level, through the participation with armed forces in peace operations, etc. Consequently, it is essential to note that the Defence Doctrine, especially in relation to prevention, can and should include some part of the country's "soft" power projection, with emphasis on the timely prevention of potentially risky developments. Therefore, it is obvious in this context that there is a need to cooperate with bodies and services that until recently were not - or considered as - an integral part of the country's defensive web.

Functionality Requirements of the NDD

Further down, we ought to clarify the requirements of functionality, and therefore effectiveness, of a National Defence Doctrine.

D.1. The Doctrine must utilize a clear analysis of the dynamic model of our country's geopolitical environment, in the framework of its geopolitical sub-system as well as in the determination of the limits of its geographical system and supra-system in (i) defence; (ii) economic; (iii) political; and (iv) cultural/information management terms.

D.1.1. This approach must extend to two main sectors of linguistic information utilisation, in peacetime as well as in the theatre of operations:

D.1.1.a. In a socio-linguistic aspect

-It is necessary to effect a diachronic registration of the linguistic behavior of the Greek Turkish-speaking citizens of Thrace, depending on the communicative instance (everyday communication, transactions, contacts with administrative services, education) and to compare, using appropriate language analysis tools, this linguistic behavior to specific activities of linguistic hegemonism on the part of Ankara (mass media, public events, etc.).

-The same approach must be adopted with respect to ethnic-cultural formations (ethno-linguistic/ethnic-religious minority pre-formations) that develop within Greece's territory, as a result of the presence of economic immigrants and of illegal immigration.

D.1.1.b. In a military-information aspect

The following actions are also considered necessary:

-The systematic collection of linguistic (textual) material within the scope of our national interest from selected sources of the adversaries or of hostile national actors or centres of asymmetrical threats (mass media, press releases of public bodies, propaganda sheets, etc.) and its classification in structured textual databases, according to specific criteria for thematic/evaluative registration.

-The collection of informative material (in cryptographic or open form) and its integration into textual databases, combined with the use of Computational Linguistics tools (statistical and frequency analysis of the lexemes ["tokens"], isolation of keywords in context [KWIC], etc.) and interaction of this informative material with the early warning networks at a staff level.

D.2. The NDD should aim at the design and drafting of the national

security of both the state and its citizens, as the safeguard against external threats of the conventional military type, both direct and indirect.

D.3. The NDD should develop a protective security framework inside the National Territory, against all kinds of asymmetrical threats.

D.4. The NDD should be able to guarantee the geographical integrity of the national space.

D.5. The NDD should guarantee the provision of assistance, both adequate and compatible with the geopolitical situation, to countries with which pertinent treaties have been signed, providing for specific obligations.

D.6. The NDD should protect the country's substantial interests, when an armed threat is directed against them that cannot be addressed within the scope of responsibility of collective security organisations.

D.7. The NDD should be able to coordinate all of the country's capabilities (in the defence, economic, political and cultural fields) in wartime and, hence, to have developed pertinent capabilities for intervention in institutions and material infrastructures.

D.8. The NDD should describe precisely the limits of a threat that could invoke an immediate and full response, using all the state's available means.

D.9. The NDD should allow for the mid- and long- term planning of forces, based on specific strategic requirements and their development.

Proposals for the Establishment of Institutional Bodies in the Context of Implementing and Operating the NDD

In order to provide for the continuity, the consistency and the robust formation of the complex of all the above targets, as well as in order to serve these targets, the following are required:

i. **an Instrument for the Continuous Geo-strategic Control** (Geo-strategic Observatory, GEO); and

ii. **an Instrument for the Prevention and Confrontation of Conventional and Asymmetrical Threats** (IPCCAT).

These two bodies could be envisaged in the organisational framework of the *Defence Analysis Institute*, which, after being substantially upgraded in this sense, should be renamed to *Institute of Geopolitical and Geo-strategic Analysis*. The GEO structure will collect, classify,

evaluate, rank, synthesize and communicate to the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister all the elements (defence, financial, economic, political and cultural) that make up the geo-strategic picture of the Mediterranean basin and determine our country's position within it. The model of its operation could be found in the Spanish institute of strategic studies (the **Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos**), an upgraded foundation with international prestige, the Research observatory for security policy and conflict analysis of the Polytechnic School of Zurich (the **Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik and Konfliktanalyse/ETH-Zurich**), the French Foundation for strategic research (the **FRS**) or the EU **Institute for Security Studies**, which was inherited from the WEU.

These two bodies must work closely with the military information directorates of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff and the corresponding directorates of the Greek National Intelligence Service. Also, the GEO structure should be linked to the C4ISR²⁸ network (i.e.: Command, Control, Communication, the three main "senses" of all the staffs regardless of the formation level, + Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance). The role of reconnaissance is usually dual and can be performed with a variety of means (ranging from the space to the naked eyes of soldiers). However, intelligence fusion, in other words the effective correlation of all the information from all sources, is currently outside the capabilities of the armed forces, in spite of the fact that this is a target to pursue. Typical examples pointing to this necessity are the explosion of fires during the summer months and the confusion that it creates due to the lack of adequate resources for the provision and synthesis of information and the recent power black-out which, inter alia, pointed also to the need to address the country's energy safety at a strategic and tactical level and, more in particular, to determine the availability of critical networks for the armed forces in periods of crises.

28. Computers used for the rapid evaluation and registration of all information, as well as for the drafting of response scenarios in the minimum possible time. This is information, of a tactical interest mainly, that can be used directly by the staffs for carrying out operations. Greece's deficit in the information chain is to be found exactly at this point, because of the nebulous distinction between tactical and strategic pieces of information. Under normal circumstances, the National Intelligence Agency would provide the armed forces with strategic and the remaining political instruments with mixed information. However, the lack of technical infrastructure at the armed forces' level makes this relation obvious; its cost in the case of Imia is paradigmatic.

Conclusions

The conclusions drawn from this study are meant to serve as guidelines for the research needed in view of drafting Greece's new Defence Doctrine.

i. The doctrine incorporates and codifies the resultant of all the country's power dimensions. Consequently, and in order for the doctrine to last in time, we should be fully aware of these dimensions prior to drafting the doctrine.

ii. The researchers must be aware of the political determination in relation to the national interests, categorized in vital, major/substantial and secondary. Under normal circumstances, this would be the simplest of tasks, as reading the country's National Defence Doctrine would suffice. However, because no such text has ever been drafted in Greece, the analyst must look into the interests and determine their classification in the eyes of the country's political leaders, considering that the determination of the national interests is not self-evident, but constitutes the work of political officials and depends on a variety of endo-systemic factors, particularly in the case of modern pluralist formations with an Aristotelian-Roman-Jewish Christian texture.

iii. The term "professional army" must be specified in full.

iv. The C3-sector must be restructured and/or changed, with the addition of the IT field and of a complete ISR network, thus creating a web fully adapted to Greece's needs and capabilities, both technological as defined above, and economic. The combination of commercial technologies (COTS) and customized applications is the crucial factor, while software development constitutes the basis of self-reliance in the future.

v. It is necessary to provide for basic geo-strategic parameters, with the maximum possible precision. Consequently, analysis of the moves of certain international players must be envisaged, based on information already available from open sources.

vi. Based on what is known or can be calculated on the basis of information available, it would be purposeful to analyze the military strategy of certain countries (the US, France, Germany, the UK, China, India, N. Korea, Japan) that guide the technological developments and, consequently, the new type of warfare that is developing worldwide, on both the theoretical and the practical levels and will exercise an increasing direct or indirect influence upon the country.

vii. The NDD should envisage the possible creation of an organisa-

tion modeled like the NSC. This would allow the radical restructuring of the doctrine and hence the strategic options emanating from it in a short period of time, while time- and resource-consuming programmes are underway. Economizing on resources and means is a strategic stake for the country, because it allows the prompt adaptation to radical changes if and when they arise, without seriously impacting the country's economic and social life. Israel's shock when it was faced with the Intifada is a typical example. In the case of Greece, economizing on forces translates into both material and human resources.

viii. The new doctrine ought to take under consideration the social and economic change in the country, which will become more apparent during its application. Despite the fact that a doctrine does not last forever, the aim for its nucleus and its basic guidelines is to not require adaptation. It is therefore necessary to incorporate the parameter of the so-called internal front. With this proviso, it is possible to pursue effective psychological warfare also towards the exterior.

ix. It is considered purposeful to create National Units for the Collection, Management and Utilisation of Information, together with the creation and utilisation of a real-time- or quasi-real-time-operable database, to allow for the continuous evaluation of capabilities and of possible internal and external threats. This will enable the adaptation of specific guidelines of the doctrine to mid-term changes before these changes actually take place. In essence, it is a form of policy implementation functioning in the framework of deterrence. Even though it is not part of the doctrine's core in practical terms, it belongs to it from a theoretical perspective. In other words, while not changing the military planning and the development of a specific range of capabilities, by means of the scenarios publicised or assumed to exist, it deters others from options which we would otherwise be called upon to face in the real world. It is an extremely delicate psychological game, which however relies on the credibility of the studies that have been made known to the enemy and, consequently, on the enemy's assumption about the existence of studies he is not aware of. The more complete this database, the higher the credibility of the assumptions in relation to what may have been studied, by entities that are unaware of what has actually been studied.

x. In order for the picture of capabilities and power limitation factors to be up-to-date and reliable, there is a need for regular and institutionally automatic consultation and exchange of information with other government agencies.

Overall, the country's new Defence Doctrine is a big analytical and theoretical exercise, given that there is no current National Defence Doctrine, on the one hand, and that the self-knowledge of the Greek state is quite limited, as witness from time to time its own services (the statistical service, the treasury, etc.); an exercise requiring a multi-disciplinary approach prior to drafting a final proposal.

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