

XXVI. A Geo-Cultural Perspective of Global Stability and Security: The Root Causes of Terrorism

[Published first in: *Defensor Pacis* 17 (2005), 5-29]

Abstract: This paper presents a geopolitical approach to the phenomenon of terrorism, dealing mainly with its geo-economic, geo-strategic and geo-cultural aspects. Aiming to establish an analytical basis for comprehending and countering the root causes of terrorism, it builds upon the global instability framework theorem as influenced by the trends of current globalisation processes, such as the issues of energy and energy resources, globalisation and the rapid technological changes, the world's demographics and global climate changes. The broad stability concept is adopted as a substitute model for the traditional power and control maxim, with special emphasis on the so-called socially acceptable models and rates of development.

Definitions of Terrorism

The phenomenon of terrorism has seen many definitions, in its geographical, political, religious and cultural dimension. This is because its opposite, i.e. the theory and the praxis of confronting the phenomenon of terrorism and its consequences, is in fact influenced by the notion of interest, national or supranational, the concept of which ultimately differentiates the semantic specification of the notion of terrorism.¹

1. For a comprehensive list of definitions of terrorism, cf. the compilation of the Terrorism and Counterterrorism Research Group, Canada at: <http://www.erta->

According to the UN Secretary General Kofi Anan:² *“Any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians and non-combatants, with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from any act”*.

According to the US Joint Command Staff:³ *“The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against people or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives”*. According to the US Department of State terrorism is: *“Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”*.⁴

According to the US Secretary of Defence, D. Rumsfeld (16.10.2001): *“Terrorism, of course, has a lot of definitions and people have different views as to what it means precisely. For myself, I think of the word as meaning an act whereby innocent people are involved and killed”*.

According to the Arab League,⁵ terrorism must be defined as: *“Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupy or seize them, or seeking to jeopardize national resources”*.

According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry:⁶ *“Terrorism can be considered as an extreme form of expression, which is most contrary to the values of democracy, civilization and humanity. Terrorist acts, methods and practices seem to be adopted by movements which are of an exclusionist nature, which refuses a priori the responsibility of living together with “the other”, who is thought to be different”*.

tcrg.org/definitions.htm.

2. Madrid, Spain, March 2005. Kofi Anan’s keynote address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security - “A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism” (full text at: <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1345>).

3. JCS Pub 1.02 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 June 89.

4. US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1994*, April 1995, vi.

5. See: The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, 22 April 1998 (full text at: <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/terrorism98.htm>).

6. See: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Terrorism/>

Aiming at a synthesis of the many definitions on terrorism, we should look into a notional/semantic delimitation of the term's qualifiers:⁷

1. The notion of terror is defined as:
 - violence (assassination, injury, various physical risks);
 - threat of the use of violence;
 - pretended use of violence;
 - indirect violence (paralysis of power, communication, water supply networks, etc.); and
 - sabotage (including the so-called "cyber-sabotage", i.e. physical destruction, using IT manipulations and tools).
2. The notion of destruction refers to:
 - human life;
 - property; and
 - information (cyber-terrorism, destruction of virtual property).
3. The legal and moral basis of terrorism is analyzed as:
 - "non-legitimate" violence (a concept distinguished from the activity of resistance groups, freedom fighters and others);
 - the use of criminal means; and
 - the illegal or criminal interference into the property and interests of third parties.
4. As pertains to their relations with states and state entities, terror groups are defined as:
 - state groups (whose members act on behalf of a state);
 - groups that are financed or otherwise encouraged by a state entity; and
 - groups that are politically aligned with state entities (e.g. vigilante groups, extreme right-wing political groups);
 - anti-state groups:
 - i) local or acting within a state territory; and
 - ii) groups that are supported, financed, encouraged or otherwise directed by another state;
 - organized crime groups aiming at influencing another state;
 - groups not related to a state or state entity;
 - groups specifically targeting other groups (e.g. industry);
 - the so-called "parallel groups" ("imported conflict": terrorists against immigrants).
5. The following are noteworthy with regard to the asymmetry of terrorism:

7. Cf.: Terrorism and Counterterrorism Research Group, Canada, *op. cit.*

- a substantial power gap between the terrorist group (or the terrorist individual) and the target;
 - terrorists do not use frontal attack and do not confront the armed forces (in this sense, terrorism is distinguished from guerrilla activity); and
 - terrorists attack so-called “soft targets”.
6. The objectives of terrorism can be classified as follows:
- radical, i.e. aiming at profound changes;
 - peripheral, i.e. serving specific interests;
 - abstract or superstitious, i.e. governed by some internal logic, e.g. religious; and
 - irrational, i.e. lacking internal logic.
7. As to its targeting, terrorism is directed against:
- direct targets, i.e. civilians, non-combat or “innocent” targets; and
 - indirect targets, i.e. beyond physical danger (well-protected, particularly important or indiscernible targets):
 - i) generally, a country’s political administration;
 - ii) big economic organisations or industries, or scientific sectors; and
 - iii) individuals exercising power.
8. In terms of their organisation, terrorist groups:
- are organized in cells;
 - participate in a movement, organized to a certain extent; and
 - in the case of individuals, are deemed to act on a mercenary basis on behalf of organized groups.
9. As pertains to the communication practices of terrorist groups, these are defined as follows:
- propaganda by means of action aiming to:
 - i) send out messages through examples;
 - ii) render terrorist attacks acceptable/understandable; and
 - iii) send out messages to other groups or individuals, as possible future recruits;
 - and practices aiming to publicize a cause, so that:
 - i) the public exercises pressure on the government;
 - ii) the public changes its attitude or behavior; and
 - iii) a massive mobilisation is caused.

In summary, a comprehensive view of the phenomenon of terrorism could end up with the following “scholarly-oriented” definition:

“Terrorism is any practice, whether collective or individual, diachronic or synchronic, deemed to be directed against interests of a na-

tion-state factor or a supranational formation, in the sense that such an interest is perceived by the factor or the formation. Terrorist activity is expressed secondarily and in proportion to the size and power of such interests, on the basis of economic and/or cultural causes”.

The economic and cultural causes of terrorist activity

The international environment is undergoing a continuous process of economic and cultural integration. In geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-cultural terms, this process is typical of the expansion of the existing zones of influence of the international power poles that may project their corresponding political, economic and cultural power towards the geographical zones of the national social formations' (States) which may in fact accept such a projection. In the modern globalized, as well as permanently chaotic, international environment, it is a mere fragmentary and isolated practice to refer solely to the branch of weapon systems and equipment, with a view to determine the zones of influence of the international poles of power, by identifying and determining these poles solely on the basis of national or –what is more inopportune- on the basis of *nation-centric* characteristics. Within this very environment, one of the major factors of discontent among the masses of the national social formations of the world, particularly those characterised by a low degree of economic, political and social development, is the *cultural* factor.

Cultural differences, mainly, together with their impact on the level of social *unconsciousness*, create the fundamentals leading to terrorist activity, more even than the economic factors, which a conventional Marxist analysis of the phenomenon of *terrorism* would identify.

The sole examples of the Basque and Irish terrorism that have tormented for so long metropolitan centers of the industrially developed Western world (Spain and N. Ireland), are enough proof of the above assumption. The case of Basque terrorism is typical of an economically flourishing society that resorts to terrorism for pure reasons of obsession, linked to the *strong nationalism* of the Basques. In the case of Northern Ireland, we also observe a dominant ideological motive. What is more in this case, nationalistic ideology is reinforced by religious ideology, at least to the extent that the dogmatic-confessional difference

between the Roman Catholic Irish and the Protestant British has historically assumed par excellence the role of the national self-consciousness of the former, as in the case of the Catholic Polish versus the Protestant Prussians or the Patriarchic Macedonian Greeks versus the Exarchic Macedonian Bulgarians, etc. In both these cases, the causes of terrorism are of *cultural nature*, without of course our underestimating the existing political and economic conditions.

The same also applies to terrorism in Italy, where a terrorist movement was born and spread during the 1970s, was terminated in 1985 and resurrected as an organisation with limited membership in 1998. In the first case, the Red Brigades, and to a lesser extent organisations like Potere Operaio and Prima Linea, developed in the form of mass movements, with a clear ideological orientation towards armed struggle and with the aim of subverting the capitalist regime and the Western-modeled structure of the state. The common matrix of these problems was the events of May 1968 in Paris and their exploitation by the KGB, in the context of its ideological conflict with NATO and the values it represented. The modern “New Red Brigades” developed within the framework of an ideological perception of Italy’s reality, assisted by ex-members of the old Red Brigades who had remained at liberty. This time, their structure was cellular with limited membership and made intensive use of technological means, both for enabling communication between members and for operational planning purposes. What is also noteworthy is the fact that the New Red Brigades never pursued the massive expression of their deeds, preferring to act as revolutionary elite (*avanguardia*).

The same could also be said with regard to the case of *Islamist* (not *Islamic*) terrorism. The -ist ending denotes an obsession, or at least an ideological diligence, purely of the cultural type. In other words, it refers to the detour of religion towards politics and paramilitary/terrorist activity. In relation to Islamist terrorism, which nowadays is the most important international factor of systemic destabilisation, it must be stressed that it is enhanced by the theological vagueness of the religion in question. In this respect, mention must be made of *Jihad* (i.e. the Holy War), which is susceptible to multiple interpretations. Certain Muslim theologians consider Jihad as referring to a triptych:

- i. the *spiritual war* conducted by the faithful Muslim *against his own passions*;
- ii. the *spiritual war* conducted by the faithful Muslim *against the sinful decadence of the Society of the Faithful*;

iii. the *spiritual war* which the Society of the Faithful (the Umma) making up the House of Islam (the Dar al-Islam) directs *against the Society of the Infidels* (the Dar al-Harb), *so that Islam can conquer the planet.*

It must be noted that the notion of the nation-state is non-existent for Islam. The “true” believers consider the “borders of the *Umma*, i.e. of the Nation of Islam, to coincide with the borders of Faith”! In other words, with the borders of the whole planet, if we assume that the ultimate and ideal case of promulgation of Islam is the entire planet.

Conversely, certain radicals, usually *former Marxists* and currently *Muslim theologians*, consider the soul-spiritual aspect of Jihad to constitute a mere part of the duties which a faithful Muslim must perform. The other and most important aspect is the armed violence against all the “betraying governments of the Umma” that abandon Islam and “decline” by adopting Western cultural and societal organisation models. In this sense, the US and Israel are seen as the “Great Satan” that panders to these governments and it is for this reason that the main part of their bloody activities is directed against these two countries and their populations.

Categorisation of the motives of terrorism

In addition to the purely cultural background, which refers to metaphysical interpretations of Good and Evil, of the Just and the Unjust, there are also other forms of terrorism that preserve the common Manichean element of distinction between Good and Evil, but legitimize their Divine Word by means of purely political and ideological criteria and by avoiding metaphysical references.

This is purely the case of *politico-ideological/politico-economic terrorism*, including both “extreme left” and “extreme right” terrorism.⁸ On the basis of these two forms of terrorism, there are de facto, cultural and economic causes as ideological references. In the case of so-called “extreme right” terrorism, there is the metaphysics of “Blood and Soil”,

8. Taking into account, of course, that unless used with further qualifiers, the terms “right” and “left” are nowadays totally inappropriate to define concisely and consistently specific political views and behaviors, or at least that these terms are substantially relative.

the ideology of the “Purity of the Race and Blood”, i.e. Racism, a concept relying semiotically on a form of anthropomorphic analogism of the notions of “fatherland”, “blood” and “race”. In other words, the ideological mechanism for the promotion of the “extreme right” ideologico-political Word is *culturally oriented, even though it is rooted mainly in economic causes*. The “great danger” is personified, also in this case, as the “American-Zionism” that “poisons and kills” the “national body”. Briefly stated, the carrier of the *ideology of extreme right terrorism is socially expressed in the sphere of political discontent of the reacting individuals*.

In the case of so-called “extreme left” terrorism, the causes are to be found again in economic grounds; however the formulation of the ideological Word retains its socio-economic type. Metaphysics is also present in this case. It is, in essence, a secularized form of metaphysics, a political theology in which the “race-centric” doctrines of extreme right terrorism are substituted by respective “society-centric” doctrines (of “class struggle” type). The element of “class”, the so-called “Lumpen Bourgeois Class”,⁹ etc. form a particularly complex system of values that can drive extreme armed violence. What is sought is the consolidation among the “fighters” of a feeling of total decadence of the “modern capitalist society”, of “American imperialism”, “international Zionism”, etc. In this case, the carrier of the ideology of “extreme left” terrorism is socially expressed in the sphere of economic discontent of the reacting individuals.

In conclusion, as pertains to these two cases, the following can be said:

- i. racist metaphysics is the main characteristic of extreme right terrorism;
- ii. in both these cases, the important contribution of structural dysfunctions of the economy is recognized as the principal cause of terrorist practice; and
- iii. common elements of the two types of terrorism are (a) a transitional supra-nationalism in the case of extreme left terrorism; and (b) a permanent supra-nationalism in its extreme right form. No matter how bizarre it may sound, and regardless of the fact that, in the case of extreme right terrorism, super-nationalism is covered by an inter-

9. Term first used by the “17 November” terrorist group in Greece, in 1986, to designate “local capitalists who failed, as a distinct class, to develop the country self-reliantly, gained intolerable profits and then exported their capital [...]”.

nationalist vocabulary, its “value” as an element for “the protection of peoples”, even in the transitional phase of societies, is fully acceptable as a motive for violence.

Another important cause of organized terrorist movements must also be observed. This is the military invasion by powerful metropolitan countries of totalitarian, absolutist, and totally corrupted regimes that either rely on super-nationalistic ideologies or are of a theocratic basis (e.g. Islamic regimes with a theocratic government structure). It must be stressed at this point that the Islamic states are not necessarily theocratic; in other words, that their cabinet ministers are not necessarily only jurisprudents and that there is no requirement for the administration of the state to emanate obligatorily from the Shari’a (the Holy Koran Law). The Iranian paradigm of the Trusteeship of the Jurisprudent (the *Wilayat al-Faqih*) is unique in the Islamic world. The usual form of administration in the Islamic countries, i.e. in countries with a quasi-total prevalence of the Muslim element in society is secular/political governance, whose acts (legislation, decisions, etc.) are however obligatorily approved by a law-interpreting theological council that operates in parallel to the government, without being part of it (e.g. the Wahhabi regime of S. Arabia). Also, there are Islamic states in which the capabilities of the law interpreters are substantially limited. Military invasions of such ethnic-religious social formations cause serious ideological-political polarisation, which often (e.g. in the case of the Islamist movement) create terrorist sub-groupings using extremely dangerous subversive and bloody methods).

Religious Terrorism: The Case of the Islamist Movement

The social scales of Islamist movements

Islamist terrorism, primarily, is not produced at the level of the state, but at that of the community. The Muslim communities of the Middle East, experiencing for more than half a century a situation of latent or declared civil war, against one another or against their national governments, constitute the origins of the two scales of radical Islamist organisations. The first scale of organisation is characterised by its sheer size and by the impact it has on the entire national social formation.

Examples of this scale are groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, in relation to their influence on the Palestinian or the Lebanese populations.

The second scale of organisation is characterised by its small size and consists mainly of schismatic formations of fractions and dissenters. Extreme tendencies are the main characteristic of such groups.

Their structures

The organisations of the two above-mentioned levels have a political and military pillar, with the corresponding structures. The size of the politico-military pillar of these organisations is large and capable of preserving a higher level of autonomy in relation to the state powers of the countries where they are established, compared to their fractions, which are soon forced to surrender before the pressure and the manipulations by the governments of the countries in the areas of their activity, and, particularly, in the M. East, Lebanon, Sudan, etc. These groups are the most dangerous ones.

The manipulation centers of schismatic terrorist organisations

At this point, we should point out, as the first centre of manipulation, the organisations acting on the national scale, from which stem the fractions of our primary focus. No matter how strange this may sound, the channels of communication are never interrupted between these two scales of organisations, regardless of how hostile these relations appear to be. It is exactly in such cases where parallel linkages must be investigated.

The second type of manipulation centre is the secret services of the countries where such organisations are based. For example, in the case of Syria, no less than thirteen secret services or paramilitary groups can be cited, all under the control of President Assad, at least theoretically:

- i. the National Security Office, specializing in Counterintelligence in Lebanon and Syria;
- ii. the General Information Service;
- iii. the Civil Security Service, dealing with foreign representations and political parties, excluding the Ba'ath;

- iv. the Lebanon Occupation Army Information Service;
- v. the Army Information Service;
- vi. the Air force Information Service;
- vii. the President's Security Council, i.e. the supreme guidance body of the above agencies;
- viii. internal Security Forces;
- ix. special forces;
- x. battle brigades;
- xi. defence brigades (nowadays substantially weakened);
- xii. the Mortezza Community (religious paramilitary Alaouite organisation); and
- xiii. the Red Riders (Alawite civil guard of Lebanon).

The human resources of the terrorist Islamist fractions

The human resources of the schismatic fractions come from three sources:

(a) the mechanism of wide, "national" scale organisation. These are ideologically cultivated individuals, mature and faithful in their work, belonging to the veterans of the regional armed conflicts;

(b) small cores sharing a common family, racial or religious-ideological basis, or even an amalgam thereof, something that is common for the anthropological-social standards of the region of the Middle East and Maghreb and

(c) finally, individuals, the so-called "Kleenexes" in the secret services dialect. These are "single use" persons that are abandoned or assassinated by their employers as soon as they carry out an operation.

Modern Forms of Conventional Terrorism

Nuclear terrorism and bio-terrorism are simply the modern forms of "conventional" terrorist threats, focusing also on political and economic motives and causes, that can influence directly and catalytically the entire political, social and economic organisation of a state, owing to the eventual extent of their attacks.

A relatively recent branch of political-economic terrorism is so-

called *Eco-terrorism*, the causes of which are to be found in the response of specific individuals against the alleged destruction of the natural environment that is attributed to the “unreasonable exploitation of the prevalent capitalist way of production, as imposed by international and internationalized capital”, to use the political phraseology of its supporters. We might of course assume that the causes are substantially the same as those of the aforementioned forms of terrorism, simply adopting a somewhat more “advanced” lexical coverage. In view of legitimizing the terrorist acts, such a lexical coverage is aimed at the most sensitive social layers in relation to the protection of the natural environment. The target is, still, “big capital” and its “possessors”. It presents a wide spectrum of semiotic tools that, yet again, stem from the international mythology of flora, science fiction, theology, etc.

Cyber-terrorism is a similar case, perhaps not always bloody, but capable of causing economic catastrophes, or even outward paralysis of an entire societal organisation. Once more, the causes are mixed: economic, political and cultural. As an example, we could cite the theology-inspired fanaticism of all kinds that sees the technology of computerized telecommunication networks or of national or international databases as an effort to “impose Satan upon the peoples”, of “misguiding the peoples through American Zionism”, and, of course, its synonym, the “international and internationalized capital”.

Comprehending the Root Causes of Terrorism and Evaluating Future Risks

At the level of root causes of terrorist practices and activity, we should necessarily proceed to some generalisations, termed as “factors of instability”,¹⁰ and it is precisely this instability, as well as the crises that must be evaluated in the context of economy, demography, society, national and international politics, in the effort to prevent and deter terrorism. The focus of this effort is on the root causes of terrorism.

Instability can be understood by “mapping” the dynamic processes

10. See: Bassford, M., Mabey, N. (2005). (UK) Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (PMSU) Background Paper «Countries at Risk of Instability: Future Risks of Instability»; and PMSU (2005), «Investing in Prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response».

and by evaluating the balance of risk. Stability stems from the effective management of tensions and changes in the territory of a state actor, as well as in the international geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic field. The negative balance of risk, i.e. the substantial imbalance and the unstable interaction between destabilizing factors, on the one hand, and of internal and external stabilizing factors, on the other, is the ultimate cause of instability.

*The instability framework*¹¹

Each country has a unique “pattern” of risk and stabilizing factors that must be analyzed specifically, with a view to determine its “balance” of risk. The complex interactions governing all the above factors must be examined in common and in combination. Complex interactions tend to neutralize simple cause-and-effect models of analysis. Consequently, the risk of instability may be forecasted with a certain degree of accuracy; however, it is not possible to determine the timing and occurrence of instability (in this case, terrorist attack or conflict), even though some causal relations may be discerned ex post.

Catalysts and accelerators of instability

The new geopolitical, geo-economic, geo-cultural and, ultimately, geo-strategic environment formed after September 11 is causing policy makers to consider, de facto, the following “catalysts” and “accelerators” of instability. These are, hierarchically:

- the issue of energy and energy resources;
- globalisation and the rapid changes in technology;
- the world demographic problem; and
- global climate changes and widespread epidemics and diseases.

The Energy Issue

Global demand for energy is increasing every day. On the contrary, the production, as well as the distribution of energy, together with the

11. *Ibid.*

growth perspectives of international energy production does not present trends that can counterbalance demand. The imbalance between supply and demand is pushing the price of oil to unprecedented levels. This economic factor is not expected to improve in the foreseeable future. The Middle East remains the main supplier of energy resources for important geopolitical complexes (the EU, China, India, SE and Eastern Asia). The problem lies in the political organisation gap separating the states of the Middle Eastern region, which in turn translates into the creation of fertile ground for the development of tendencies towards terrorism, as a means of “reaction” and “subversion” of the “infidel” regimes. What is more, the self-understood need of economies to turn to other non-soft energy paths, e.g. nuclear, is by itself an additional factor of instability, since it enhances the risk of nuclear- and eco-terrorism incidents.

Globalisation and Rapid Changes in Technology

The increasing integration of markets, economies, trade, policies and culture forms, at least for a 20-year horizon, and a new framework of interdependence between the national and ethnic-state actors and supranational formations, are superseding the traditional analytical framework of geographic proximity. Analysts predict that the end of this period will mark the substitution of the current globalisation model by a linearly developing phenomenon that will be characterised by increased levels of volatility and vulnerability at a global level. Globalisation helps to open up markets throughout the world, is an enabler of trade and encourages efficient processes, in both the secondary and the tertiary sector. International trade significantly promotes the effort for the reduction of poverty in the least developed countries (LDCs). Contrary to what is generally believed LDCs present a high level of trade integration with the remaining countries of the world. It is however observed, based on UN figures that the “globalisation index” gap widens for LDCs in the regions of the Middle East and Africa, depending on their responsiveness to globalisation and their economic connection with the EU.

The impact of further globalisation on developing countries can be summarized in three models:

-Integration into the world system. These countries are character-

ised by sound macroeconomic management and by transparency of revenues, attract foreign direct investment and have few structural risk factors.

-Alienation from the world system. These countries are poor performers in macroeconomic management and have a poor record of corruption. Countries at risk of instability are generally unattractive to foreign direct investment, while most countries at risk of instability fall into this category.

-Both integration and alienation. These countries are often characterised by FDI concentrated in economic centers and in one or two industries. Generally speaking, the rural areas suffer from lack of investment and there are significant inequalities between groups and regions. The expansion of the world economy will tend to function in favor of countries with a strong internal potential and a financial environment capable of fostering foreign investment. On the other hand, countries characterised by instability or by risk of instability often fail to attract investors. These countries remain detached from the world economy, resulting in further alienation of the state formations and groups that are unable to or refuse to integrate themselves into the world system. Eventually, the deficient management of globalisation creates a suitable background for the expansion of disparities, both between and within these states, thus fostering the occurrence of corruption and organized crime phenomena, in other words of potent destabilizing factors. Technology also acts as a catalyst of change. It facilitates the cross-linking of functions and activities on the global level, something that positively influences the social formations capable of accessing the technological potential and of utilizing new Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). On the other hand, the technological divide, both between and within states, is a potent factor of instability and of expansion of disparities. Finally, technology benefits insurgent, illegal and terrorist activities, by providing organisations with new means and materials to connect to international crime networks.

The World Demographic Problem

The world population is expected to increase by 25 percent in the next 20 years, with a substantial concentration of this increase in the developing economies of Central and Eastern Asia. It is natural for this

rise to cause a series of problems, starting from the insufficiency of states to create new and adequate infrastructures (public goods provision, ensuring of public services in the health sector, drinking water supply, job creation, etc.) and will be intensified further by the social exclusion phenomenon, an outcome of urbanisation and the creation of inflated metropolitan centers (mainly in developing economies). Such exclusions are bound to express themselves in “centers of tension” within the metropolitan areas, as well as in terrorist activity, directed against the “insufficient state”, and/or in massive emigration of qualified workers. Given the difficulty in addressing the so-called “guerrilla” attacks by the military, it is easy to conclude that big metropolitan areas can offer not only an appropriate refuge, but also an expanding core of the root causes of terrorism related to the economy, society and culture.

Global Climate Changes and Widespread Epidemics and Diseases

These two catalysts/accelerators also affect the same areas: the economy, administration, society and international politics. In the economic area, the operation of state economies is harmed, entailing an increased need to allocate significant resources in order to address disasters (infrastructures, health services), which in turn increases foreign debt. In the administrative area, we note states’ incapacity to adequately address anthropogenic natural disasters. In the social area, the social web is damaged, entailing the creation of suitable ground for social discontent, something that can be exploited by organized crime and terrorist groups. In the area of international politics, a common feature of the disasters caused by climate changes and widespread diseases and epidemics is their expansion towards neighboring countries and areas, a phenomenon that is an undoubted cause of instability and tension in international and bilateral relations.

At the level of climatic changes, the major security-related problems are deforestation, natural disasters and the desertification of lands. Desertified areas are characterised by limited state control, and can therefore offer a suitable environment for the development of organized crime networks and terrorist activity. A common parameter is the fact that the funds of international humanitarian aid organisations end up

in the “wrong hands”, in the case of despotic or undemocratic regimes, resulting in an increase of corruption and therefore of the social demand to contain it. The insufficient containment or the non-containment of corruption can indeed constitute a factor of instability and of its expression through terrorist activity.

Terrorism as a threat to global stability and security

It is widely acknowledged that any effort to contain terrorism and to counter its root causes must rely on the assumption that we are currently faced with a new kind of threat to global stability and security that blends the traditional patterning of international power antagonisms with cross-regional terrorist-related fanaticism and organized crime networks. The new international environment is faced with complex and transnational threats that challenge the traditional strategic maxim of power and control. Indeed, it is only in the short-term, and not without significant cost, that powerful states can contain modern security threats. Iraq is a paradigm of the perplexity of security-related containment measures and of the inability of the US to contain, geographically, as well as economically and politically, an alleged security issue, that of WMDs. The risks of instability during the post-intervention era in Iraq are:

- *Ethnic origin-related risks*: the final status of the Kurdish areas in N. Iraq, with direct repercussions on Turkey, Syria and Iran.
- *Risks of religious origin*, e.g. the Sunni minority, symbolically representing the Sunni majority in the Arab world and the security-related implications of the new Shiite governance on the country’s external relations in the region.
- *Resource-related security risks*, e.g. the future exploitation of good quality oil reserves situated in the Kurdish and Shi’a areas; and the alleged re-commissioning of the Mosul-Haifa oil pipeline.
- *Potential export of terrorism risks*: the experience which Iraqi guerrilla groups are gaining in Iraq can be exported to the West, together with religious fanaticism, thus advancing the threat of terrorism worldwide.
- *Political risks of instability*, related to the unknown stance of a nuclearized Iran, if and when the new Iraqi state is strengthened.
- *The political, economic and social impact* from the use of water

resources by Turkey as a factor of power projection, when it feels threatened by the developments on its periphery.

- *The chain reaction* in terms of probable regional destabilisation, following the creation of a Kurdish state on Turkey's SE borders and its implications for the Aegean, Cyprus and the Balkans.¹²

- *The symbolic loss of power projection capability*, primarily of the US and secondarily of the West, and therefore the reduction of their capacity to act as external stabilizing factors, i.e. as security providers in this and other areas of the world, can prejudice the balance with destabilizing factors and thus boost the aspirations of terrorist groups and organisations worldwide.

It is in this sense that the broad stability concept operates as an addendum and perhaps a future replacement to the traditional "power and control" maxim. Seen as essential to prosperity and security in a globalized world that is largely unpredictable and unstable, the broad stability concept provides a new framework of thought, in which states perceive the world as interconnected and integrated, as a wide area where national interests overlap and transnational threats are tackled through multilateral action. In this sense, international law and accountability are primary instruments of stability, promoted and operated in the context of strong regional organisations that are both willing and able to act. The European Union, if and when it is politically integrated, can utilize its traditional values of democracy, the welfare state and the rule of law, as well as its socially-compatible model of economic development as a new paradigm for providing security in its region and worldwide, as contrasted to the obsolete hard power projection model. The prospective European concept of broad stability can act as a world model for regional and global players, both traditional and emerging, to the benefit of international stability and of terrorism containment.

12. The security equation in the greater region of the Middle East, the Balkan peninsula and the SE Mediterranean is a delicate balance of power and strategic control, intermingling the aspirations of Turkey and Egypt for regional influence, the Israeli-Palestine issue, Israel's perspective for vital economic space in the Arab world following the elimination of the Syrian threat, the Cyprus issue, Turkey's aspirations over and in the Aegean Archipelago, i.e. a sea connecting the Black Sea and the commercial routes of the Eastern Mediterranean with Europe, and of course, the supervisory role of the US in the region, a matter directly impacting upon both transatlantic relations and the EU's geopolitical involvement.

“The EU faces threats from widespread conflict and instability”. Source: “Enhancing Britain’s Place in the world”. UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit. December 2003.

Conclusions

It is clear that *terrorism* is and must be considered as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. In other words, each terrorist movement must be considered and studied within its specific economic, social, political, historical, cultural and religious framework.

There is no “single” terrorism but a “multitude” of terrorisms. There is no single psychological profile of terrorism, but a multitude of profiles. In essence, it should be mentioned that terrorism is tactically used by many types of social groups and individuals, in many different parts of the world, and for the achievement of many different aims.

Having analyzed the complexity of the root causes of terrorism, it is clear that this phenomenon cannot be eliminated, but only mitigated. And it must be mitigated. We should also address a largely discussed issue: is terrorism only the result of the poverty of the masses? The answer is definitely no! Social malaise and/or degradation (“poverty”) alone must not be seen as the dominant cause of terrorism. What actually triggers the bloody chain reaction of terrorism is a combination of poverty and rapid economic and technological modernisation, imposed from above or from outside, sometimes using methods that are both socially relentless and culturally inexcusable. This conflict drives social masses to economic marginalisation, technological illiteracy, cultural alienation and social exclusion. This chain of consequences causes aggressive shocks on societal unconscious and, in the presence of psychologically unstable individuals, can easily lead to the formation of groups ready for sacrifice, after having lost their chances of re-inclusion in a societal formation which they can neither understand nor follow. Naturally, the leading élite of terrorist groups, which often belongs to the highest educational and social ranks, evades the abovementioned model. Such individuals are often recruited in terrorist groups for reasons that are mainly ideological-religious and are largely mixed with elements of their personality.

Gradual development, at a rate that is both acceptable and “absorbable” within a given societal structure is one of the major antidotes to

terrorism, particularly when, in systemic terms, this is due to purely endogenous causes. By “socially acceptable rates”, we mean primarily and principally the specific cultural characteristics of each developing society.

In addition to the above, the export of terrorism aims at subversive activities within the territory of other states and is part of the geo-strategic activities of various opponents among state, community or ethnic-state factors. Also in these cases, it is possible to limit such risks to a remarkable extent by safeguarding a stable and socially acceptable rate of development that leaves no space for the emergence of intense social gaps or of “cultural discontent” among the members of such ethnic or ethnic-state factors, and by adopting a general national security policy that addresses “imported asymmetrical threats” (e.g. the export of Islamist terrorism by a state-producer of terrorism to other Islamic countries).

In conclusion, it must be noted that no religion is characterised by an endogenous tendency towards terrorism. It is however a sound remark that any religion, if it is misinterpreted and distorted, can offer an optimum background to terrorist activity, exactly because of the metaphysical targeting and focus of all religions. It is also true that religious distortion can add to the cruelty of terrorist activity, rendering it totally unrestrained.

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