@article {3355,
	title = {Can a Historian of Science be a Scientific Realist?},
	journal = {Philosophy of Science},
	volume = {68},
	year = {2001},
	pages = {S531-S541},
	abstract = {<p>In this paper I address some of the problems that the historical development of science\&nbsp;poses for a realist and discuss whether a realist construal of scientific activity is conducive\&nbsp;to historiographical practice. First, I discuss, by means of historical examples,\&nbsp;Ian Hacking{\textquoteright}s defense of entity realism. Second, I try to show, drawing on Kuhn{\textquoteright}s\&nbsp;recent work on incommensurability, that the realism problem is relevant to historiography\&nbsp;and that a realist position entails a particular historiographical strategy, which\&nbsp;faces problems. Finally, I suggest that for historiographical purposes an agnostic attitude\&nbsp;with respect to scientific theories and unobservable entities is the most appropriate.</p>},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3080971?sid=21106179574903\&uid=70\&uid=3738128\&uid=2\&uid=2134\&uid=4},
	author = {Arabatzis, T.}
}
