<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Arabatzis, T.</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What’s in It for the Historian of Science? Reflections on the Value of Philosophy of Science for History of Science</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">International Studies in the Philosophy of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02698595.2017.1370924</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">31</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">69-82</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by introducing a distinction between two ways of integrating history and philosophy of science: historical philosophy of science (HPS) and philosophical history of science (PHS). I then offer a critical discussion of Imre Lakatos’s project to bring philosophy of science to bear on historical interpretation. I point out certain flaws in Lakatos’s project, which I consider indicative of what went wrong with PHS in the past. Finally, I put forward my own attempt to bring out the historiographical potential of philosophy of science. Starting from Norwood Russell Hanson’s insight that historical studies of science involve metascientific concepts, I argue that philosophical reflection on those concepts can be (and, indeed, has been) historiographically fruitful. I focus on four issues (epistemic values, experimentation, scientific discovery and conceptual change) and discuss their significance and utility for historiographical practice.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>