<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Arabatzis, T.</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;div&gt;Engaging Philosophically with the History of Science: Two Challenges for Scientific Realism.&lt;/div&gt;</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://spontaneousgenerations.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/SpontaneousGenerations/article/view/27095</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35-37</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;span&gt;I raise two challenges for scientific realists. The first is a pessimistic meta-induction (PMI), but not of the more common type, which focuses on rejected theories and abandoned entities. Rather, the PMI I have in mind departs from conceptual change, which is ubiquitous in science. Scientific concepts change over time, often to a degree that is difficult to square with the stability of their referents, a sine qua non for realists. The second challenge is to make sense of successful scientific practice that was centered on entities that have turned out to be fictitious.&lt;/span&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>