<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Arabatzis, T.</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the Historicity of Scientific Objects</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Erkenntnis</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10670-011-9344-5</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">75</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">377-390</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The historical variation of scientific knowledge has lent itself to the development of historical epistemology, which attempts to historicize the origin and establishment of knowledge claims. The questions I address in this paper revolve around the historicity of the objects of those claims: How and why do new scientific objects appear? What exactly comes into being in such cases? Do scientific objects evolve over time and in what ways? I put forward and defend two theses: First, the ontology of science is so rich and variegated that there are no universally valid answers to these questions. Second, we need a pluralist account of scientific objects, a pluralist metaphysics that can do justice to their rich diversity and their various modes of being and becoming. I then focus on hidden objects, which are supposed to be part of the permanent furniture of the universe, and I discuss their birth and historicity: They emerge when various phenomena coalesce as manifestations of a single hidden cause and their representations change over time. Finally, I examine the conditions under which an evolving representation may still refer to the same object and I illustrate my argument drawing upon the early history of electrons.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record></records></xml>