<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Arabatzis, T.</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Can a Historian of Science be a Scientific Realist?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophy of Science</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2001</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3080971?sid=21106179574903&amp;uid=70&amp;uid=3738128&amp;uid=2&amp;uid=2134&amp;uid=4</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">68</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">S531-S541</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this paper I address some of the problems that the historical development of science&amp;nbsp;poses for a realist and discuss whether a realist construal of scientific activity is conducive&amp;nbsp;to historiographical practice. First, I discuss, by means of historical examples,&amp;nbsp;Ian Hacking's defense of entity realism. Second, I try to show, drawing on Kuhn's&amp;nbsp;recent work on incommensurability, that the realism problem is relevant to historiography&amp;nbsp;and that a realist position entails a particular historiographical strategy, which&amp;nbsp;faces problems. Finally, I suggest that for historiographical purposes an agnostic attitude&amp;nbsp;with respect to scientific theories and unobservable entities is the most appropriate.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record></records></xml>