<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spanos, L.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tsipouri, L.J.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Xanthakis, D.M.</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Corporate governance rating of family firms at the Athens exchange market</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Managerial Finance</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2008</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/03074350810874424</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">34</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">465-478</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;Purpose&lt;br&gt;– Corporate governance (CG) has mainly focused on highly dispersed corporations. This paper has two objectives: to enrich the debate in this area and to contribute to the increasing body of literature by exploring the CG of the listed family firms in Greece; and to place the CG practices of Greek family firms within the international debate, especially in the framework of a small open capital market. In addition, this paper presents an attempt to quantify the compliance of family firms with international best practices.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Design/methodology/approach&lt;br&gt;– The methodology consisted of the creation of a questionnaire reflecting the Greek CG code and other well‐regarded CG codes, like the OECD principles. The authors constructed a CG rating system and applied it to distinguish family from non‐family firms.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Findings&lt;br&gt;– The main conclusion is that the family firms lack an efficient CG mechanism and they demonstrated poor governance compared with non‐family firms.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Practical implications&lt;br&gt;– The results disclose the potential strengths and weaknesses of the existing CG framework of the family‐owned firms. The methodology applies in a small open economy and may have significant implications in other similar capital markets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Originality/value&lt;br&gt;– Methodologically, the merit of the exercise lies in its approach toward the creation of “collectively subjective” weightings, and is valuable to policymakers and academics.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></issue></record></records></xml>