@proceedings {30074,
	title = {Geopolitical Findings on the Russian Strategic Approach in the Recent War in Artsakh},
	journal = {Armenia and the Region: Lessons, Evaluations, Perspectives. Collection of Reports of the International Conference Dedicated to the Centennial of the Moscow and Kars Agreements (1921). Oct.19-21, 2021 Yerevan},
	year = {2022},
	pages = {399-413},
	publisher = {Institute of History of NAS RA and Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA},
	address = {Yerevan, Armenia},
	abstract = {Moscow managed to "diplomatically" contain the Baku-Yerevan-Stepanakert explosion since Russia reemerged in a dominant and decisive way as a peacekeeping military and economic actor in the Armenia-Azerbaijan dipole. In fact, Russia stopped more bloodshed, might drive it away from its "regular" ally, Turkey, and cut all ties with Azerbaijan handing it over to the West. Therefore, this explains Moscow{\textquoteright}s initiative to propose solutions to the Pashinyan government inclusive of a peaceful return of Azeri refugees from areas of Sushi, before its eventual handover to the Azeris, under the guarantee of Russia{\textquoteright}s own military presence in order to "ensure cohabitation between Armenian residents and Azeri repatriates". However, these proposals, which would have meant Artsakh{\textquoteright}s "losing" of a single province (Sushi), were not accepted by Pashinyan, precisely because of his effort to avoid all Russian presence in the region. After all, his Government{\textquoteright}s members also pushed in this direction. His mistake, however, proved to be huge and the price was paid by the unfortunate Armenians of Artsakh.},
	author = {Ioannis Mazis}
}
