@article {39705,
	title = {Serious actualism},
	journal = {Philosophical Review},
	volume = {116},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {219-250},
	abstract = {<p>Serious actualism is the principle that, for every entity x and every property φ, it could not have been that x did not exist but had φ. The principle was called {\textquoteleft}serious actualism{\textquoteright} by A. Plantinga, who argued for it. Accepting it has serious consequences about how it is philosophically preferable to develop first-order modal logic. In the paper I show why some alleged counterexamples to the principle should not convince us, and then I offer three arguments for serious actualism and for the corresponding principle about relations. According to the first, by accepting those doctrines we avoid a serious difficulty when we try to explain when two properties, or two relations, coincide in extension. The second argument relies on some tenets about sets. The third improves upon Plantinga{\textquoteright}s reasoning in favour of serious actualism. I then draw some conclusions about when a linguistic expression ought to be regarded as a predicate from a logical and semantic point of view. Finally, I discuss certain principles about time and space that are analogous to serious actualism.</p>},
	author = {Yannis Stephanou}
}
