<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yannis Stephanou</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">'Actually' again</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ratio</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">104-111</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Some authors have suggested that, contrary to what is usually thought, ‘actually’ and similar expressions (‘in fact’, ‘in reality’, etc.) cannot effect a return to the actual world when used in a context generated by a different modal operator, and so are quite unlike the actuality operator of modal logic. I argue that they can induce such a return. The argument involves comparing them with other devices that can play a similar role, such as scope and mood, and examining the effect of ‘actually’ and the like in a range of different sentences.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record></records></xml>