<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yannis Stephanou</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Necessary beings</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Analysis</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2000</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">60</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">188-193</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;This paper shows that some plausible assumptions about any object that has a name lead to the conclusion that the object could not have failed to exist. Considering the conclusion wrong, I argue that the source of the error is the principle “If something is the case, it could not have been impossible”, which occurs in some systems of modal logic; if an object did not exist, it would not be possible for it to exist.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record></records></xml>