<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>10</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yannis Stephanou</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The liar and a theory of truth</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proceedings of the 8th Panhellenic Logic Symposium</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year></dates><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ioannina, Greece</style></pub-location><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">99-103</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The liar and kindred paradoxes make it difficult to construct a consistent and plausible formal theory of truth. One approach is to tackle them not by restricting the principles about truth that pre-theoretically seem correct, but by deviating from classical logic. I outline a nonclassical propositional logic I have constructed within that approach, as well as a theory of truth embedded in the framework of the logic. (Preliminary presentation of some of the material that eventually became the paper 'A propositional theory of truth'.)</style></abstract></record></records></xml>