Abstract:

We study the effects of disruption risk in a supply chain where one retailer deals with competing risky suppliers who may default during their production lead times. The suppliers, who compete for business with the retailer by setting wholesale prices, are leaders in a Stackelberg game with the retailer. The retailer, facing uncertain future demand, chooses order quantities while weighing the benefits of procuring from the cheapest supplier against the advantages of order diversification. For the model with two suppliers, we show that low supplier default correlations dampen competition among the suppliers, increasing the equilibrium wholesale prices. Therefore the retailer prefers suppliers with highly correlated default events, despite the loss of diversification benefits. In contrast, the suppliers and the channel prefer defaults that are negatively correlated. However, as the number of suppliers increases, our model predicts that the retailer may be able to take advantage of both competition and diversification. © 2007 INFORMS.

Notes:

cited By 148

Website