This book offers the first comprehensive history and analysis of Turkey’s relations with Israel since 1948, when the state of Israel was established, up until 2010 and places them within the wider framework of Turkey’s foreign policy. It highlights the remarkable lack of consistency in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Israel, under different Turkish governments, which has given the relationship a pervasive sense of unpredictability.  Combining empirical-analytical evidence with role theory insights, as developed in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), it explores Turkish foreign policy makers’ perceptions regarding the proper role and function of the country in the international system and the sub-system of the Middle East and how they affected the policy towards Israel. The author argues that Ankara’s ambivalent policy towards Israel for over sixty years can be explained by Turkey's multiple and often contradictory national role conceptions. The study, which draws from archival material and over fifty interviews with Turkish, Israeli, American and Arab officials and experts, places Ankara’s policy into a larger analytical framework, which helps link the past to the present and future.

The long-standing tension between the two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, Greece and Turkey, and their recurrent spats has often made them the subject of Western diplomatic and political attention. There are three external actors, the United States, NATO and the EU which have been particularly interested in Greek-Turkish relations and the security situation in the eastern Mediterranean. Of these three parties NATO has had the least significant role to play, while between the United States and the EU the former has the longer period of involvement in this part of the world and today continues to play a major, though arguably, less committed role. This chapter examines the overall US response to the turbulence between its two allies since the 1950s by placing it within the larger context of US foreign policy.

Εξετάζεται η πολιτική και στρατηγική της Αθήνας προς την Τουρκία, μετά τα τέλη της μεταψυχροπολεμικής δεκαετίας και μέχρι το 2019, θέτοντας στο επίκεντρο του προβληματισμού την κατανόηση της σημασίας μιας εσωτερικής παραμέτρου, της συναίνεσης, η οποία είναι μάλλον αγνοημένη στο πλαίσιο της μελέτης των ελληνοτουρκικών σχέσεων. Συγκεκριμένα διαπιστώνεται ότι, ενώ επί μία εικοσαετία έχει υπάρξει σταθερή πολιτική συναίνεση όσον αφορά την πολιτική βελτίωσης των ελληνοτουρκικών σχέσεων, δεν έχει υπάρξει συναίνεση όσον αφορά την αναγκαιότητα υποστήριξης αυτής της πολιτικής από μια στρατηγική η οποία δύναται να οδηγήσει σε συνεννόηση με την Τουρκία όσον αφορά την κύρια διμερή διαφορά, δηλαδή την οριοθέτηση της υφαλοκρηπίδας αλλά και τη συνολικότερη οριοθέτηση των θαλασσίων ζωνών. Παράλληλα, επιδιώκεται να αναδειχθεί ότι η διαιώνιση μιας μονολιθικής και απλουστευτικής ‘εικόνας’ για τις ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις και την Τουρκία αποτελεί παράγοντα που έχει συμβάλει αποφασιστικά στην αδυναμία οικοδόμησης μιας τέτοιας συναίνεσης.

Από τη λήξη του Ψυχρού Πολέμου και μέχρι σήμερα η Ελλάδα έχει βρεθεί αντιμέτωπη με έναν αυξανόμενο αριθμό προκλήσεων και διλημμάτων εξωτερικής πολιτικής τόσο παραδοσιακών, όπως η σχέση με την Τουρκία ή το περιεχόμενο της συνεργασίας με τις ΗΠΑ, όσο και νέων, όπως θέματα ενέργειας, το μεταναστευτικό- προσφυγικό και η συνεργασία με την Κίνα. Με ποιον τρόπο και με ποιο βαθμό επιτυχίας οι ελληνικές κυβερνήσεις και η ελληνική κοινωνία έχουν αντιδράσει στο πλαίσιο ενός ραγδαία μεταβαλλόμενου διεθνούς και εσωτερικού περιβάλλοντος; Ο παρόν τόμος επιχειρεί, πρώτον, να απαντήσει στο παραπάνω ερώτημα και, δεύτερον, να εξετάσει τις βασικές επιλογές και προσδοκίες της ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής στον 21ο αιώνα. Τα επί μέρους κεφάλαια αναδεικνύουν τον χαρακτήρα και τη δυναμική της εξωτερικής πολιτικής της Ελλάδας μέσα από μια ευρύτητα προοπτικής και προσφέρουν μια κριτική θεώρηση παραδοσιακών και εναλλακτικών θεάσεων της ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής και στρατηγικής. Έτσι, ο αναγνώστης δύναται να αντιληφθεί τις εξελίξεις στις πραγματικές διαστάσεις τους και να στοχασθεί για τα σημαντικότερα ζητήματα που απασχολούν την ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική. Ο συλλογικός αυτός τόμος καλύπτει το κενό που υπάρχει στην υπάρχουσα βιβλιογραφία της ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής από την έναρξη της νέας χιλιετίας και μέχρι σήμερα, με ενδιάμεσο σταθμό, ως χρονικό ορόσημο, το ξέσπασμα της οικονομικής κρίσης στην Ελλάδα το 2010.

During the transitional period between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the 1950s London and Ankara left behind the coolness that had crept into their relations as a result of Turkey’s neutrality during the war and reaffirmed their pre-war alliance. However, the strategic interests the two countries shared did not result in a closer political bilateral relationship. Moreover, before long the British government had succeeded by various ill-thought actions in causing the resentment of their Turkish ally. The respective attitudes of the British and the Turks towards each other were informed by the interplay between material interests and ideational factors against the backdrop of the perceived Soviet threat, Britain’s ebbing power and the rising power of the United States. This study narrates a brief but interesting chapter in the course of Turkish-British relations. It also offers interesting insights into the dynamics of great power/small state interaction.

This paper is concerned with the Greeks’ unfavorable perceptions of the ‘Turk’ among and suggests that they are part of a psychological barrier which constitutes one of the major factors underlining Greek-Turkish relations. It examines how these perceptions have been set by Greek historiography and complemented by popular to this day works of literature from a previous period. It maintains that despite the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, they cannot be expected to sharply change because they are part of the deeply ingrained in the Greek psyche national schema. However, in the light of findings of empirical research, it also argues that the picture is more complicated because a less-stereotypical image of the Turk has been accepted by more Greeks than in the recent past.

Within the context of Turkey's relationship with Israel, the 1950s are remembered largely as the decade when bilateral relations developed dramatically reflecting the US orientation of Adnan Menderes's foreign policy. On closer observation, however, one cannot fail to notice that there was more ebb than flow in Turkey's policy towards Israel which already assumed the double-faced profile (cold or reproachful in public/positive behind closed doors), which is usually associated with the next two decades. Drawing on substantial research in official US and British archives, this article explores the multiple considerations which informed the approach of the Menderes government towards Tel-Aviv. Crucially, it places the Turks’ approach within their broader Middle Eastern policy with the aim of showing that it was shaped not only by their relationship with their powerful ally, the United States, but also by the need to look after relations with neighbourly Arab regimes.

Taking the period from the end of the 1970s to the end of the 1990s, this book critically examines the evolution of the strategic relationship between the US and Turkey during this period, with a particular focus on the Middle Eastern context. Strategic Relations Between the US and Turkey employs interviews with US, Turkish and Israeli officials and archival research in order to offer an alternative reading of the realities that shaped bilateral co-operation through multi-level analysis. The unraveling of these realities enlightens the reader about the past course of events but also aids the understanding of the dynamics of the relationship today. Essential reading for students and scholars of U.S. and Turkish foreign policy, this study of co-operation between a super-power and a relatively weak state in the international system will also be of use to those interested in International Relations, Diplomatic History and World Politics more broadly.

The first enlargement of NATO in 1952, to include Turkey and Greece, integrated the eastern Mediterranean with West European strategic planning and consolidated US presence in the area. Today, Turkey's inclusion in the North Antlantic Treaty Organisation seems natural, given Soviet pressures against the country in 1945-1946 and its geostrategic position. Yet, in the early post-Cold War period this was not a foregone conclusion in the minds of policy-makers in Washington and particularly, in London, despite Ankara's relentless efforts after 1947 to obtain an American security guarantee.   This first book-lenght study of the background to Turkey's accession to NATO provides us with a better understanding of a neglected chapter in the history of the early Cold War. The book offers a detailed analysis of how American and British security considerations in the eastern Mediterranean evolved, sometimes in parallel, sometimes in a rival fashion, bewteen 1945 and 1952 against the backdrop of the Turks' diplomatic pressure for a US military commitment. I addition, it provides an in-depth look into the fundamental tenets of Turkish foreign policy, which, it is argued, remained the same throughtout the first 30 years of the life of the Turkish republic.  

If improved relations between Turkey and Greece simply meant the implementation of of modest CBMs, more trade and regular meetings between the leaders of the two countries then the bilateral relationship seems better than perhaps at any time since the 1930s. But in the context of the issues that have bedevilled bilateral relations for over thirty years, these changes have not been profound. This paper tries to answer why the ongoing dialogue between Ankara and Athens since 1999 has not led to reconciliation over differences in the Aegean.

The topic of this article is the historical evolution of Greek foreign policy in the Middle East over the past thirty-five years. It essentially seeks to explain the broad framework of conditions and objectives within which Greek foreign policy has been made towards the Arab Middle East and Israel. It argues that the amount of involvement of Greek foreign policy in the area was relatively little. Though much has changed in Greece's approach towards the Middle East since the 1990s, there is also a significant continuity of attitude, in the sense that serious attention has not been paid to this part of the world.

At a time when the European Union is further expanding and countries, such as Turkey are being accepted for eventual membership, the question of what is meant by a unified Europe and how that might be achieved has never been more pressing. Europe is more than a system of rules and political institutions that regulate European citizenship: it is also a space of political traditions, political experiences and cultural memories. Can political integration ever be realised without an understanding and acceptance of the complexity of the political cultures that make up Europe ? In this volume, European scholars from a diversity of backgrounds explore the issues that must be addressed if the challenge of an integrated Europe is to be successfully met.

In response to the Israeli-Turkish strategic partnership of the 1990s Greece was driven closer than ever before to Israel. By the end of the 1990s it was clear that Athens had reached a turning point in its policy towards Israel. The PASOK government wished to maintain Greece's traditionally good relations with the Arabs. Nevertheless, it was ready to risk upsetting them in the pursuit of a good relationship with Israel. The promotion of relations with Jerusalem (underdeveloped for over 40 years), was understood to serve national policy goals. It was viewed as part of Greece's strategy towards Turkey (Greece's perennial adversary), as well as of its policy of full alignment with the US and its EU partners. Developments in the regional environment and the ability of the Greek government to respond to opportunities will determine whether Greek-Israeli relations could grow in substance.