Can a Historian of Science be a Scientific Realist?

Citation:

Arabatzis T. Can a Historian of Science be a Scientific Realist?. Philosophy of Science [Internet]. 2001;68(3):S531-S541.
2001a272 KB

Abstract:

In this paper I address some of the problems that the historical development of science poses for a realist and discuss whether a realist construal of scientific activity is conducive to historiographical practice. First, I discuss, by means of historical examples, Ian Hacking's defense of entity realism. Second, I try to show, drawing on Kuhn's recent work on incommensurability, that the realism problem is relevant to historiography and that a realist position entails a particular historiographical strategy, which faces problems. Finally, I suggest that for historiographical purposes an agnostic attitude with respect to scientific theories and unobservable entities is the most appropriate.

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