Arabatzis T, Vermeir K. Centaurus: Continuing as an Open Access Journal. Centaurus [Internet]. 2022;64(1):11-12. Publisher's Version 2022a.pdf
Kampouridis S, Simões A, Arabatzis T. Quantum Chemistry in Historical Perspective. In: O. Lombardi et al (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives in Quantum Chemistry. Cham: Springer; 2022. pp. 3-28. Publisher's VersionAbstract
Quantum chemistry is a firmly established branch within theoretical chemistry. However, in the late 1920s and early 1930s when the first foundational papers and books appeared, mostly written by physicists as well as by chemists or chemical physicists, the disciplinary identity of the emerging field was a contentious issue: Was it physics or was it chemistry? This question was tied to the problem of reductionism and received different answers, which led to different ways of practicing quantum chemistry and eventually stabilized its identity as an in-between/ boundary discipline. During its subsequent development the question of disciplinary identity continued to be central, as quantum chemistry established connections to other disciplines and was deeply shaped by computing technology. In this chapter we discuss the historical development of quantum chemistry, integrating several strands, conceptual, institutional, methodological, and epistemological.
Panoutsopoulos G, Arabatzis T. . Physics in Perspective [Internet]. 2021;23(4):181-201.
In this paper, we employ Ian Hacking’s insight that ‘‘unity’’ has a double meaning, singleness and harmonious integration, to revisit a major episode from the recent history of CERN: the UA1 and UA2 experiments in the early 1980s, which led to the discovery of the W and Z bosons. CERN is a complex institution, where diverse groups are called upon to cooperate. We argue that this lack of unity, in the first sense of the term, is counterbalanced by specific mechanisms of integration, so that CERN achieves its standing as a unified organization. The UA1/UA2 episode highlights this interplay between unity and disunity. The UA2 experiment was designed and carried out in order to confirm the validity of the results obtained by UA1. The two experimental teams, working independently and with different mentalities, built separate detectors and refrained from systematically sharing their data. This gave rise to strong antagonisms and diametrically opposed opinions over what conclusions could legitimately be drawn from the resulting data. Our analysis focuses on the mechanisms which compensated for that disunity and eventually led to a unified consensus between UA1 and UA2.
Simos M, Arabatzis T. Ian Hacking’s metahistory of science. Philosophical Inquiries [Internet]. 2021;9(1):145-165. Publisher's VersionAbstract
In this paper we attempt a critical appraisal of the relation between history of science and philosophy of science in Ian Hacking’s styles of scientific reasoning project. In our analysis, we employ a distinction between “historical philosophy of science” and “philosophical history of science”: the former aims at addressing philosophical issues, while the latter aims at telling stories about the scientific past that are informed by philosophical considerations. We argue that Hacking practices historical philosophy of science; discuss how his approach is differentiated from the so-called confrontation model; and show that he opts for a strong integration between history and philosophy of science. Finally, we discuss the historiographical implications of his approach and suggest that his aim to maintain a middle position, on the one hand, between contingency and inevitabilism, and, on the other, between internalism and externalism in the explanation of the stability of scientific knowledge, is compromised by his philosophical commitments.
Arabatzis T. 20th Century Philosophy of Science in Focus. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science [Internet]. 2020;33(1):53-57. Publisher's VersionAbstract
Review of J. Losee, The Golden Age of Philosophy of Science 1945 to 2000 (London: Bloomsbury, 2019).
Arabatzis T. Review of J. Navarro, Ether and Modernity, 2018. Centaurus [Internet]. 2020;62(3):573-575. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T. What are scientific concepts?. In: K. McCain and K. Kampourakis (eds.), What is Scientific Knowledge? An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology of Science. 1st ed. New York: Routledge; 2019. pp. 85-99. Publisher's VersionAbstract
In this article I discuss the nature and function of scientific concepts, what ittakes to possess them, how they can be represented, and how they can be studiedby examining the uses of the scientific terms associated with them. I then examinethe epistemological issues that arise when considering conceptual change.Furthermore, I draw a distinction between concepts referring to manifest entities(accessible to observation) and concepts referring to hidden entities (temporarilyor permanently unobservable). I argue that the function of scientific concepts isdifferent in the two cases. In the former case, their function is primarily classificatory;whereas in the latter case, their function is primarily explanatory. Finally,I suggest that the epistemological problems generated by the evolution of scientificconcepts are more severe in the latter case than in the former.
Arabatzis T. Explaining Science Historically. Isis [Internet]. 2019;110(2):354-359. Publisher's VersionAbstract
The author brings out the many faces of explanation in history of science by commenting on the contributions to a Focus section of Isis on historical explanation. The essay starts by indicating several ways in which the term “explanation” is used in historiographical discourse. It then distinguishes the object of explanation from the process of explanation and points out common themes and points of contention among the thirteen contributions. It also discusses two of those points in more detail: the problems of causal explanation in history of science and the imperative of avoiding anachronism in historical interpretation. The essay concludes by suggesting a pluralist take on explaining science historically.
Arabatzis T. Review of J. Schickore, About Method: Experimenters, Snake Venom, and the History of Writing Scientifically (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017). Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte [Internet]. 2018;41:473-474. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T. How Physica Became Physics: Review of J. L. Heilbron, Physics: A Short History from Quintessence to Quarks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). Science & Education [Internet]. 2018;27:211-218. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T. Review of A. Franklin, What Makes a Good Experiment? Reasons and Roles in Science (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016). Isis [Internet]. 2018;109(1):146-147. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T. Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science [Internet]. 2018;9(1):35-37.
I raise two challenges for scientific realists. The first is a pessimistic meta-induction (PMI), but not of the more common type, which focuses on rejected theories and abandoned entities. Rather, the PMI I have in mind departs from conceptual change, which is ubiquitous in science. Scientific concepts change over time, often to a degree that is difficult to square with the stability of their referents, a sine qua non for realists. The second challenge is to make sense of successful scientific practice that was centered on entities that have turned out to be fictitious.
Arabatzis T. What’s in It for the Historian of Science? Reflections on the Value of Philosophy of Science for History of Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science [Internet]. 2017;31(1):69-82. Publisher's VersionAbstract
In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by introducing a distinction between two ways of integrating history and philosophy of science: historical philosophy of science (HPS) and philosophical history of science (PHS). I then offer a critical discussion of Imre Lakatos’s project to bring philosophy of science to bear on historical interpretation. I point out certain flaws in Lakatos’s project, which I consider indicative of what went wrong with PHS in the past. Finally, I put forward my own attempt to bring out the historiographical potential of philosophy of science. Starting from Norwood Russell Hanson’s insight that historical studies of science involve metascientific concepts, I argue that philosophical reflection on those concepts can be (and, indeed, has been) historiographically fruitful. I focus on four issues (epistemic values, experimentation, scientific discovery and conceptual change) and discuss their significance and utility for historiographical practice.
Arabatzis T, Gavroglu K. From Discrepancy to Discovery: How Argon Became an Element. In: T. Sauer & R. Scholl (eds), The Philosophy of Historical Case Studies. Dordrecht: Springer; 2016. pp. 203-222. Publisher's VersionAbstract
In this paper, we revisit the discovery of argon by Lord Rayleigh and William Ramsay. We argue that to understand historically how argon was detected, conceptualized, and accommodated into chemical knowledge we need to take into account the philosophical insight that scientific discovery is often an extended process. One of argon’s most intriguing properties was that it did not react with other elements. Reactivity, however, had been a constitutive property of elements. Thus, the discovery of argon could not have been accepted by chemists without a reconceptualization of ‘element’. Furthermore, there were difficulties with the accommodation of argon in the Periodic table, because argon appeared to undermine the conception of matter that underlay the Periodic table. The discovery of argon was complete only after those conceptual difficulties had been removed. This is why it has to be understood as an extended process, rather than as an event. Furthermore, we will suggest that some of the factors that complicated the discovery of argon were related to the legitimization of physical techniques of investigation in chemistry and the emergence of physical chemistry.
Arabatzis T. In: A. Blum, K. Gavroglu, C. Joas, and J. Renn (eds.), Shifting Paradigms: Thomas S. Kuhn and the History of Science. Berlin: Edition Open Access, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science; 2016. pp. 191-201. 2016a.pdf
Αραμπατζής Θ. 1915-2015: μια ιστορική-επιστημολογική αποτίμηση της θεωρίας της σχετικότητας. Η ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙΔΑ ΤΩΝ ΣΥΝΤΑΚΤΩΝ [Internet]. 2015;(12-13 Δεκεμβρίου):78-79. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T, Gavroglu K. Myth 18: That the Michelson-Morley Experiment Paved the Way for the Special Theory of Relativity. In: R. L. Numbers, K. Kampourakis (eds.), Newton's Apple and Other Myths about Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 2015. pp. 149-156, 254-255. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T, Ioannidou D. The role of models and analogies in the Bohr atom. In: F. Aaserud and H. Kragh (eds.), One Hundred Years of the Bohr Atom. Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters; 2015. pp. 360-376. 2015b
Arabatzis T, Nersessian NJ. Concepts Out of Theoretical Contexts. In: T. Arabatzis, J. Renn, A. Simões (eds.), Relocating the History of Science: Essays in Honor of Kostas Gavroglu. Dordrecht: Springer; 2015. pp. 225-238. Publisher's VersionAbstract
In this paper we take as our point of departure Kostas Gavroglu and Yorgos Goudaroulis’s insight that, in the process of describing and explaining novel phenomena, scientific concepts are taken “out of” their original theoretical context, acquire additional meaning, and become relatively autonomous. We first present their account of how concepts are re-contextualized and, in the process, extended and/or revised. We then situate it within its philosophical context, and discuss how it broke with a long-standing philosophical tradition about concepts. Finally, we argue that recent developments in science studies can flesh out and vindicate the “concepts out of contexts” idea. In particular, historical and philosophical studies of experimentation and cognitive-historical studies of modeling practices indicate various ways in which concepts are formed and articulated “out of context”.
<em>Relocating the History of Science: Essays in Honor of Kostas Gavroglu</em>
Relocating the History of Science: Essays in Honor of Kostas Gavroglu. 1st ed. (Arabatzis T, Renn J, Simões A). Dordrecht: Springer; 2015 pp. vii + 383. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T. Review of J. Navarro, A History of the Electron: J. J. and G. P. Thomson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Isis [Internet]. 2015;106(1):204-205. Publisher's Version
Integrated History and Philosophy of Science in Practice. Special Issue of<em>Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.</em>
Integrated History and Philosophy of Science in Practice. Special Issue ofStudies in History and Philosophy of Science. Arabatzis T, Howard D. [Internet]. 2015;50:1-90. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T, Howard D. Introduction: Integrated history and philosophy of science in practice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science [Internet]. 2015;50:1-3. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T. Experiment. In: M. Curd and S. Psillos (eds), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. 2nd ed. London: Routledge; 2014. pp. 191-202. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T, Kindi V. The Problem of Conceptual Change in the Philosophy and History of Science. In: S. Vosniadou (ed.), International Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change. 2nd ed. London: Routledge; 2013. pp. 343-359. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T. Experimentation and the Meaning of Scientific Concepts. In: U. Feest and F. Steinle (eds.), Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice. Berlin: de Gruyter; 2012. pp. 149-166. Publisher's Version 2012a.pdf
Arabatzis T. Hidden Entities and Experimental Practice: Renewing the Dialogue Between History and Philosophy of Science. In: S Mauskopf and T. M. Schmaltz (eds.), Integrating History and Philosophy of Science: Problems and Prospects . Dordrecht: Springer; 2012. pp. 125-139. Publisher's VersionAbstract
In this chapter I investigate the prospects of integrated history and philosophy of science, by examining how philosophical issues raised by “hidden entities”, entities that are not accessible to unmediated observation, can enrich the historical investigation of their careers. Conversely, I suggest that the history of those entities has important lessons to teach to the philosophy of science. Hidden entities have played a crucial role in the development of the natural sciences. Despite their centrality to past scientific practice, however, several of them (e.g., phlogiston, caloric, and the ether) turned out to be fictitious. For this reason, they have figured prominently in recent debates on scientific realism. The issues I explore in this paper are entangled with those debates. I argue that our understanding of hidden entities and their role in experimental practice can be enhanced by adopting an integrated historical-cum-philosophical approach. On the one hand, philosophical reflection on the reality of those entities has a lot to gain by examining historically how they were ntroduced and investigated. On the other hand, the historical reconstruction of the careers of those entities may profit from philosophical reflection on their existence.
Arabatzis T, Schickore J. Introduction: Ways of Integrating History and Philosophy of Science. Perspectives on Science [Internet]. 2012;20(4):395-408. Publisher's Version 2012c.pdf
Special &amp;HPS3 Issue of <em>Perspectives on Science.</em>
Special &HPS3 Issue of Perspectives on Science. Schickore J, Arabatzis T. [Internet]. 2012;20(4). Publisher's Version
<p class="MsoNormal"><em><span style="font-family: 'Arial','sans-serif';">Η Κρίση στη Φυσική και η Δημοκρατία της Βαϊμάρης: Η Πολιτισμική Ιστορία της Κβαντικής Θεωρίας</span></em></p>

Η Κρίση στη Φυσική και η Δημοκρατία της Βαϊμάρης: Η Πολιτισμική Ιστορία της Κβαντικής Θεωρίας

. (Αραμπατζής Θ, Γαβρόγλου Κ). Ηράκλειο: Πανεπιστημιακές Εκδόσεις Κρήτης; 2012. Publisher's Version
<em>Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Revisited</em>
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Revisited. (Kindi V, Arabatzis T). Routledge; 2012. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T. Review of J. Canales, A Tenth of a Second: A History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). Isis [Internet]. 2011;102(4):774-775. Publisher's Version 2011a
Arabatzis T. Electron. In: S. Azzouni et al (eds), Eine Naturgeschichte für das 21. Jahrhundert : hommage à, zu Ehren von, in honor of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger. Berlin: Max Planck Institute for the History of Science; 2011. pp. 231-232. 2011b
Arabatzis T. On the Historicity of Scientific Objects. Erkenntnis [Internet]. 2011;75(3):377-390. Publisher's VersionAbstract
The historical variation of scientific knowledge has lent itself to the development of historical epistemology, which attempts to historicize the origin and establishment of knowledge claims. The questions I address in this paper revolve around the historicity of the objects of those claims: How and why do new scientific objects appear? What exactly comes into being in such cases? Do scientific objects evolve over time and in what ways? I put forward and defend two theses: First, the ontology of science is so rich and variegated that there are no universally valid answers to these questions. Second, we need a pluralist account of scientific objects, a pluralist metaphysics that can do justice to their rich diversity and their various modes of being and becoming. I then focus on hidden objects, which are supposed to be part of the permanent furniture of the universe, and I discuss their birth and historicity: They emerge when various phenomena coalesce as manifestations of a single hidden cause and their representations change over time. Finally, I examine the conditions under which an evolving representation may still refer to the same object and I illustrate my argument drawing upon the early history of electrons.
Αραμπατζής Θ.

Η γνωσιακή διαπερατότητα της παρατήρησης

. Νόησις. 2010;6:91-98. 2010
Αραμπατζής Θ. Βιβλιοκριτική του Pierre Duhem, Σώζειν τα φαινόμενα: Δοκίμιο για την έννοια της φυσικής θεωρίας από τον Πλάτωνα έως τον Γαλιλαίο (Αθήνα: Νεφέλη, 2007).
Νεύσις [Internet]. 2009;18:276-277. Publisher's Version 2009a
Arabatzis T. Cathode Rays. In: F. Weinert, K. Hentschel, & D. Greenberger (eds.), Compendium of Quantum Physics: Concepts, Experiments, History and Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer; 2009. pp. 89-92. Publisher's Version 2009b
Arabatzis T. Electrons. In: F. Weinert, K. Hentschel, & D. Greenberger (eds.), Compendium of Quantum Physics: Concepts, Experiments, History and Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer; 2009. pp. 195-199. Publisher's Version 2009c
Arabatzis T. Experiment. In: S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. 1st ed. London: Routledge; 2008. pp. 159-170.
Arabatzis T. Experimenting on (and with) Hidden Entities: The Inextricability of Representation and Intervention. In: U. Feest et al (eds.), Generating Experimental Knowledge. Preprint 340. Berlin: Max Planck Institute for the History of Science; 2008. pp. 7-17. 2008b
Arabatzis T, Kindi V. The Problem of Conceptual Change in the Philosophy and History of Science. In: S. Vosniadou (ed.), International Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change. 1st ed. London: Routledge; 2008. pp. 345-373.
Arabatzis T. Causes and contingencies in the history of science: a plea for a pluralist historiography. Centaurus [Internet]. 2008;50(1-2):32-36. Publisher's Version 2008d
Arabatzis T. Review of M. Norton Wise (ed.),Growing Explanations: Historical Perspectives on Recent Science (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005). Centaurus [Internet]. 2007;49(2):178-179. Publisher's Version 2007a
Arabatzis T. Conceptual Change and Scientific Realism: Facing Kuhn’s Challenge. In: S. Vosniadou, A. Baltas and X. Vamvakoussi (eds.), Reframing the Conceptual Change Approach in Learning and Instruction. Amsterdam: Elsevier; 2007. pp. 47-62. 2007b
Τι θα είχε συμβεί εάν ..; Ο ρόλος των υποθετικών ερωτημάτων στην Ιστορία. Cogito. 2006;4:54-56. cogito_2006.pdf
Arabatzis T. On the Inextricability of the Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification. In: J. Schickore and F. Steinle (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on the Context Distinction. Dordrecht: Springer; 2006. pp. 215-230. Publisher's Version 2006
<em>Representing Electrons: A Biographical Approach to Theoretical Entities</em>
Arabatzis T. Representing Electrons: A Biographical Approach to Theoretical Entities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2006. Publisher's Version
Αραμπατζής Θ, Γαβρόγλου Κ. Ο Αϊνστάιν και η ειδική θεωρία της σχετικότητας στην ιστορία και στη φιλοσοφία της επιστήμης. In: Θ. Αραμπατζής & Κ. Γαβρόγλου (επ.), Ο Αϊνστάιν και η σχετικότητα: Ιστορικές μελέτες. Ηράκλειο: Πανεπιστημιακές Εκδόσεις Κρήτης; 2005. pp. ix-xlix. 2005a
Arabatzis T. Experiment. In: M. Horowitz (ed.), New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. Vol. 2. Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons; 2005. pp. 765-769. 2005b
Arabatzis T, Gavroglu K. Physical Chemistry. In: C. A. Russell and G. K. Roberts (eds.), Chemical History: Reviews of the Recent Literature. Cambridge: The Royal Society of Chemistry; 2005. pp. 135-153. Publisher's Version 2005c
<em>Ο Αϊνστάιν και η σχετικότητα: Ιστορικές μελέτες</em>
Ο Αϊνστάιν και η σχετικότητα: Ιστορικές μελέτες. (Αραμπατζής Θ, Γαβρόγλου Κ). Ηράκλειο: Πανεπιστημιακές Εκδόσεις Κρήτης; 2005. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T, Gavroglu K. Criogenia, superconduttività e superfluidità. In: Sandro Petruccioli (ed.), Storia della scienza. Vol. 8. Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana; 2004. pp. 423-430. Publisher's Version 2004
Arabatzis T, Gavroglu K. Entropy. In: The Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2003. pp. 268-269. Publisher's Version 2003a
Arabatzis T. Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics. In: J. L. Heilbron (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2003. pp. 798-799. Publisher's Version 2003b
Arabatzis T. Towards a historical ontology?. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science [Internet]. 2003;34(2):431-442. Publisher's Version 2003c
Arabatzis T. Can a Historian of Science be a Scientific Realist?. Philosophy of Science [Internet]. 2001;68(3):S531-S541. Publisher's VersionAbstract
In this paper I address some of the problems that the historical development of science poses for a realist and discuss whether a realist construal of scientific activity is conducive to historiographical practice. First, I discuss, by means of historical examples, Ian Hacking's defense of entity realism. Second, I try to show, drawing on Kuhn's recent work on incommensurability, that the realism problem is relevant to historiography and that a realist position entails a particular historiographical strategy, which faces problems. Finally, I suggest that for historiographical purposes an agnostic attitude with respect to scientific theories and unobservable entities is the most appropriate.
Arabatzis T. The Zeeman Effect and the Discovery of the Electron. In: J. Z. Buchwald and A. Warwick (eds.), Histories of the Electron: the Birth of Microphysics. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press; 2001. pp. 171-194. Publisher's Version 2001b
<em>Φιλοσοφία της Επιστήμης</em>
Αναπολιτάνος Δ, Αραμπατζής Θ, Καρακώστας Β, Κιντή Β. Φιλοσοφία της Επιστήμης. Πάτρα: Ελληνικό Ανοικτό Πανεπιστήμιο; 2001. Publisher's Version
Αραμπατζής Θ. Ιστορία της επιστήμης και σχετικισμός. Νεύσις. 2000;9:75-93. 2000
<em>Ιστορία των Επιστημών και της Τεχνολογίας</em>
Αραμπατζής Θ, Γαβρόγλου Κ, Διαλέτης Δ, Χριστιανίδης Γ, Κανδεράκης Ν, Βερνίκος Σ. Ιστορία των Επιστημών και της Τεχνολογίας. Αθήνα: Οργανισμός Εκδόσεως Διδακτικών Βιβλίων; 1999. Publisher's Version
Arabatzis T. How the Electrons Spend their Leisure Time: Philosophical Reflections on a Controversy between Chemists and Physicists. In: P. Janich and N. Psarros (eds.), The Autonomy of Chemistry: 3rd Erlenmeyer-Colloquy for the Philosophy of Chemistry. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann; 1998. pp. 149-159. Publisher's Version 1998
Arabatzis T, Gavroglu K. The chemists’ electron. European Journal of Physics [Internet]. 1997;18(3):150-163. Publisher's VersionAbstract
This paper narrates the way chemists have been using the electron to account for one of the most intriguing problems, namely the bonding of two neutral atoms to form a molecule. The chemists' attempts to account for the mechanism of the homopolar bond, first in the context of the old quantum theory and after 1926 in the context of wave mechanics, brought the specter of reductionism to physics. We argue that the chemists' successful appropriation of the electron strengthened, first, the autonomy of physical chemistry and, then, of quantum chemistry with respect to physics.
Arabatzis T. Rethinking the 'Discovery' of the Electron. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics [Internet]. 1996;27(4):405-435. Publisher's Version 1996a
Αραμπατζής Θ. Σκέψεις για την ιστοριογραφία των επιστημονικών ανακαλύψεων: η περίπτωση του ηλεκτρονίου. Νεύσις [Internet]. 1996;5:33-53. Publisher's Version 1996b
Arabatzis T. Rational versus sociological reductionism: Imre Lakatos and the Edinburgh school. In: K. Gavroglu et al. (eds.), Trends in the Historiography of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer; 1994. pp. 177-192. Publisher's Version 1994
Arabatzis T. The discovery of the Zeeman effect: A case study of the interplay between theory and experiment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science [Internet]. 1992;23(3):365-388. Publisher's Version 1992