This paper examines the lessons learned from the IsraelHezbollah war at a political and military level. It demonstrates the political benefits for Israel in security terms, and its military weak points. It also unveils how Iran and Syria influence the Middle East geostrategic subsystem and the Lebanon case, and suggests that a US attack against Iran is not realistic. It draws on valid evidence and statements by political figures from all involved parties.
The Lebanon II war required the utmost attention, in foreign policy terms, from both Greece and Cyprus. This is because the conflict between Israel and Lebanon resulted in obvious dangers for the flaring up of all the national-state and ethnic actors in the region.
Saddam Hussein’s execution on Saturday December 31, 2006 and its broadcast over the internet in the form of video footage “leaked” by one of the bystanders constitutes a milestone of important geostrategic developments in the Middle East, mainly as a multiplier of the Shia-Sunni tension, between the followers of Moktanta al Sadr and the Sunnis, between the Shiites of Tehran and the Lebanese Muslims (Shiites and Sunnis). The execution also triggered a chain reaction of the Kurdish ethnic pockets in the area, starting with Iraqi Kurdistan. This reaction engages Turkey in the issue of geostrategic reshuffling in the area and provides its military regime with the opportunity to use this threat to achieve EU tolerance as regards the country’s accession process without having to implement the necessary adjustments stipulated by the “acquis communautaire” and without trying to clear the “Cyprus hurdle” in the course of the entry talks. Greece and Cyprus must adopt a coordinated approach at all levels to deal with this situation, in which even “hot conflict provocations” by Turkey against Greece, but also an increase of pressure from across the Atlantic directed against Levkosia and Athens, cannot be ruled out.
A democratic European Turkey, that endorses the acquis communautaire and the European political culture as that has evolved over the last 50 years is not considered by Greece as a security threat. However, certain forms of conduct on the part of our neighbor and NATO ally cause serious concern to Athens and the Greek people, which determines the approach of the Greek government towards Greek-Turkish relations.
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Turkish Studies and Modern Asian Studies. (+30) 210.368.9579 4 Dragatsaniou Str. 10559, Athens. firstname.lastname@example.org