Concerning the present situation we must bear into mind the following: A) No external mediation can replace the interested parties in a recommencement of talks for a jointly accepted solution in the Cyprus Issue. B) The Turkish occupation troops must withdraw from the Island shortly and certainly before the implementation of the new solution. C) The last wave of Turkish settlers must return to Turkish territories, where it originally came from. D) The complete demilitarization of the Island and its accession to NATO, as the unique reliable figure of regional and international security. This means that Ankara can no longer promote claims of “insecurity” for the Turkish population of the Island. Furthermore it means that the “Sovereign British Bases” have no place in Cyprus. E) In order for all this to be achieved, the government of Athens must not pressure in any way the legitimate Government of the Republic of Cyprus of Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos and it must allow as it has already done in the case or the April 4th Referendum, the Cypriot people to express freely and without bias its opinion. The line of action adopted by Mr. Karamanlis and Mr. Molyviatis in this case must be continued. On the other hand, the talks with the legitimate Cypriot government of the now European Republic of Cyprus for its accession to NATO must begin. This will constitute the most important key-point of the century-old Cyprus Issue.
The post Arafat era of the Palestinian issue is characterized by two different possible paths: 1) The path of conflict between opposite groups of PLO, i.e. Hamas (which is more widely accepted by people than Fatah), Hezbollah as well as other “Arafatian” tendencies which will lead the Palestinian case to disaster, and 2) The desired path of finding a “successor” to Arafat, who will be accepted as a negotiator by the other side that is the Israeli and, principally, the American one. In that case, acceptance by the American side is far more important than that by the Israeli government, as it will help address the Palestinian claims more fully. As things have evolved according to what was predicted, Mahmoud Abbas (better known under his PLO name as Abu Mazen) is Arafat’s successor and is considered by the Israelis as a tough but honest negotiator; he is also accepted by the Americans. Certainly, in both cases, it is reasonable that diplomatic references between the two parties will be defined in the Oslo Agreement Ι and ΙΙ and in the “Road Map”, since the aforementioned Agreement has been accepted by i) the American arbitration and the Quartet ii) the Israeli side and iii) the Palestinian side. Moreover, iv) it bears the seal of Arafat, which provides the text with moral and political vindication for the Palestinians and, therefore, with greater flexibility for legitimate national maneuvers to his successor. In both cases, the period within which commonly accepted conclusions may be reached, can be no less than 5 years.
The recent activity of the events over the project has been handled by the experts with restraint. The negotiations between the Russian President Putin and the Greek Prime Minister Mr. Karamanlis that took place in Moscow in December 2004 did not make the situation over the future of the project any clearer. We cannot deny that among many Bosporus bypassing projects, it is the Bourgas-Alexandroupolis project that is the most advantageous for Russia from the geopolitical point of view. And it is logical to assume that the Russian authorities will be guided by the geopolitical interests of the country, while making a decision on overcoming the Bosporus deadlock. The same interests will no doubt become the decisive ones for the policy of the oil companies that are likely to participate in the project. In any case, we should take into account that Russian oil exports are almost completely controlled by the government, and the decision on choosing new export routes is its exclusive prerogative. Thus, the “last word” on the future of Bourgas-Alexandroupolis will be said by the Russian president. The project could be also promoted by the European Union, and it will be in line with the economic and political interests of the EU, that in the future it can confront the situation when Turkey will control oil traffic from the Caspian region to Europe. However, until now there has not been any essential reaction from the EU authorities, and the European Committee on Transport, Energy and Communications has concentrated its attention on the disputable Ukrainian route Odessa-Brody.
This paper presents a geopolitical approach to the phenomenon of terrorism, dealing mainly with its geo-economic, geostrategic and geo-cultural aspects. Aiming to establish an analytical basis for comprehending and countering the root causes of terrorism, it builds upon the global instability framework theorem as influenced by the trends of current globalisation processes, such as the issues of energy and energy resources, globalisation and the rapid technological changes, the world’s demographics and global climate changes. The broad stability concept is adopted as a substitute model for the traditional power and control maxim, with special emphasis on the so-called socially acceptable models and rates of development.
The ever-increasing mobility in Greece’s geopolitical neighborhood calls for an evaluation and re-design of the existing crisis management mechanism, with a long-term perspective. Due to the fact that the mechanism in question is based on the functioning of the Governmental Council on Foreign and Defence Matters (KYSEA), this evaluation is focused on the Council’s current structure and on its weaknesses.
Generally speaking, the drafting of a Defense Doctrine follows the drafting and adoption, on the part of a government, of a National Security Policy, which includes the statement of the country’s Defense Policy and, consequently, its Defense Doctrine. In order to clarify the theoretical premises of the aims underlying the drafting of the Defense Doctrine, a set of definitions must be presented in detail. It should be stressed that this framework proposal, by its very nature, cannot be considered to imply a detailed presentation of the country’s New Defense Doctrine. It simply aims to outline the essential parameters which, in the eyes of its authors, should be considered by the country’s political leadership so that the final drafting of this Chart will be both complete and effective in view of protecting our national interest in all its aspects.
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Turkish Studies and Modern Asian Studies. (+30) 210.368.9579 4 Dragatsaniou Str. 10559, Athens. email@example.com